[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15710 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 6, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00443-CR-1-JTC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT KNIGHT,
a.k.a. Robert E. Knight,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 6, 2010)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Knight appeals his 95-month, 17-day sentence, imposed at
resentencing, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court originally sentenced Knight to 120 months’
imprisonment on this charge, but on appeal, we vacated that sentence and
remanded for the district court to credit him for time served in relation to his state
court conviction for the related offense of escape, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.
See United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009). On remand,
the district court left the original sentence unaltered save for a 743-day credit,
which resulted in the sentence now at issue. In this appeal, Knight argues that his
revised 95-month, 17-day sentence was substantively unreasonable.1 After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which
“merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
351 (2007)).
In reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness, we consider the
“totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
1
On appeal, Knight acknowledges but does not challenge the increase of his sentence from
92 months and 19 days to 95 months and 17 days. Accordingly, he has abandoned any claim in this
respect. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
defendant abandoned claims not raised “plainly and prominently” in his initial brief).
2
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). This review is “deferential,” requiring us to determine
“whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of
sentencing as stated in section 3553(a).”2 United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,
788 (11th Cir. 2005). There is a “range of reasonable sentences from which the
district court may choose,” and a sentence within the guideline range is ordinarily
expected to be reasonable. Id.
“The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute our judgment
in weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832
(11th Cir. 2007) (quotation and brackets omitted). The district court need not
discuss each § 3553(a) factor. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Rather, “[t]he sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. We will remand for
resentencing only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the
2
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect
the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical
care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing
disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
3
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (citation and quotation omitted).
The burden is on the defendant to show that the sentence was unreasonable in light
of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Knight has not shown that his revised sentence was substantively
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. As the record shows,
the circumstances of his offense were accentuated by numerous aggravating
factors: not only did Knight possess a loaded gun, but he was armed while at a
public gathering, and tried to hide the gun from a police officer. When arrested, he
provided false information to police. Thereafter, Knight attempted to escape twice
-- the first attempt was unsuccessful, but led to the injury and hospitalization of a
police officer; the second attempt was successful, and Knight remained a fugitive
for over a year. Moreover, at the time of his initial conviction in 1997, Knight
already had amassed a decade-long criminal history sufficient for him to be placed
in category VI. Even assuming that these numerous offenses were actually not as
serious as they sounded, the district court was permitted to -- and did -- consider
that they were similar in nature to the instant offense, and draw from this the
inferences that Knight had not learned from earlier mistakes and a guideline
4
sentence would sufficiently deter similar conduct and protect the public. Thus, the
district court considered several § 3553(a) factors -- including the seriousness of
the offense, Knight’s extensive criminal history, and his obstructive conduct -- to
impose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range.3
Moreover, at resentencing, the district court invited Knight to provide a §
3553(a) argument. His contentions at resentencing were nearly identical to the
conventions raised at his original sentencing and now raised on appeal --
over-representation of his criminal history; pre-trial confinement in dangerous
conditions; health problems; his father’s death; and his commitment to changing
his life direction -- and there is no indication that the district court ignored any of
these factors. Contrary to Knight’s assertion on appeal, the district court was not
required to explain how the sentence served each § 3553(a) factor. Talley, 431
F.3d at 786. In sum, the district court set forth a sufficiently reasoned basis for
exercising its authority, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 95-month,
17-day sentence.
AFFIRMED.
3
Although Knight’s revised sentence amounts to the statutory maximum minus time served,
that was only because the statutory maximum was the low end of the applicable guideline range.
5