[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 04, 2010
No. 09-11079 JOHN LEY
________________________ ACTING CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-01599-CV-T-26-TGW
WILLIAM C. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PROGRESS ENERGY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 4, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and BARZILAY,* Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
William Brown appeals an adverse summary judgment in favor of his
employer, Progress Energy (“Progress”), on Brown’s claims that he was subjected
to a racially hostile work environment and denied training in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 Brown
argues that he has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
subject to a racially hostile work environment during his 2002-2006 apprenticeship
as a lineman at Progress. He further contends that the district court erred as a
matter of law in holding that, absent proof of a denial of promotional opportunities,
he cannot establish that Progress’s failure to train him constituted an adverse
employment action. Finally, Brown challenges the district court’s conclusion that
Progress was not vicariously liable for the hostile work environment or failure to
train.2
1
Section 1981 protects an individual’s right to be free from racial discrimination in the
“making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” We analyze
employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to § 1981 using the same substantive analysis
as those brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Standard v. A.B.E.L.
Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
2
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same
legal standards as the district court. See Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th
Cir. 1999). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c):
[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the evidence before the court shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this determination, the court
must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.
2
We have reviewed the entire record and conclude that Brown’s hostile work
environment claim is based on his subjective perception and speculation rather
than on specific facts from which a reasonable jury could find that he was
subjected to a discriminatorily hostile work environment because of his race.
Likewise, insufficient facts were presented with respect to Brown’s failure
to train claim. Although a failure to train claim is not necessarily dependent on a
showing of an additional adverse employment action, the evidence presented here
is insufficiently concrete to establish as a matter of fact that Brown was actually
denied otherwise available training, because of his race, over the course of his
apprenticeship. Rather, it is undisputed that the senior lineman about whom Brown
complains was notoriously reluctant to provide training to any of the apprentices in
his crew, a source of frustration to white apprentices as well.3
AFFIRMED.
The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that
dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of
substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does
not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict in its favor. Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted).
3
Because we have concluded that Brown has not presented a genuine issue of material
fact as to his hostile work environment and failure to train claims, we do not reach the district
court’s alternate conclusion that Progress cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged
violations.
3