[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 12, 2010
No. 09-13917 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00228-CR-ORL-22-KRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE ROSARIO-OQUENDO,
a.k.a. Cheko,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 12, 2010)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Rosario-Oquendo, through counsel, appeals his 300-month sentence for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.
Rosario-Oquendo argues that the district court erred (1) in applying a 4-level role
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and (2) in holding him accountable for
more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
Rosario-Oquendo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. A notice filed by the government set forth
the following facts. In June 2007, federal and local law enforcement agents
discovered that a specific drug-trafficking organization was mailing cocaine almost
every week from Puerto Rico to Orlando. In the fall of 2006, Miguel Antonio
Montes took charge of the organization’s Orlando operations. The notice stated
that Rosario-Oquendo
worked directly with the drug trafficking organization in Puerto
Rico. During telephone conversations with Montes,
[Rosario-Oquendo] arranged for the distribution of cocaine
from Puerto Rico to Orlando; he delivered cocaine to associates
in Puerto Rico for packaging and mailing to Orlando, Florida;
and he received drug proceeds from couriers sent by Montes in
Orlando, including, but not limited to, indicted co-conspirators
Ricardo Perlaza, Feliz Hernandez, Jorge Cortijo, Luis Cruz, Iris
Pacheco, Ida Acevedo and Loanna Cortijo.
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The government also submitted transcripts of four intercepted telephone
conversations between Montes and Rosario-Oquendo.
At the plea hearing, Rosario-Oquendo admitted that the conspiracy involved
5 kilograms or more of cocaine, but disputed the government’s contention that the
conspiracy involved more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. The magistrate judge
found that there was a sufficient factual basis for Rosario-Oquendo’s guilty plea,
and the district court subsequently adjudicated Rosario-Oquendo guilty.
The PSI set Rosaro-Oquendo’s base offense level at 38, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(1), because his offense involved more than 150 kilograms of cocaine.
Rosario-Oquendo received a four-level increase, pursuant to § 3B1.1(a), because
he was an organizer or leader of the offense, which involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive. He received a 3-level reduction, under
§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense
level of 39. Rosario-Oquendo’s total offense level of 39 combined with his
criminal history category of II yielded a guideline imprisonment range of 292 to
365 months.
Rosario-Oquendo objected to the drug amount set forth in the PSI, arguing
that he should be held accountable for at least 5, but less than 15, kilograms of
cocaine, rather than 150 kilograms or more of cocaine. He also objected to the
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application of the four-level § 3B1.1(a) enhancement for his role in the offense,
arguing that he was not an organizer or leader.
At the sentencing hearing, Ray Schulte, an officer with the Orange County
Sheriff’s Office, testified that Montes told him that Rosario-Oquendo initially
shipped to Montes smaller quantities of 4 kilograms of cocaine, but eventually
shipped up to 50 kilograms of cocaine per week in April and May 2007. Schulte
noted that Montes and Rosario-Oquendo were engaged in transactions with one
another from approximately September 2006 through June 2007. Referring to the
transcript of a May 30, 2007 telephone conversation, Schulte testified that
Rosario-Oquendo told Montes that he was planning to ship 10 kilograms daily, for
a total of 40 to 50 kilograms of cocaine per week. Based on Schulte’s
investigation, these amounts were consistent with the amounts of cocaine that
actually were shipped. Schulte noted that, during an intercepted conversation on
June 1, 2007, Rosario-Oquendo stated that “[t]here are 60 Chanels,” meaning that
Rosario-Oquendo had 60 kilograms of cocaine bearing the Chanel label.
Schulte testified that Montes paid for his cocaine by sending couriers with
money to Puerto Rico. These couriers included Ricardo Perlaza, Felix Hernandez,
Luis Gonzalez, Aida Acevedo, Jorge Cortijo, and Luana Cortijo. Schulte stated
that these couriers told him that Rosario-Oquendo would meet them at the airport
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in Puerto Rico and give them directions while they were there. Schulte also
testified that Rosario-Oquendo himself did not package and mail the cocaine, but
that other people did this under Rosario-Oquendo’s direction. Schulte noted that,
during one telephone conversation with Montes, Rosario-Oquendo discussed
sending Luis Cruz, a money courier known as “the old guy,” to Boston.
Rosario-Oquendo argued that the court should not consider Schulte’s
testimony because it could not reasonably be assured that the information he
provided was accurate. Rosario-Oquendo also argued that there was insufficient
evidence to determine that he was a leader or organizer, and that he should be held
accountable for less than 15 kilograms of cocaine.
The government responded that it was apparent from the transcripts of
telephone conversations that Rosario-Oquendo was supplying Montes with large
quantities of cocaine, as Rosario-Oquendo at once said that he was able “to move
ten a day, 40 to 50 per week” and acknowledged that “he had then available 60
kilos that he had just washed.” The government also noted that Rosario-Oquendo
directed the activities of seven money couriers who traveled to Puerto Rico, as well
as the activities of Cruz, whom he sent to Boston.
The court stated that it had heard Montes testify in other proceedings and it did not
“have any reason to believe that what [Montes] had said to Mr. Schulte and what is
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included in the transcripts that [the government] referred to is untrue.”
The court overruled Rosario-Oquendo’s objections to the PSI’s factual
statements and guideline calculations. It found that Rosario-Oquendo had a total
offense level of 39, a criminal history category of II, and a guideline imprisonment
range of 292 to 365 months. It sentenced Rosario-Oquendo to 300 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by a 5-year term of supervised release.
II.
“A district court’s enhancement of a defendant’s offense level based on his
role as an organizer or leader is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error.” United
States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003). “The government bears
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had an
aggravating role in the offense.” United States v. Yeager, 331 F.3d 1216, 1226
(11th Cir. 2003). We also review for clear error the district court’s factual
determination of the drug quantity for which the defendant is accountable. United
States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing.
Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3). Thus, hearsay may be admitted at sentencing if there are
“sufficient indicia of reliability, the [district] court makes explicit findings of fact
as to credibility, and the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the evidence.”
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United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1031 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations
omitted). “[T]he focus is upon the question of [the hearsay’s] reliability, which
must be determined on a case by case basis.” United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267,
1275 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a four-level enhancement may be
applied if “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a). In determining whether a § 3B1.1(a) enhancement applies, the district
court should consider:
(1) exercise of decision-making authority, (2) nature of
participation in the commission of the offense, (3) recruitment
of accomplices, (4) claimed right to a larger share of the fruits
of the crime, (5) degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, (6) nature and scope of the illegal
activity, and (7) degree of control and authority exercised over
others.
Rendon, 354 F.3d at 1331-32 (quotation omitted); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment.
(n.4). “There is no requirement that all the considerations have to be present in any
one case.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005).
However, “[s]ection 3B1.1 requires the exercise of some authority in the
organization, the exertion of some degree of control, influence, or leadership.”
United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006). “Thus, for example,
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a defendant’s management of assets, standing alone, is insufficient to support an
enhancement under Section 3B1.1.” United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022,
1026 (11th Cir. 2009). More than one person can qualify as a “leader” or
“organizer” of a criminal conspiracy for purposes of receiving the role
enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4).
The government “must establish the quantity of drugs by the preponderance
of the evidence.” United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993).
When a conviction stems from a conspiracy charge, the defendant is responsible
for the amount of drugs in all reasonably foreseeable acts done in furtherance of
the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Even if the district court does not
make individualized findings, a defendant’s sentence may be upheld if the record
supports the amount of drugs attributed to the defendant. Ismond, 993 F.2d
at 1499. Base offense level 32 applies to drug offenses involving at least 5, but
less than 15, kilograms of cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). Base offense level 38
applies to drug offenses involving 150 kilograms or more of cocaine.
Id. § 2D1.1(c)(1).
III.
As an initial matter, Rosario-Oquendo argues that the district court should
not have considered Schulte’s hearsay testimony about Montes’s prior statements.
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It should be noted that much of Schulte’s testimony was simply his interpretation
of telephone conversation transcripts or his own opinions based on his
investigation, rather than testimony about what Montes had told him. Thus, this
testimony did not constitute hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as
“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). Although
Schulte’s testimony regarding Montes’s statements constituted hearsay, Schulte’s
testimony showed “sufficient indicia of reliability” and was properly admitted.
See Zlatogur, 271 F.3d at 1031. Much of Schulte’s testimony, including his
testimony about Montes’s statements, was supported by the transcripts of the
telephone conversations between Montes and Rosario-Oquendo, and the district
court specifically noted that it had heard Montes testify in other related cases and
found no reason to disbelieve what he told Schulte. Under these circumstances, the
district court did not err in admitting and considering Schulte’s testimony.
Role Enhancement
The facts culled from the plea hearing and the evidence presented at
sentencing provide an adequate factual basis for the four-level role enhancement.
The government’s notice of the factual basis for the plea stated that
Rosario-Oquendo arranged for the distribution of narcotics from Puerto Rico to
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Orlando, delivered cocaine to associates in Puerto Rico for packaging and mailing
to Orlando, and received proceeds from couriers sent by Montes.
Rosario-Oquendo stated at the plea hearing that the factual basis accurately
described his role in the offense.
At the sentencing hearing, Schulte stated that Montes’s couriers acted under
Rosario-Oquendo’s direction while in Puerto Rico. He identified six individuals
who acted as couriers—Perlaza, Hernandez, Gonzalez, Acevedo, Jorge Cortijo, and
Luana Cortijo. Furthermore, Schulte stated that an unspecified number of
individuals packaged and mailed cocaine under Rosario-Oquendo’s direction.
Schulte also testified that Rosario-Oquendo directed Cruz, known as “the old guy,”
to travel to Boston in connection with the conspiracy. This testimony was directly
supported by transcripts of telephone conversations, in which Montes asked about
“the old guy” and Rosario-Oquendo responded that he sometimes sent him “over
there to Massachusetts and stuff.” Thus, the evidence presented at sentencing
established that Rosario-Oquendo exerted “some degree of control, influence, or
leadership” over at least seven individuals—the six named couriers and Cruz—in
addition to unnamed individuals who packaged and mailed cocaine under
Rosario-Oquendo’s direction. See Gupta, 463 F.3d at 1198; cf. United States v.
Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court erred in
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applying the four-level role enhancement where there was no evidence to establish
that the defendant was more than a mere seller of narcotics). Accordingly, the
district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level § 3B1.1(a) enhancement.
See Rendon, 354 F.3d at 1331.
Drug Quantity
The evidence established that Rosario-Oquendo was responsible for more
than 150 kilograms of cocaine. Schulte testified at the sentencing hearing that
Rosario-Oquendo began supplying Montes with smaller quantities of cocaine in
September 2006, although he eventually was shipping up to 50 kilograms of
cocaine per week in April and May 2007. As noted above, the district court
properly could consider Schulte’s testimony. Furthermore, Schulte’s testimony
was supported by a transcript of a telephone conversation between Montes and
Rosario-Oquendo, in which Rosario-Oquendo stated that he planned to ship “ten
daily” for a total of “40 or 50.” Schulte noted that, through his investigation, he
determined that these amounts were consistent with the amount of cocaine
Rosario-Oquendo actually shipped. Schulte also noted that Rosario-Oquendo
referenced, in a conversation with Montes, 60 kilograms of cocaine bearing the
“Chanel” label. The transcripts of telephone conversations between Montes and
Rosario-Oquendo verify that Rosario-Oquendo told Montes that “[t]here are 60
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Chanels.” Adding together the 60 kilograms of cocaine bearing the Chanel label
and the 40 to 50 kilograms of cocaine per week that Rosario-Oquendo shipped in
April and May 2007 results in a total drug quantity of over 150 kilograms.
Accordingly, based on Schulte’s testimony and the telephone transcripts, the
district court did not clearly err in holding Rosario-Oquendo accountable for more
than 150 kilograms of cocaine. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1296.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record and consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm Rosario-Oquendo’s 300-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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