[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11954 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 10, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 90-06040-CR-WJZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HENRY CANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 10, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Cano, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his
motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to Amendment 505 to the Sentencing
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
We remanded Cano’s first appeal of the denial of his section 3582(c)(2)
motion to the district court because the court failed to articulate whether it had
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors or what factors it had relied
on in denying Cano a sentence reduction. See United States v. Cano, 07-14100
(11th Cir. January 16, 2009) (unpub.). On remand, the district court again denied
Cano’s section 3582(c)(2) motion. The court stated that Cano’s amended
guidelines range after application of Amendment 505 was 262 to 327 months.* But,
after considering the entire court file from sentencing and the section 3553(a)
factors, the court stated that it would impose the same original sentence of 405
months. The court based its decision chiefly on the amount of cocaine involved,
over half a ton.
On appeal, Cano argues that the court did not engage in the proper
*
Amendment 505 reduced Cano’s base offense level from 40 to 38.
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retroactivity analysis because drug quantity was not, by itself, a sufficient reason
not to reduce his sentence. Cano characterizes the court’s 405-month sentence as
an upward departure from base offense level 38 to 40. We review for an abuse of
discretion a district court’s decision not to grant a sentence reduction under section
3582(c)(2). United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 2005).
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that later has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). A “district court must make two distinct determinations before
deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under” section 3582(c)(2).
United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998). First, the court must
determine the sentence it would have imposed, given the defendant’s amended
guidelines range and keeping constant all other guidelines determinations made at
the original sentencing hearing. Id. Then, the court must consider the factors in
section 3553(a) and determine, in its discretion, whether to reduce the defendant’s
sentence. Id. The court need not present particular findings on each section
3553(a) factor as long as the court clearly considered those factors and set forth
adequate reasons for refusing to reduce a prisoner’s sentence. See United States v.
Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997) (the record must demonstrate
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that the pertinent factors were taken into account by the district court).
Here, the district court engaged in the proper two-part analysis in
determining whether to reduce Cano’s sentence. First, the court applied
Amendment 505 to Cano’s original sentencing and recalculated his sentencing
range at 262 to 327 months. And, consistent with our mandate, the court
considered Cano’s motion, the entire court file, and the section 3553(a) factors in
exercising its discretion not to reduce Cano’s sentence. The court specifically
relied on the large amount of drugs involved in Cano’s offense to deny a sentence
reduction.
Contrary to Cano’s appellate argument, the district court did not depart
upwardly and re-sentence Cano; instead, the court permissibly exercised its
discretion not to reduce his sentence. Because the district court properly engaged
in the required analysis, we affirm the denial of Cano’s section 3582(c)(2) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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