J-S44010-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NICKIE ROBERT LOGAN
Appellant No. 1220 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 23, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004530-2011
CP-02-CR-0004829-2011
CP-02-CR-0006403-2011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
Appellant Nickie Robert Logan appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition
filed for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 We
affirm.
On February 1, 2012, a jury convicted Appellant of: fleeing or
attempting to elude police,2 receiving stolen property,3 and two counts of
____________________________________________
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a).
J-S44010-15
recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”)4 at CP-02-CR-00004530-
2011 (“Docket No. 4530”);5 fleeing or attempting to allude police, receiving
stolen property, unauthorized use of an automobile,6 resisting arrest or other
law enforcement,7 and accident involving damage to attended vehicle 8 at CP-
02-CR-0004829-2011 (“Docket No. 4829”);9 and receiving stolen property,
criminal mischief,10 and two counts of theft by unlawful taking,11 at CP-02-
CR-0006403-2011 (“Docket No. 6403”).12, 13
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
5
These convictions stemmed from Appellant’s theft of a Buick Century on
March 31, 2011.
6
18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a).
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
8
75 Pa.C.S. § 3743.
9
These convictions stemmed from Appellant’s theft of a Jeep Cherokee on
January 28, 2011.
10
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(2).
11
18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
12
Police filed this criminal complaint against Appellant for his involvement in
the theft of eight vehicles with damaged steering columns and doors that
were stolen in January and March of 2011, including the Buick Century and
the Jeep Cherokee. One conviction of theft by unlawful taking at this
criminal information stemmed from Appellant’s theft of the Jeep Cherokee.
All other convictions at this criminal information stemmed from Appellant’s
theft of a Pontiac Grand Am.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2-
J-S44010-15
On March 19, 2012, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of eight (8) to seventeen (17) years’ incarceration, plus two years’
probation.14 On March 28, 2012, Appellant filed post-sentence motions,
which the court denied the next day. On April 26, 2012, Appellant filed a
notice of appeal. After complying with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Appellant filed a
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
13
The jury acquitted Appellant of charges of escape, possessing instruments
of crime, aggravated assault, theft of a motor vehicle, two charges of
loitering and prowling, two additional charges of theft by unlawful taking (for
the Buick Century and a Chevrolet Blazer), and an additional charge of
receiving stolen property (for the Chevrolet Blazer).
14
At Docket No. 4530, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms
of twelve (12) to thirty-six (36) months of incarceration for fleeing or
attempting to elude police, (18) to thirty-six (36) months of incarceration for
receiving stolen property and six (6) to twelve (12) months of incarceration
for each of his REAP convictions. The court imposed restitution in that case
of $1,250.00.
At Docket No. 4829, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of
eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months of incarceration for fleeing or
attempting to allude police, eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months of
incarceration for receiving stolen property, and two (2) years of probation
for resisting arrest or other law enforcement. The court also imposed a
$2,000.00 fine for an accident involving damage to a vehicle and no further
penalty for unauthorized use of an automobile. The court imposed
restitution in that case of $1,542.20.
At Docket No. 6403, the court sentenced Appellant to eighteen (18) to
thirty-six (36) months of incarceration for each of his theft by unlawful
taking convictions, the first of which it imposed concurrently with his
sentence at Docket No. 4829 for receiving stolen property, and the second of
which it imposed consecutively with his other sentences. The court imposed
no further penalties for Appellant’s remaining convictions and found
restitution in this case to be $3,122.56.
-3-
J-S44010-15
notice of discontinuance of action on November 1, 2012, and did not pursue
a direct appeal with this Court.
On February 4, 2013, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.15
The court appointed counsel who filed five motions for an extension of time
to file an amended PCRA petition. On October 29, 2013, Appellant filed a
notice of his intent to proceed pro se. On January 10, 2014, the PCRA court
conducted a Grazier16 hearing. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s request
to proceed pro se on January 13, 2014. On June 4, 2014, the PCRA court
filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. On June 24, 2014, the PCRA
court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal.17 The next day, the PCRA court ordered
____________________________________________
15
Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA petition, which he dated March 26,
2013, the same day Richard J. Narvin, Esq. entered his appearance for
Appellant. Although the amended petition was not docketed, it became part
of the record on August 26, 2015, when the court granted Appellant’s
motion to supplement the record. The PCRA court refers to Appellant’s
amended PCRA petition in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, and we shall
consider Appellant’s issues contained therein preserved for appellate review.
16
Commonwealth v.Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.1998).
17
Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed with the court until July
28, 2014, we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal timely because he mailed it
from prison on July 22, 2014. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931
A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.Super.2007) (“Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, we
deem a document filed on the day it is placed in the hands of prison
authorities for mailing.”).
-4-
J-S44010-15
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and
he timely complied on August 14, 2014.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. CAN SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BE ESTABLISHED
WITHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH SHOWING A NEXUS OF
LIABILITY?
2. DID PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL COUNSEL RENDER INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE CAUSING [APPELLANT] PREJUDICE IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND TO BE CONVICTED OF CRIMES
HE HAS NOT COMMITTED?
3. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT MISCONDUCT BY
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION OF THE SAME CRIME IN
DIFFERENT CRIMINAL INFORMATION(S), AND DID THE
TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ALLOWING [APPELLANT]
TO BE PROSECUTED FOR CRIME NOT CHARGED, AND DID
THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY FAILING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY?
4. DID THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY KNOWINGLY USE FALSE
TESTIMONY AND FABRICATED EVIDENCE TO INFECT THE
JURY TRIAL WITH UNFAIRNESS AND CAUSE MR. LOGAN
TO BE CONVICTED OF CRIMES HE DID NOT COMMIT?
5. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSE SENTENCE(S) THAT
VIOLATED [APPELLANT’S] RIGHT UNDER DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, AND ARE THE SENTENCES OF RESTITUTION
ERRONEOUS AND UNSUPPORTED BY PROOF OF ACTUAL
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OWNED BY COMMONWEALTH, AND
ARE THE SENTENCES OF RESTITUTION A DOUBLE COUNT
OF THE SAME RESTITUTION ALREADY IMPOSED?
6. DID THE P.C.R.A. COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR(S) IN IT’S REVIEW OF THE P.C.R.A. AND FIRST
AMENDED P.C.R.A. PETITION AND, SHOULD THIS MATTER
BE REMANDED FOR AN [EVIDENTIARY] HEARING?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
-5-
J-S44010-15
Our well-settled standard of review for orders denying PCRA relief is
“to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by
the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings
will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the
certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-192
(Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence was the
result of one or more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States which, in the circumstances of the particular
case, so undermined the truth-determining process that
no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have
taken place.
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication
of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the
circumstances make it likely that the inducement
caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner
is innocent.
(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials
of the petitioner’s right of appeal where a meritorious
appealable issue existed and was properly preserved in
the trial court.
(v) Deleted.
(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of
exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become
-6-
J-S44010-15
available and would have changed the outcome of the
trial if it had been introduced.
(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the
lawful maximum.
(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).
In his first argument, Appellant argues the trial court had no subject
matter jurisdiction over him. In his pro se brief, he suggests that because
the police and prosecutors did not own the stolen vehicles, they have failed
to establish a “nexus of liability” with Appellant, and that the Commonwealth
lacked standing to bring an action against him. See Appellant’s Brief at 7-
10. He concludes that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and that his
conviction and sentence must be vacated. Appellant is incorrect.
Generally, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Roney,
79 A.3d 595, 611 (Pa.2013) cert. denied sub nom. Roney v. Pennsylvania,
___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 56, 190 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 275 (Pa.2011)). However, “[a]n
objection to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived; it may
be raised at any stage in the proceedings by the parties or by a court in its
own motion.” Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa.1974). An
issue regarding the jurisdiction of the trial court lies within the scope of the
PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(viii).
-7-
J-S44010-15
Here, Appellant did not raise his subject matter jurisdiction issue in his
amended PCRA petition, but instead raised the issue for the first time on
appeal. Because subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, this
issue is properly before this Court; however, it merits no relief.
“[T]he two requirements for subject matter jurisdiction as it relates to
criminal defendants [are] the competency of the court to hear the case, and
the provision of formal notice to the defendant of the crimes charged in
compliance with the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v.
Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 210 (Pa.2007). “[T]he courts of common pleas have
statewide jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Crimes Code.” Id. See
also 42 Pa.C.S. § 931. “The Commonwealth is the party plaintiff in a
criminal prosecution. The district attorney’s function is to represent the
Commonwealth in these proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Jury, 636 A.2d
164, 171, (Pa.Super.1993), appeal denied, 644 A.2d 733 (Pa.1994) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa.Super.1982)).
Here, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas was competent to
hear Appellant’s criminal case. Appellant was given notice of the crimes with
which he was charged at Docket Nos. 4530, 4829, and 6403. Because the
district attorney represents the Commonwealth, who is the party plaintiff in
a criminal prosecution, Appellant’s argument that the district attorney and
-8-
J-S44010-15
police lacked standing because they did not own the stolen vehicles is devoid
of merit.
In his second issue, Appellant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to conduct pre-trial discovery and discover double jeopardy
violations, for failing to present an alibi defense, for failing to file a motion in
limine to exclude evidence, and for erroneously advising him not to testify. 18
This Court follows the Pierce19 test adopted by our Supreme Court to
review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
When a petitioner alleges trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in
a PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place. We have
interpreted this provision in the PCRA to mean that the
petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of counsel’s
ineffectiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and
(3) that the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner-i.e.,
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error
of counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. We presume that counsel is effective, and
it is the burden of Appellant to show otherwise.
____________________________________________
18
“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro
se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”
Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super.2005). We will
address only the allegations of ineffectiveness that we can decipher that he
raised in his first amended PCRA petition. See Roney, supra.
19
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
-9-
J-S44010-15
Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal
denied, 889 A.2d 87 (Pa.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1129, 126 S.Ct 2029,
164 L.Ed.2d 782 (2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The
petitioner bears the burden of proving all three prongs of this test.
Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 A.2d 312, 319-320 (Pa.2001). “If an
appellant fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any of the
Pierce prongs, the Court need not address the remaining prongs of the
test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 979 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.Super.2009),
appeal denied, 990 A.2d 727 (Pa.2010) (citation omitted).
First, Appellant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
conduct a pre-trial investigation, review discovery material, realize a double
jeopardy violation existed, and get the charges against him dismissed. He
claims that if counsel had carefully reviewed the criminal informations, he
would have realized Appellant was charged twice with stealing the same
cars. Further, he avers that a more thorough investigation would have
proven he did not steal any of the vehicles, and his counsel’s failure to get
the charges against him dismissed, or alternately, to win his case,
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Appellant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails the Pierce
test because it lacks arguable merit. Nothing in the record indicates trial
counsel failed to conduct a pre-trial investigation or review discovery
material. Trial counsel displayed a detailed knowledge of Appellant’s case as
- 10 -
J-S44010-15
he cross-examined all witnesses. See N.T., 1/30/12, at 43-52 (questioning
Officer Zawischa about lighting conditions and initial description of Appellant
and comparing Appellant’s actual appearance), 98-101 (questioning Officer
Myers about whether Appellant was wearing gloves when he was arrested
and pointing out discrepancies between his in-court testimony and his
description in the original police criminal complaint), 129-130 (questioning
Detective Moriarity about the lack of fingerprints or DNA on any of the stolen
vehicles). Further, there was no double jeopardy violation to discover.
The double jeopardy clause provides: “No person shall … be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. V. “For double jeopardy purposes, it is not enough that the two
offenses be part of the same episode; double jeopardy principles bar double
prosecution only for a single offense.” Commonwealth v. Downs, 575,
483 A.2d 884, 887 (Pa.Super.1984). “To determine whether a defendant’s
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense has been
violated, this Commonwealth applies the test set forth in Blockburger v.
U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).” Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa.Super.2010) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Beckwith, 674 A.2d 276, 279 (Pa.Super.1996)). This test provides:
In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution
contexts, […] where the two offenses for which the
defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the “same-
elements” test, the double jeopardy bar applies. The
same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the
“Blockburger” test, inquires whether each offense
- 11 -
J-S44010-15
contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they
are the “same offence” and double jeopardy bars
additional punishment and successive prosecution.
Id. (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849,
125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)).
Police issued three criminal complaints against Appellant for the many
crimes he committed. Appellant is correct the criminal complaint at 6403
refers to his theft of eight vehicles, including the theft of the Buick Century
and the theft of the Jeep Cherokee. However, Appellant was not charged
twice with the same crimes. Regarding the Jeep Cherokee, he was charged
and convicted of fleeing or attempting to allude police, receiving stolen
property, unauthorized use of an automobile, resisting arrest or other law
enforcement, and accident involving damage to vehicle at Docket No. 4829,
and theft by unlawful taking at Docket No. 6403. Each of these crimes has
different elements. His allegation that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to get the charges against him dismissed is devoid of merit because he was
not charged twice with the same crimes.
Next, he contends counsel was ineffective for failing to present an alibi
defense. Specifically, he complains that his parole agent, Michael Kotcho,
would have testified that he was with Appellant on January 28, 2011, six to
seven hours after one of the alleged thefts and that Appellant told him, at
that time, that he was at his residence at the time of the theft. Again,
Appellant’s argument is devoid of merit.
- 12 -
J-S44010-15
An alibi defense is “a defense that places the defendant at the relevant
time in a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom
as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” Commonwealth
v. Kolenda, 676 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa.1996) (internal citations omitted).
“The alibi defense, either standing alone or together with other evidence,
may be sufficient to leave in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt which,
without it, might not otherwise exist.” Id.
Here, Appellant’s parole officer’s testimony would not have removed
Appellant from the scene of the crimes so as to render it impossible for him
to be the guilty party. It may have established where he was after one of
the car thefts, but that would not have affected where he was during the
crime(s) for which he was convicted.
Further, his parole officer could not have testified about where
Appellant told him that he was during the crime, because the testimony
would have been impermissible hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Kuder,
62 A.3d 1038, 1055 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416
(Pa.2015) (“hearsay is inadmissible, because such evidence lacks
guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to our system of jurisprudence”);
Pa.R.E. 802.
Next, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion in limine to exclude evidence, or to object to the introduction of
evidence. Appellant avers that the jacket found in the Jeep Cherokee and
- 13 -
J-S44010-15
the receipt in the pocket did not belong to him, and the prosecution had no
reason to introduce them into evidence. He claims his counsel’s failure to
exclude the prejudicial evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
that entitles him to a new trial. We disagree.
Even if Appellant’s claim had merit, and the court excluded the
evidence, Appellant cannot prove the introduction of the jacket and receipt
into evidence was prejudicial, considering the overwhelming amount of other
evidence against him.
Officer Lee Myers testified that he arrested Appellant after Appellant
drove a stolen Buick Century, attempted to flee from a marked police vehicle
with its emergency lights activated, wrecked two other vehicles, and
attempted to run from police on foot. N.T., 1/30-2/1/12, at 85-89. Officer
Myers observed that the Buick’s passenger window and steering column
were broken and that the car was running without a key. Id. at 91. Officer
Robert Pedley testified that a search incident to arrest revealed two
screwdrivers in Appellant’s pants pockets. Id. at 106. Sergeant Ralf
Zawischa identified Appellant as the person he had attempted to arrest after
Appellant fled from his marked police vehicle in a stolen Jeep Cherokee, then
fled on foot after punching Sergeant Zawischa in the face. Id. at 32-36.
The Jeep Cherokee also had a smashed door and broken steering column,
and it was running without a key. Id. at 38. Detective Daniel Soroczak
- 14 -
J-S44010-15
testified that the condition of these cars was the same as the condition of
two other stolen vehicles. Id. at 139-140.
Based on the testimony presented in court against Appellant, the
introduction of the jacket and the receipt into evidence did not change the
outcome of the trial. Because Appellant fails to plead and prove the third
prong of the Pierce test, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
without merit.
Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
erroneously advising him not to testify. Again, his allegation merits no
relief.
“Claims alleging ineffectiveness of counsel premised on allegations that
trial counsel’s actions interfered with an accused’s right to testify require a
defendant to prove either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or
that counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing
and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.” Commonwealth v.
Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 660 (Pa.2009) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
The trial court conducted a colloquy regarding Appellant’s decision not
to testify on his behalf.
THE COURT: Now, you have had a full opportunity to
speak with [DEFENSE COUNSEL], not just in the last half
an hour here, but up to and preparing for trial and
throughout the course of the trial; is that correct?
- 15 -
J-S44010-15
[APPELLANT]: Yeah. I’ve had various opportunities in the
bullpen to speak with him, but he hasn’t been to the jail to
visit me; but outside of that, we’ve been in communication
with one another.
THE COURT: So are you satisfied today with the services
that he’s provided to you?
[APPELLANT]: At this point we have a few discrepancies
about issues, but we’re doing good. You know, he’s fairly
trying to do the best he can.
THE COURT: Okay. Basically he has spoken to you about
your rights as a defendant in a criminal trial?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And he’s explained to you that as a
defendant in a criminal trial, you have absolutely no
obligation whatsoever to testify. Is that correct?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And you understand that the burden of proof
remains at all times on the Commonwealth and that you as
a defendant need do nothing.
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Likewise, however, you have the absolute
right to testify if you choose to. And you’ve discussed this
with [defense counsel]?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Understand that if you do testify, you testify
under oath and subject to cross-examination.
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And having discussed your right to testify or
your right to remain silent with [defense counsel], have
you reached a decision whether or not you wish to testify
in this this case?
- 16 -
J-S44010-15
* * *
[APPELLANT]: I will not testify.
* * *
[APPELLANT]: I apologize. Yes. He discussed with me my
right to testify, and I’m giving that up right now.
N.T., 1/30/12, at 172-175.
Appellant’s trial counsel did not interfere with his right to testify;
rather, he discussed this right with Appellant. Appellant voluntarily gave up
his right to testify and cannot now claim he was deprived of it. Further, his
testimony would not have changed the outcome of his case. Thus, Appellant
failed to establish the underlying claim had merit and failed to establish
prejudice.
In his third and fifth issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the legality
of his sentence.
“In reviewing an illegal sentence claim, the issue is a question of law
and, as such, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de
novo.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super.2011),
appeal denied, 38 A.3d 487 (Pa.2011) (internal citations omitted).
“A court may entertain a challenge to the legality of the
sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the
claim. In the PCRA context, jurisdiction is tied to the filing
of a timely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Berry,
877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa.Super.2005) (en banc), appeal
denied, 917 A.2d 844 ([Pa.]2007). “A sentence is illegal
where a statute bars the court from imposing that
- 17 -
J-S44010-15
sentence” or where the sentence subjects a defendant to
double jeopardy. Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 592 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal
denied, 944 A.2d 756 (Pa.2008).
First, Appellant claims that he was punished twice for the same
offense. However, as discussed previously, although he was charged at
three different criminal informations, he was not charged twice for the same
crime. Because each of his charges and convictions was based on a
separate crime, he was not subjected to double jeopardy.
Next, Appellant argues that he was prosecuted for a crime with which
he was not charged, and that he did not receive notice he would be charged
with the crime of theft by receiving stolen property. Again, his argument
lacks merit. Police filed a criminal complaint against Appellant on April 28,
2011, charging him with six counts of receiving stolen property.
Next, Appellant contends his sentences of restitution were illegal. He
seems to argue that because the Commonwealth did not present
photographic evidence of the damaged vehicles, there was no “nexus of
liability” between himself and the damage done to the cars, which makes the
restitution unsupported. Appellant’s Brief at 39-40. His sentences of
restitution were legal.
We observe:
In the context of criminal proceedings, an order of
“restitution is not simply an award of damages, but,
rather, a sentence.” Commonwealth v. C.L., 963 A.2d
- 18 -
J-S44010-15
489, 494 (Pa.Super.2008). An appeal from an order of
restitution based upon a claim that a restitution order is
unsupported by the record challenges the legality, rather
than the discretionary aspects, of sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Redman, 864 A.2d 566, 569
(Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 875 A.2d 1074
([Pa.]2005).
Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771-72 (Pa.Super.2012).
The relevant statute on restitution provides, in pertinent part:
§ 1106. Restitution for injuries to person or property
(a) General rule.--Upon conviction for any crime wherein
property has been stolen, converted or otherwise
unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as
a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered
personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the
offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition
to the punishment prescribed therefor.
* * *
(c) Mandatory restitution.—
* * *
(2) At the time of sentencing the court shall specify the
amount and method of restitution. In determining the
amount and method of restitution, the court:
(i) Shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the
victim, the victim’s request for restitution as
presented to the district attorney in accordance with
paragraph (4) and such other matters as it deems
appropriate.
* * *
(4) (i) It shall be the responsibility of the district
attorneys of the respective counties to make a
recommendation to the court at or prior to the time
of sentencing as to the amount of restitution to be
- 19 -
J-S44010-15
ordered. This recommendation shall be based upon
information solicited by the district attorney and
received from the victim.
(ii) Where the district attorney has solicited
information from the victims as provided in
subparagraph (i) and has received no response, the
district attorney shall, based on other available
information, make a recommendation to the court
for restitution.
18 Pa.C.S. § 1106.
Here, the court imposed restitution for the damage Appellant caused
to the vehicles he stole in the amount of $1,250.00 at Docket No. 4530,
$1,542.20 at Docket No. 4829, and $3,122.56 at Docket No. 6403. At
sentencing, Appellant’s counsel stated: “[W]e don’t dispute that the damage
was done to those vehicles, and those are accurate reflections of the value.”
N.T., 3/19/12, at 5. The statute does not require photographic evidence.
Thus, Appellant stipulated to the restitution and his issue is meritless.
In his third and fifth issues, while still claiming to challenge the legality
of his sentence, Appellant also challenges the propriety of the trial court’s
jury instructions. Appellant claims the trial court impermissibly altered the
burden of proof by telling the jury it could find Appellant guilty of theft by
receiving stolen property if: “the defendant received, retained or disposed of
the property, either knowing that it had been stolen or believing that
it had probably been stolen.” Appellant’s Brief at 28 (quoting N.T., at
246). He also claims the trial court improperly instructed the jury when it
stated: “the Commonwealth has charged here that the crime the defendant
- 20 -
J-S44010-15
intended to commit with the screwdrivers, those being the instruments they
allege meet the standard for this count of receiving stolen property.”
Appellant’s Brief at 30 (quoting N.T., at 250). He claims this error caused
the jury to impermissibly convict him of receiving stolen property when it
acquitted him of possessing an instrument of crime. Unfortunately for
Appellant, challenges to a trial court’s jury instructions are not cognizable
under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). Accordingly, these claims fail.20
In his fourth issue, Appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct. He
claims the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony and fabricated items
as evidence “to infect the trial [] with unfairness” and to “shift the burden of
proof” to Appellant. Prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable under the
PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). Therefore, Appellant’s fourth claim fails.
____________________________________________
20
We note that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to these jury
instructions. The court properly instructed the jury on the crime of receiving
stolen property. N.T., 1/30-2/1/15, at 243-246. The court then gave the
jury proper instructions on possessing an instrument of crime. Id. at 250-
251. In its concluding sentence, however, the court misspoke and uttered
the phrase to which Appellant refers above, naming the count as “receiving
stolen property” rather than possessing an instrument of crime. Id. This,
however, was harmless error. The jury convicted Appellant of receiving
stolen property, but acquitted Appellant of possessing an instrument of
crime. The crime of receiving stolen property does not require possessing
an instrument of crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925. Therefore, despite Appellant’s
contention, the jury permissibly convicted him of receiving stolen property
even though it acquitted him of possessing an instrument of crime.
- 21 -
J-S44010-15
In his sixth and final issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred by
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s issues, and that its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion is not supported by the record. We disagree.
“A PCRA petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter
of right, but only where the petition presents genuine issues of material fact.
A PCRA court’s decision denying a claim without a hearing may only be
reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1094 (Pa.2012) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 852 A.2d 1168, 1180 (Pa.2004)).
Here, as previously discussed, Appellant’s amended PCRA petition does
not present an issue of material fact that would warrant an evidentiary
hearing. Thus, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA
court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015
- 22 -