[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13262 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 6, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00042-CR-FTM-29SPC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 6, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Young appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
incriminating statements he made to a police officer regarding cocaine located in
the trunk of a vehicle. Young argues that his statements were inadmissible because
(1) he made his initial statement when he was in custody and subject to the
functional equivalent of interrogation, but before he had been informed of his
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966), rights; and (2) his statements were coerced. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
I.
Young pled not guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii)(11),
and 846, (“Count 1”); and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii)(11), (“Count 2”).
Prior to trial, Young filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements he
made to officers during his arrest. He argued that admitting the statements would
violate Miranda because he was not advised of his Miranda rights, was sprayed
with an aerosol subject restraint (“ASR”), and was placed under arrest before he
made the statements. Young also contended that his statements were coerced
because the arresting officer failed to render first aid, even though Young
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complained of pain and loss of breath after being sprayed with ASR.
The government responded that, although Young was in custody at the time
he made the incriminating statements, he was not subject to interrogation. It
contended that Young’s statements were made spontaneously, and that the
arresting officer did not intend to elicit the statement from Young.
At the evidentiary hearing, Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Adam Heinlein
testified that, on March 11, 2008, he conducted a traffic stop on a red Hyundai with
four occupants. During the stop, Young, a passenger in the vehicle, was hostile,
cursing, and giving Heinlein a hard time. While Heinlein was standing next to the
passenger side of the vehicle, he smelled an odor of marijuana coming from inside
the vehicle. Heinlein called for backup because of Young’s attitude.
While Heinlein was issuing a speeding citation to the driver of the vehicle,
Trooper Michael Merrit and Officer Todd Harris arrived on scene. Officer Harris’s
K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the suspects’ vehicle. Heinlein and Merrit
instructed the occupants to sit in the rear of a patrol car, but Young refused. The
officers advised Young that, if he refused to comply, he would be placed under
arrest. Young stated that, he would not get into the car, and Heinlein advised
Young that he was being placed under arrest. Heinlein ordered Young to put his
hands behind his back, but Young began to struggle with Heinlein and Merrit.
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During the struggle, Merrit deployed his ASR, which Heinlein described as
“mace,” into Young’s face. Heinlein noted that “[e]verybody got sprayed” and
Heinlein could not see. The other three occupants attempted to enter their vehicle.
Merrit disengaged from Young and ordered the occupants to stay away from the
vehicle. Heinlein eventually secured Young and placed him into the rear seat of
his patrol car. Heinlein then saw Merrit chasing the three other occupants in the
median area of the interstate. The three suspects were eventually apprehended.
When Heinlein was sure that the three individuals were secure, he returned to his
patrol car.
Heinlein retrieved his medical bag from the trunk of his patrol car to render
first-aid to Young. He rolled down the back windows of his patrol car, and, while
he was retrieving his medical bag, Young told Heinlein that he could not breathe.
Young then stated, “Help me, help me. You can have everything in the trunk.
There’s one and a half kilos of cocaine in there. I’m done fighting with you, just
help me, just wipe off my face.” Heinlein retrieved his medical bag, wiped off
Young’s face with an alcohol swab, fanned Young’s face with a blanket, and
opened the partition in his vehicle to allow the air conditioner to blow in Young’s
face. Heinlein then read Young his Miranda rights. In response, Young stated that
he had approximately one and a half kilograms of cocaine in the trunk. Young
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indicated to Heinlein that he had been trying to sell the cocaine, but was unable to
do so. Heinlein eventually closed the partition to the patrol car and performed an
interior search of the suspects’ vehicle. In the trunk, Heinlein located a shoe box
containing 17 separate bags of cocaine.
According to Heinlein, Young was sitting in the patrol car for “maybe two
minutes, at the most” before Heinlein returned and rendered first aid. Heinlein
stated that, after Young asked him for help, he told Young “just hold on a second,
I’m going to get the bag and stuff like that out of the car.” He told Young several
times that the pain would go away shortly and that he was going to administer first
aid. Heinlein noted that he also had been sprayed with ASR and was coughing and
trying to get the ASR out of his eyes. Heinlein acknowledged that DVD footage of
the traffic stop showed him walking up to the Hyundai and taking the keys out of
the ignition immediately after putting Young in the patrol car. He explained that
he was securing the vehicle.
Young testified that he never resisted the officers and never made any
statements about the cocaine in the trunk of the car. He stated that Heinlein never
advised him of his Miranda rights. Young testified that he had to ask Heinlein six
or seven times to help him because his face was burning and he could not breathe.
The magistrate issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), finding that
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Heinlein’s testimony was more credible than Young’s. The magistrate determined
that, although Young was in custody at the time he made his incriminating
statements, he was not being interrogated, and, therefore, Miranda warnings were
not required. The magistrate also found that Young’s statements did not result
from the use of force or coercion, and it recommended denying Young’s motion to
suppress.
Young filed objections to the R&R, arguing that Heinlein’s testimony was
incredible and his statements regarding the cocaine were made under duress.
The district court found that Heinlein’s testimony was credible and that
Young’s statements were not coerced or obtained in violation of Miranda.
Prior to trial, the government moved to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment.
A jury found Young guilty of Count 2, possession with intent to distribute 500
grams of cocaine. The court sentenced Young to 87 months’ imprisonment,
followed by 4 years of supervised release.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress under
a mixed standard of review, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its application of law to those facts de novo. United
States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000). “Credibility determinations
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are typically the province of the fact finder,” and we defer to a district court’s
determinations regarding witness credibility unless the district court’s
understanding of the facts appears to be unbelievable. United States v.
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). The facts must be construed
in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court. United
States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir. 2000).
As an initial matter, Young’s evidentiary hearing testimony differed
significantly from Heinlein’s testimony. The district court found that Heinlein’s
testimony regarding these events was more credible than Young’s. Because
Heinlein’s testimony does not appear to be unbelievable on its face, and because
we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the government, we accept
Heinlein’s testimony as credible. See Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749; Santa, 236
F.3d at 668.
III.
Compliance With Miranda
To comport with the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled
self-incrimination, a person taken into custody must be advised of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel prior to an interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. However, Miranda only applies where “a person in
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custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.”
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980). The “functional equivalent” of interrogation refers “to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301-03, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-91
(holding that officers could not have known that their conversation between
themselves was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement). This
inquiry “focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police.” Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. “Volunteered statements of any
kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected
by [the holding in Miranda].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630;
Cannady v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[v]oluntary and
spontaneous comments by an accused . . . are admissible evidence if the comments
were not made in response to government questioning”).
It is clear that Young was in custody at the time he made his first
incriminating statement regarding the cocaine because he was handcuffed and
secured in Heinlein’s police cruiser. Young concedes that he was not subject to
express questioning when he made the incriminating statements. Thus, the
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relevant inquiry for purposes of Miranda is whether Young was subject to the
“functional equivalent” of questioning when he made the incriminating statements.
See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689.
Heinlein’s testimony establishes that Young was not subjected to the
functional equivalent of interrogation at the time that he made the incriminating
statement. The initial use of the ASR, which Young contends was an “unusual
degree of force,” was not intended to elicit incriminating statements from Young.
Instead, it was intended to subdue Young, who refused to comply with the officers’
commands to sit in the police cruiser. See United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d
809, 815 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that, even if the circumstances of an arrest are
inherently coercive, the defendant must show a link between the coercion and his
statements to establish that he was subjected to the functional equivalent of
interrogation). In fact, Young did not make his incriminating statements
immediately after being sprayed with the ASR. Furthermore, the reason for the use
of the ASR should have been clear to Young because it was Young who refused to
comply with the officer’s orders. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690
(instructing courts to focus on the defendant’s perception of officers’ actions).
Placing Young into the patrol car with the windows rolled up also did not
amount to the “functional equivalent” of interrogation. In fact, Heinlein would not
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have been able to hear any statements that Young made at this time because he was
not near the police cruiser and the windows were closed. Furthermore, upon
returning to the cruiser, Heinlein rolled down the windows and told Young that he
would help him. He then retrieved his medical bag and gloves. These actions
would have the adverse effect of eliciting an incriminating response, as they should
have reassured Young that Heinlein was preparing to help him and that a
confession was not necessary to obtain medical help. Nothing in the record
suggests that Heinlein should have known that the brief delay in providing medical
care was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement from Young. See
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. Thus, Heinlein’s testimony
establishes that Young’s statements did not result from the “functional equivalent”
of interrogation but, instead, were made voluntarily and spontaneously and,
therefore, were admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; Cannady, 931 F.2d at 754.
Voluntariness
“[A] confession is deemed involuntary if the [speaker’s] will was overborne
in such a way to render his confession the product of coercion.” Land v. Allen, 573
F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). In analyzing the
voluntariness of a confession, we consider the totality of the circumstances
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surrounding the confession. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 993 (11th Cir.
1985).
Although Heinlein handcuffed Young and placed him in the police cruiser
with ASR on his face, he remained there for only two to three minutes before
Heinlein began rendering first aid. The delay was caused by the flight of Young’s
codefendants, as well as Young’s previous resistance, which forced Heinlein to
secure Young, secure the suspect vehicle, and ensure that the codefendants were
apprehended before tending to Young. Because the purpose of the delay was to
secure the scene rather than obtain a confession from Young, these actions did not
render Young’s subsequent statements involuntary. See Rouco, 765 F.2d at 993
(holding that Rouco’s confession was not involuntary where Rouco was placed
face-down on a hot parking lot pavement, handcuffed, detained at gunpoint, and
subsequently placed in an unairconditioned squad car with the windows rolled up
for 20 minutes because “any physical discomfort Rouco may have suffered at the
arrest scene was not caused intentionally but stemmed from the agents’
preoccupation with [the victim’s] condition”).
As discussed above, Young’s first statement did not violate Miranda and
was not the product of coercion. Therefore, the district court correctly found that
the statement was admissible. Young’s second, post-Miranda, statement was also
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admissible because it was not tainted by any prior constitutional violation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Young’s motion to suppress,
as well as Young’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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