[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 27, 2009
No. 08-14170 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-01463-CV-T-27-TBM
KAREN E. KEELER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Division of Disability Determinations,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 27, 2009)
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Karen E. Keeler (“Keeler”) appeals pro se the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Florida Department of
Health (“Department”), based upon the court’s finding that Keeler failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). After review of the record
and the parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Keeler began working at the Department’s Division of Disability
Determinations as a Records Technician in September 2003. R1-32 at 187. She
was directly supervised by Mae Harper, who was supervised by Bonnie Cain. Id.
at 24-25. On 15 September 2004, Keeler told Cain that she wanted to transfer to a
vacant Senior Clerk position. Id. at 24, 26-27. During this conversation, Keeler
began to cry and explained to Cain that her current position was too stressful and
that her unit was “being forced to squeeze in nine hours of work into an eight-hour
day.” Id. at 27-29. Keeler did not at that time disclose to Cain that she suffered
from any disabilities. Id. at 27. Cain told Keeler that she was doing fine in her
current position, but indicated that she would speak to her supervisor, Alan
Shaffren, about transferring Keeler to the open position. Id. at 25, 29, 44-45.
In a 16 September 2004 follow-up e-mail to Cain, Keeler reiterated her
2
interest in the Senior Clerk position and stated that “[t]he stress and volume
(regardless of it’s [sic] simplicity) of work expected from [her current] position is
more often than not, overwhelming.” Id., Exh. G. The next day, Keeler sent Cain
another e-mail, in which she indicated that she was “capable of maintaining [her]
position for an extended period of time just encase [sic] you have an alternative
position that you would prefer me in as opposed to the senior clerk position.” Id.,
Exh. H. Sometime thereafter, Cain informed Keeler that Shaffren had denied
Keeler’s request for a job transfer because he “[did]n’t like to demote his
employees” and because they believed Keeler was “doing fine” in her position as a
records technician. Id. at 25, 64.
On Friday, 22 October 2004, Harper and Cain met with Keeler to discuss
Keeler’s work performance. Id. at 105-06. During this meeting, Keeler admitted
that she had been working overtime in order to complete her work assignments. Id.
at 112 & Exh. A. Harper and Cain reminded Keeler that she was not to work
overtime without prior approval and instructed her to adhere to her scheduled work
hours. Id. at 105-06, 112 & Exh. A. Keeler testified at her deposition that she
“broke down” and started crying during the meeting. Id. at 207-08. When she
stated “I can’t believe that this is happening to me,” Cain responded, “Well, that’s
what happens when you stir the pot.” Id. at 208. Later that same day, Cain
3
observed Keeler, who was scheduled to work from 7:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M., leaving
the building at approximately 4:40 P.M. Id. at 117 & Exh. C. The following
Monday, Cain confronted Keeler about working until 4:40 P.M. after being
specifically directed not to work overtime without prior approval. Keeler denied
that she was working after 4:00 P.M. and told Cain that she was in the restroom
and was making personal telephone calls. See id., Exh. J at 3. Keeler did not
report the extra time she worked on 22 October on her time sheet for the pay period
from 22 October through 4 November. Id.
On 26 October 2004, Harper issued a memorandum of counseling to Keeler
in which she again advised Keeler that “[w]orking unapproved overtime constitutes
insubordination” and that “violating agency policies and procedures . . . will not be
tolerated.” Id. at Exh. A. The memorandum also noted that Keeler had been given
fourteen cases to input into the computer system on 22 October, but had only
completed seven cases by the end of the day. Id. Keeler was warned that failure to
complete her assigned tasks in a timely manner “constitutes poor performance,
inefficiency and could also be negligence.” Id.
In her written response, Keeler disclosed that she suffered from Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), a “neurological disability,” and
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”), a “mental disability,” and took daily
4
medication for both disabilities. Id., Exh. D; see also id. at 66.1 She stated that the
recent discussions regarding her work performance were causing “an even greater
amount of stress and pressure . . . which [was] hindering [her] performance even
further,” and explained that she had requested a transfer to avoid the “current
stressful position.” Id. at Exh. D. When asked during her deposition to identify
the major life activities that were significantly impaired by her disabilities, Keeler
stated only that she was unable to “stay organized” and to “keep track of things”
and admitted that she was able to bathe herself, brush her own teeth, and perform
normal personal grooming. Id. at 159-64.
Keeler further admitted that she did not at any time prior to the counseling
meeting with Cain and Harper disclose to her supervisors that she suffered from
any disabilities. Id. at 27, 44, 162, 209-10. She claimed that Cain nevertheless
should have been aware of her disabilities based on the e-mails she sent to Cain in
which she indicated that her job was “stressful” and that the “stress and volume” of
work was “overwhelming.” Id. at 66-67, 203-04. According to Keeler, these were
“buzz words” that “indicated an underlying problem that should have been
addressed.” Id. Keeler also averred that Cain should have been aware of her
disabilities because Keeler cried when she requested a transfer to a lower position
1
The Senior Clerk position was no longer available at the time Keeler submitted her
response. Id. at 157.
5
on 15 September 2004 and because she had a habit of taking copious notes, which,
according to Keeler, was a symptom of her OCD, ADD/ADHD, and anxiety. Id. at
66, 201.
On 10 December 2004, Keeler received a letter from the director of her
division notifying her that her employment was being terminated. Id., Exh. I. The
letter advised Keeler that her “action in working unauthorized overtime [on 22
October] after being specifically directed earlier in the day not to do so
constitute[d] Poor Performance, Insubordination, Violation of Law of Agency
Rules, and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee,” and that her actions in
“falsely stating to Ms. Cain that [she] had performed no work after 4:00 p.m. on
October 22, 2004” and “falsifying [her] time and attendance record constitut[ed]
Violation of Law or Agency Rules and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee.”
Id. at 3.
Keeler filed the instant pro se complaint against the Department on 4 August
2005, alleging “retaliation” and “failure to uphold the laws set forth by the
Americans with Disabilities Act.” R1-1 at 1. She stated that the Department
denied her request for a job transfer in retaliation for her “acknowledging
inadequacies within [her] unit and for saying that [employees in her unit] were
overworked.” Id. at 2. She claimed that the Department terminated her “to let the
6
others in [her] unit knows [sic] what would happen to them if they begin [sic]
‘Stirring the Pot.’” Id. Keeler later clarified during her deposition that her
allegation was that the Department retaliated against her “because [she] told Mrs.
Cain that there was a problem with our workload; that the employees in [her]
unit . . . [were] being forced to work – to put in nine hours of work in an eight-hour
day.” R1-32 at 198-99. She alleged additionally that the Department “violated the
law by denying [her] an accommodation.” R1-1 at 2.
In March 2006, the Department filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that Keeler failed to state
either a failure-to-accommodate or retaliation claim under the ADA. The district
court denied the motion, noting that “[i]t [was] difficult to discern from the face of
the Complaint specifically what ADA violations Plaintiff alleges.” R1-18 at 2 n.2.
The court first found that “[Keeler]’s allegations concerning the [Department]’s
knowledge of her disability and her request for an accommodation [were] not
crystal clear” and, with respect to her retaliation claim, that “it [was] unclear
whether ‘Stirring the Pot’ include[d] protected activity under the ADA.” R1-18 at
3-4.2
2
The district court found that the Department was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity from claims for monetary damages brought under Title I of the ADA and dismissed
Keeler’s complaint to the extent that it asserted such a claim. Id. at 2-3, 5.
7
On 16 November 2007, the district court issued a case management and
scheduling order, which set a discovery cut-off date of 5 January 2008. R1-27 at 2.
The order also established a deadline for filing motions to amend pleadings that
was ten days after the discovery cut-off date and made clear that any such motions
would be disfavored. Id. On 18 January 2008, Keeler filed a “Motion for an
Extension of Time Within Which to File a Motion to Seek Leave from the Court to
Amend Plaintiff’s Complaint,” in which she indicated that she needed additional
time “to correctly and more specifically address which laws are applicable to [her]
[c]omplaint” and requested that the court extend until 22 January 2008 the deadline
for filing a motion to amend. R1-29 at 1-2. The district court denied her motion as
moot, noting that she never filed a motion to amend her complaint, nor did she
attach a copy of the proposed amended complaint to her extension motion. R1-30.
On 15 February 2008, Keeler moved the court to reconsider its ruling,
arguing that she had submitted the extension motion within the time-frame for
filing motions to amend and that she correctly waited for the court to grant her an
extension of time before submitting either a motion to amend or an amended
complaint. R1-33 at 1-3, 5. That same day, Keeler also filed a motion to amend
her complaint, in which she alleged that the Department had violated the First
Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
8
§ 794; the Fair Labor Standards Act; and Titles I, II, and IV of the ADA. R1-34 at
1-3. Attached to the motion was Keeler’s amended complaint, which referred to
these statutes. Id., Amended Complaint. The district court denied both motions,
finding first that although its order disposing of the Department’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings put Keeler on notice as early as January 2007 that her
complaint was not well-pleaded, Keeler offered no explanation for her delay in
seeking leave to amend. R1-39 at 1, 3. It further found that Keeler’s amended
complaint included “new, distinct claims” and would therefore unfairly prejudice
the Department and “invariably delay a resolution of the case.” Id. at 3. On this
point, the court noted that the case had been pending for over two years, discovery
was closed, a trial date was set, and the Department’s motion for summary
judgment, which the Department had filed on 15 February 2008, was pending. Id.
at 3-4; see R1-31. Permitting Keeler to add new claims at this late stage of the
litigation would, it found, undermine “the critically important concept of finality.”
R1-39 at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, the court noted that
Keeler’s amended complaint failed to state claims upon which relief could be
granted and would not survive a motion to dismiss in any event. Id.
In its motion for summary judgment, the Department argued that Keeler
could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she
9
failed to show: (1) that she was disabled; (2) that she could perform her job with or
without reasonable accommodations; or (3) that the Department treated similarly
situated persons without disabilities more favorably. R1-31 at 14-17. The
Department argued further that, even if Keeler could satisfy the elements of a
prima facie case of discrimination, it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
dismissing her, namely, her misconduct and poor performance, and she had failed
to show that those reasons were pretextual. Id. at 17-18. With respect to Keeler’s
allegations of retaliation, the Department argued that Keeler failed to state a claim
because she did not allege that she had engaged in activity protected by the ADA,
such as filing of an EEOC charge or opposing workplace discrimination. Id. at 19-
20. Rather, Keeler simply complained that there was too much work and not
enough time to accomplish that work. Id. at 20.
Keeler responded that in characterizing her suit as an employment
discrimination case under Title I of the ADA, the Department had ignored “the
other part of the complaint, which was retaliation not for ADA but for speaking out
about overtime work.” R1-41 at 1, 11. Keeler stated that the Department’s
arguments regarding the ADA were designed to distract the court from “the real
issues,” which were retaliation under the First Amendment and the FLSA, and
“failure to consider an accommodation.” Id. at 19. With respect to the latter,
10
Keeler argued that the Department should have been aware that her request for a
transfer was a request for an ADA accommodation. Id. at 12-13. Keeler
subsequently supplemented her response with a notarized affidavit in which she
stated, inter alia, that the Department’s retaliation against her began soon after the
her 15 September meeting with Cain and culminated in her dismissal on 9
December. Id. at 6, 8. According to Keeler, Cain’s comment, “‘Well that’s what
happens when you stir the pot,’” related to her “speaking out about uncompensated
overtime work.” Id. at 6-7.3
The district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment
after finding that Keeler had failed to meet her burden of establishing either a
prima facie case of disability discrimination or a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title I of the ADA. R1-54. With respect to her failure-to-accommodate
claim, the court found that Keeler did not show that: (1) she had a “disability” as
defined by the ADA; (2) the Department was aware of her alleged disability when
it denied her request for a transfer; or (3) her request for a transfer was a request
for a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 10-17. With respect to her retaliation
3
Attached to Keeler’s affidavit were unauthenticated letters from physicians,
unauthenticated typewritten notes, and a job description for the records technician position. R1-
47, Keeler Aff., Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G. The district court denied the Department’s motion to
strike Keeler’s affidavit and supporting documents, but indicated that it would not consider the
unauthenticated documents, hearsay evidence, and improper argument in ruling on the summary
judgment motion. See R1-53.
11
claim, the court found that Keeler failed to show that she engaged in any activity
that was protected by the ADA. Id. at 17-19.4 This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Keeler argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Department and that it abused its discretion in denying her
motion for an extension of time, her motion to reconsider, and her motion to
amend the complaint.
A. Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kelley
v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A party is entitled to
summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The ADA, as amended, provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
4
Keeler filed several post-judgment motions, insisting that summary judgment was
improper and seeking to introduce additional evidence. R1-56; R1-57; R1-58; R1-59. While
Keeler indicates in her brief that she seeks review of the district court’s denial of these motions,
she offers no argument in support of these challenges. Accordingly, they are deemed waived.
See United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006) (issues on which party
provides no argument or legal support are deemed waived).
12
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”5 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009). In order to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
she has a disability; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer
discriminated against her because of her disability. See Greenberg v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (interpreting
prior version of Act).
A “disability” is defined by the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has further defined
“major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1264 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). For purposes of the
third element, an employer unlawfully discriminates against an employee because
of her disability by “not making reasonable accommodations to the [employee’s]
known physical or mental limitations” if the employee is otherwise qualified to
5
Recent amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.
(“ADA”) became effective on 1 January 2009. See 29 U.S.C. § 705, Effective and Applicability
Provisions (providing that amendments pursuant to Pub. L. 110-325, § 8, Sept. 25, 2008, 122
Stat. 3559 became effective on 1 January 2009).
13
perform her job and the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added); see
also Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Keeler failed to show that the Department knew of her alleged
impairments when it denied her request for a transfer. Keeler testified in her
deposition that “nobody knew” of her disabilities when she asked Cain to be
transferred to the Senior Clerk position and she admitted that she did not disclose
her disabilities to her supervisors until after that position had been filled. R1-31 at
27, 154-55, 157. Nonetheless, Keeler asserts that the Department should have
known of her limitations because she took lots of notes, cried while speaking to
Cain about the transfer, and advised Cain that her position as a records technician
was stressful and overwhelming. This behavior was not, however, sufficient to put
the Department on notice that Keeler was disabled because it in no way suggested
that Keeler was substantially limited in any major life activity.
Because the Department did not have sufficient knowledge of Keeler’s
mental impairments, the district court correctly concluded that the Department
could not be liable for any failure to accommodate. See, e.g., Cordoba v. Dillard’s,
Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1186 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in discriminatory
discharge case, employer could not have fired employee “because of” a disability
14
that she knew nothing about).6
B. Denial of Motion for Extension of Time, Motion for Reconsideration, and
Motion to Amend
Keeler argues that she filed her motion for an extension within the time
prescribed for filing a motion for leave to amend, that she was complying with
local court rules by waiting for the court’s ruling on her extension motion before
filing a motion for leave to amend, and that the amended complaint would not have
unfairly prejudiced the Department because it concerned the same facts as the
original complaint. Keeler further contends that in ruling on her motion for an
extension, motion to reconsider, and motion to amend, the district court “never
addressed the other issue raised in the complaint, which was retaliation under the
FLSA and First Amendment.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. According to Keeler, her
complaint stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the
FLSA because she alleged that she was terminated for speaking out about the
inadequacies of her unit and for reporting that employees were forced to work
uncompensated overtime in order to keep up with their heavy workloads. She
asserts that it was necessary for her to amend her complaint once “it became
6
Keeler does not challenge the district court’s finding that she failed to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation under the ADA and thus has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Davis
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 972 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n argument not
included in the appellant’s opening brief is deemed abandoned.”).
15
apparent [that] the only violations of the law that would be considered by the
District Court would be [ADA violations].” Id. at 10. We first address whether the
district court erred in denying Keeler’s motion to amend and related motions and
then whether the district court erred in construing her complaint as alleging claims
arising only under Title I of the ADA.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for
extension of time. See Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th
Cir. 2004). We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a
motion to amend the pleadings. See Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157,
1160-61 (11th Cir. 1999). Under this standard, “[t]he district court has a range of
options,” and we will not disturb the district court’s decision unless it constitutes a
clear error in judgment. Young, 358 F.3d at 863.
A party may amend her complaint after a responsive pleading is served only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). Where a party’s motion to amend is filed after the deadline for such
motions, as delineated in the court’s scheduling order, the party must show good
cause why leave to amend the complaint should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
A court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the
amendment would prejudice the defendant, follows undue delays, or is futile. See
16
Maynard v. Board of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2003) (district
court did not abuse discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend,
filed on last day of extended discovery period, because amendment “would have
produced more attempts at discovery, delayed disposition of the case, and likely
prejudiced” the defendant, and there was no good reason why plaintiff could not
have filed motion earlier).
Keeler filed her motion for an extension of time to amend her complaint
after the close of discovery and filed her motion to amend over a month after the
deadline for such motions had passed. Although Keeler thus was required to show
good cause as to why the amendments should be permitted, she offered no
explanation in any of her motions as to why she failed to propose her amendments
within the time limits prescribed by the court in its scheduling order. As in
Maynard, Keeler’s proposed amended complaint, which purported to add new
claims, would have resulted in additional discovery and delayed disposition of the
case. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
denying Keeler’s motion for an extension of time, motion to reconsider, or motion
to amend the complaint.
Although the district court properly denied Keeler leave to amend the
complaint, it erred in construing the complaint as asserting only violations of the
17
ADA. It is well-settled that “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). While we have little
difficulty finding that Keeler’s complaint failed to state a claim under the First
Amendment,7 it is less clear whether her complaint adequately stated a claim
within the purview of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. The FLSA, which
addresses, inter alia, minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay, makes it
unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Informal
complaints are sufficient to trigger this anti-retaliation provision. See E.E.O.C. v.
White, 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “unofficial complaints
7
In order to establish a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, an employee first
must show that her speech was protected by the First Amendment. See Anderson v. Burke
County, Ga., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Constitutional protection
attaches to a public employee’s speech only where the employee is speaking “as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.” Battle v. Board of Regents for Georgia, 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Vila v. Padron, 484 F.3d
1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The threshold question is whether [the employee] spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern.”). If the employee is not speaking as a citizen on a matter
of public concern, “[she] has no First Amendment cause of action based on . . . her employer’s
reaction to the speech.” Battle, 468 F.3d at 760 (quotation marks and citation omitted). When
Keeler reported to management that records technicians in her unit were working
uncompensated overtime, she was speaking in her capacity as an employee on a matter of
personal interest, and not as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Cf. Anderson, 239 F.3d at
1220. Because Keeler’s speech did not “relate to the political, social or other interest of the
community,” id., the First Amendment was not implicated, and her retaliation claim necessarily
fails. See Vila, 484 F.3d at 1339.
18
expressed by [employees] to their employer about unequal pay constitute[d] an
assertion of rights protected under the [FLSA].”).
Although Keeler’s complaint cited the ADA as the statutory basis for her
lawsuit, she alleged that she suffered retaliation for reporting uncompensated
overtime to Department management. While this type of speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection, it does trigger the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.
See White, 881 F.2d at 1011 (noting that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA
is “giv[en] a broad construction”). Because Keeler’s complaint, liberally
construed, may have stated a claim under the FLSA,8 the district court erred in
treating her complaint as alleging only failure-to-accommodate and retaliation
claims under the ADA and in confining its summary judgment analysis to those
claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Keeler appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Department. Because Keeler failed to show good cause as to why the court should
modify its scheduling order to permit amendment of her complaint, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Keeler’s motion to amend the
8
In denying Keeler’s motion to amend, the district court noted that the proposed claims,
which included an FLSA claim, were futile and would not have survived a motion to dismiss.
The reasoning underlying this conclusion is not clear, however. See R1-39 at 4.
19
pleadings. Although we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment
with respect to Keeler’s failure-to-accommodate claim, we VACATE its judgment
and remand the case for further proceedings because Keeler’s complaint, liberally
construed, also stated a claim for retaliation under the FLSA.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
20