IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-2075
Filed October 14, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEYAWNA LEANETT TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals her convictions for driving while barred and selling her
services in a sex act. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Joseph A. Fraioli, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephen H. Holmes, County Attorney, and Shean Fletchall, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., McDonald, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Defendant Deyawna Taylor appeals her convictions for driving while
barred and selling her services in a sex act, claiming they should be dismissed
on speedy trial grounds. Taylor waived her right to a speedy trial when she
entered into a proffer agreement with the State after the ninety-day speedy trial
deadline had passed and she was aware the criminal proceedings against her
would be postponed until after she testified in the trial of a codefendant. We
preserve for possible postconviction proceedings her claim of ineffective
assistance due to counsel’s failure to promptly file a motion to dismiss on speedy
trial grounds. We affirm Taylor’s convictions.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
The State filed a trial information in Story County on July 28, 2014,
charging Taylor with driving while barred, in violation of Iowa Code section
321.561 (2013), an aggravated misdemeanor, and selling her services in a sex
act, in violation of section 725.1, an aggravated misdemeanor.
Taylor’s arraignment was scheduled for August 11, 2014, but she did not
appear, and a warrant was issued for her arrest. No further action occurred in
the case until October 29, 2014, when the State requested that Taylor be
transported from the Mitchellville Correctional Facility in order to appear for
arraignment.1 Taylor filed a written arraignment on November 12, 2014.
1
On July 29, 2014, the day after the trial information was filed in this case, Taylor was
arrested in Polk County. At the time of her scheduled arraignment in Story County, she
was in custody in Polk County. She was subsequently transferred from the Polk County
jail to the Mitchellville Correctional Facility.
3
On the same day, November 12, 2014, Taylor also entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding in which she agreed to cooperate and testify in
the trial of a codefendant, which was expected to take place within a few months,
and in exchange certain concessions would be made by the State.2 At the
proffer meeting, defense counsel asked if Taylor could go ahead and file guilty
pleas to two simple misdemeanors at that time, with the understanding the State
would dismiss the charges for aggravated misdemeanors. The prosecutor
requested Taylor not file the guilty pleas until after she had testified at the
codefendant’s trial because the testimony was an integral part of the agreement.
At the time the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, it was clear to all the
parties that the criminal prosecution against Taylor would remain pending until
after she had testified in the codefendant’s trial, which was expected to take
place in a few months.
On December 8, 2014, Taylor filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a
speedy trial. She argued she had not been tried within ninety days after the trial
information was filed, as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33. The
State claimed Taylor waived her right to a speedy trial by entering into the
Memorandum of Understanding. It also asserted that by seeking dismissal
based on speedy trial grounds, Taylor violated the terms of the agreement.
After a hearing the court denied the motion to dismiss, stating:
2
The Memorandum of Understanding is not included in the record. A transcript was
prepared from the meeting when the agreement was signed. Although the transcript as
a whole is also not part of the record in this case, parts of the transcript were read into
the record at the hearing on Taylor’s motion to dismiss and therefore provide some
evidence of the terms of the agreement and the matters discussed at the proffer
meeting.
4
I think what the file here really shows it that even though a
speedy trial had maybe technically ran on the 25th of October, the
defendant acquiesced to that waiver of speedy trial when she
signed a proffer on November 12 of 2014. There are multiple
reasons why maybe she didn’t want to file a motion to dismiss for
speedy trial at that time. I’m not going to second guess counsel’s
decision. It might have been that counsel wasn’t for sure that the
motion to dismiss would be granted for lack of speedy trial. She
wanted to take advantage of the plea agreement. There was lots of
discussion it sounds like about the delay, so the defendant and her
attorney knew there would be a delay if she signed the proffer, and
she signed the proffer anyway without signing—or without filing a
motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial or even discussing that.
Now, the defendant filed her motion to dismiss for lack of
speedy trial on December 8th of 2014. So I think what happened
was she waived speedy trial on November 12 of 2014, and
acquiesced to going past the speedy trial date before that by
signing the proffer.
Taylor waived her right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court
based upon the minutes of evidence. The court found her guilty of driving while
barred and selling her services in a sex act. She was sentenced to two years in
prison on each charge, to be served consecutively. Taylor now appeals, claiming
the charges against her should have been dismissed on speedy trial grounds.
II. Speedy Trial
A. Taylor contends the district court abused its discretion in denying
her motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. She claims the court erred by
finding she had waived her right to a speedy trial by entering into the
Memorandum of Understanding. Taylor points out that when she entered into
the agreement, on November 12, 2014, the ninety-day speedy trial period had
already expired on October 26, 2014. She argues the terms of the agreement
were not sufficient to waive her speedy trial rights because the speedy trial
deadline had expired before she entered into the agreement.
5
Our review is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Miller, 637
N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). “The trial court’s discretion to avoid dismissal . . .
is circumscribed by the limited exceptions to the rule’s mandate.” Id. Ultimately,
then, the issue is whether the district court abused its limited discretion. Id.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be
brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court
must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the
contrary be shown.
Criminal charges should be dismissed if the speedy trial deadlines have been
surpassed “unless the defendant has waived speedy trial, the delay is
attributable to the defendant, or other ‘good cause’ exists for the delay.” State v.
Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). The concept of “good cause” focuses
on only one factor—the reason for the delay. Id. at 205.
Even when a person does not expressly waive the right to a speedy trial,
the person may impliedly waive the right by delaying trial, such as filing a motion
to continue. See State v. LeFlore, 308 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Iowa 1981). Also, “a
defendant may not actively, or passively, participate in the events which delay his
or her trial and then later take advantage of that delay to terminate the
prosecution.” State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). At the
time Taylor entered into the agreement, she was aware the trial would be further
delayed until after the trial of her codefendant, thus impliedly waiving her right to
a speedy trial by agreeing to a delay in the proceedings.
When a person enters a guilty plea the person waives all challenges to the
charge based on speedy trial claims. See State v. McGee, 211 N.W.2d 267, 268
6
(Iowa 1973) (“We hold that defendant waived delay in trial by pleading guilty.”);
see also State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (stating a guilty
plea waives challenges to a charge based on statute-of-limitations or speedy
indictment grounds). Here, Taylor was prepared to file guilty pleas on November
12, 2014, which shows she was willing to waive her speedy trial objections at that
time.
Moreover, where a delay is the result of negotiations between the
defendant and the State, there may be good cause for the delay. Ruiz, 496
N.W.2d at 792; see also State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Iowa Ct. App.
1984) (finding one factor supporting good cause for delay was defendant’s
decision not to participate in further plea negotiations). The prosecutor argued
Taylor was involved in discussions before she entered into the agreement to
testify against her codefendant, which would provide good cause for at least part
of the delay.
We find the district court did not err in concluding, “the defendant
acquiesced to that waiver of speedy trial when she signed a proffer on November
12 of 2014.” In addition, the court did not err in finding Taylor “acquiesced to
going past the speedy trial date before that by signing the proffer.”
B. On appeal, Taylor has presented a proposal for a bright-line rule for
postexpiration waiver of speedy trial rights. She asserts that after the speedy
trial deadline has passed the State should be required to establish the defendant
received a benefit in exchange for waiving the violation of the speedy trial rights.
This issue was not raised before the district court, and we conclude it has not
been preserved for our review. See State v. Wilson, 573 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa
7
1998) (stating issues are preserved when they are considered and ruled upon by
the district court).
III. Ineffective Assistance
A. Taylor asserts that if we find her motion for dismissal on speedy
trial grounds was not timely because it was raised after the ninety-day speedy
trial deadline had passed, this was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We
have not determined Taylor’s motion for speedy trial was untimely but considered
her speedy trial claim on the merits. We therefore do not address her claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
B. Taylor also claims she received ineffective assistance because
defense counsel did not promptly file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds
once the ninety-day speedy trial deadline passed. Generally, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are considered in postconviction relief
proceedings. State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2015). We resolve such
claims on direct appeal only if the record is adequate to address the claim. Id.
We conclude the record is not adequate to address this issue on direct appeal.
We determine the issue should be preserved for possible postconviction
proceedings.
AFFIRMED.