[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13564 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 12, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-21601-CV-AJ
JOSEPH P. MANNING,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Bill McCollum,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 12, 2010)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph P. Manning, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that
his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to strike a particular juror during jury
selection. After a thorough review, we affirm.
Manning was indicted by a Florida grand jury for first-degree premeditated
murder. During voir dire, defense counsel asked potential juror Paula Paul
whether she felt that the defense had to prove anything during the trial, and she
replied that it did. Counsel then explained that the state had the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that Manning had committed the crime and asked Paul
if she still wanted the defense to provide something. Paul again replied that she
did. Despite these comments, both the state and the defense accepted Paul as a
juror. Manning testified in his own defense, was found guilty, and was sentenced
to life without parole. The state appeals court affirmed Manning’s conviction and
sentence on direct appeal.
Manning then filed a pro se motion for state post-conviction relief under
Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to strike juror Paul.
At an evidentiary hearing, the assistant public defender who had represented
Manning at trial, Michael Melinek, testified that his trial strategy was to argue self-
defense. Because this defense necessitated Manning’s testimony at trial, and Paul
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had stated that she wanted to hear from the defense, Melinek decided not to strike
Paul from the panel. Moreover, there was other background information that led
Melinek to believe she would be a favorable juror for the defense. After voir
dire was complete, Melinek went over his notes with Manning, and they discussed
issues. Melinek did not recall Manning’s objecting to any of the jurors.
The state trial court denied Manning’s post-conviction motion in a written
order, finding that Melinek had made a valid and reasonable decision to keep Paul
on the jury panel. Manning then filed the instant § 2254 petition.
A magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny Manning’s
§ 2254 petition because the state court’s factual determination was amply
supported by the evidence and Manning could not establish prejudice arising from
counsel’s alleged deficient performance. The district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation over Manning’s objections. Although the district
court noted Paul’s problematic answers during voir dire, it concluded that there
was no evidence Paul was biased because, under Florida law, a defendant has the
initial burden of producing evidence to support a prima facie case of self defense.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that under the specific circumstances of
the case, the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal law.
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Manning requested a certificate of appealability, which the district court
granted with respect to whether Manning’s trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he failed to strike prospective juror Paul during jury selection.
On appeal, Manning argues that Melinek erred in failing to strike potential
juror Pauline Paul because she indicated that she was biased and unable to render a
fair or impartial verdict. Manning argues that, regardless of counsel’s trial
strategy, Paul should have been removed because reasonable doubt existed as to
whether she was impartial.
“When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact
for clear error.” Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). Federal
courts are forbidden from granting habeas relief on claims that were previously
adjudicated in state court, unless the adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28
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U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under federal law, a defendant
must show both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Where a defendant makes an insufficient showing on one
prong of the Strickland test, we need not address the other. Id. at 697. “When a
convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88.
The Supreme Court has instructed that courts’ scrutiny of counsel’s
performance should be “highly deferential,” specifying that
[a] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial
strategy.” There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
defend a particular client in the same way.
Id. at 689 (citation and quotations omitted). Additionally, under Florida law,
“[w]hen the defense of self-defense is asserted, a defendant has the burden of
producing enough evidence to establish a prima facie case demonstrating the
justifiable use of force.” Fields v. State, 988 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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2008).
Here, the district court properly denied Manning’s § 2254 petition because
he failed to show that trial counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced as a
result of counsel’s strategic decision. Under state law, Manning retained the
burden to show a prima facie case of self defense. Therefore, under the
circumstances, Melinek’s decision not to strike Paul was a reasonable trial strategy.
Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, the state court’s decision to deny
relief was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The denial
of Manning’s § 2254 petition is
AFFIRMED.
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