[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15474 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 21, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00319-CR-01-RWS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTOINE ANTHONY ADAMS, II,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 21, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Antoine Anthony Adams, II, appeals the sentence imposed by the district
court following the revocation of his supervised release. He contends that his
sentence of 9 months imprisonment and 2 years of supervised release was
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
I.
We review the sentence imposed following the revocation of supervised
release only for abuse of discretion, and we use a two step process. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594 (2007); United States v. Sweeting, 437
F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006). First, we must “ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128
S.Ct. at 597. If we find the sentence to be procedurally sound, the second step is to
review the “substantive reasonableness” of the sentence, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Id. “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears
the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both that
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record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,
788 (11th Cir. 2005).
Adams contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because
the district court did not expressly refer to the § 3553(a) factors before imposing its
sentence. We have explained that “noting in Booker or elsewhere requires the
district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the §
3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott,
426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). When a district court does not expressly
mention the § 3553(a) factors, we look to the record to see if the factors were, in
fact, considered. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007)
The record makes clear that the district court considered the § 3553(a)
factors. Before imposing its sentence, the district court listened to statements from
Adams’ counsel, his employer, and his fiancee, all of whom discussed Adams’
characteristics and history. The district court commented that it did not “want to
undo what [Adams] ha[d] accomplished; but by the same token, the court’s orders,
the court’s expectations have to be met.” That statement illustrates the district
court’s consideration of Adams’ history and the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)
(2)(B). We conclude that no procedural error occurred.
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Adams also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He
contends that it was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.
The district court sentenced Adams to a term of imprisonment within the advisory
guidelines and significantly below both the government’s recommended sentence
and the statutory maximum. The term of supervised release imposed by the district
court was also well below the statutory maximum. Given Adams history of
violating the terms of his supervised release, we cannot say that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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