[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14660 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 21, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-80184-CR-DTKH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DWAINE EASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 21, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On June 15, 2007, the district court sentenced Dwaine Eason on a plea of
guilty to possession of a semi-automatic pistol and ammunition, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), to a prison term of 72 months. In July 2008,
Eason, proceeding pro se, filed a “nunc pro tunc motion based on defendant's
‘actual innocence’ of the illegal sentence enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4).” Eason did not appeal his sentence.1 The district court summarily
denied his motion. He now appeals the denial.
At sentencing, the district court enhanced Eason’s base offense level because
it determined that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon constituted
a crime of violence. He claims that the court erred in doing so because, after our
decision in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008), carrying a
concealed weapon does not constitute a violent felony for sentencing purposes.
Eason argues that he is “actually innocent” of the “illegal sentencing enhancement”
he received, and requests that we remand his case for resentencing.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Consequently, we construe
Eason’s motion as a request for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 35.
1
A motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is presently pending in
the district court.
2
A district court may not modify a defendant’s sentence except in limited
circumstances, which are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). United States v. James,
548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir. 2008) (addressing a § 3582(c)(2) motion). Section
3582(c) provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. — The court
may not modify
a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that —
(1) in any case —
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the term of
imprisonment (and may impose a term of
probation or supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved
portion of the original term of imprisonment),
after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable . . . .
(B) the court may modify an imposed term of
imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly
permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
(2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion
of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the
term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
3
Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
In addition, Rule 35 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Correcting Clear Error. Within 7 days after sentencing,
the court may correct a sentence that resulted from
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.
(b) Reducing a Sentence for Substantial Assistance.
(1) In General. Upon the government’s motion made within
one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if
the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial
assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.
(2) Later Motion. Upon the government’s motion made more
than one year after sentencing, the court may reduce a
sentence if the defendant's substantial assistance involved:
(A) information not known to the defendant until
one year or more after sentencing;
(B) information provided by the defendant to the
government within one year of sentencing, but
which did not become useful to the
government until more than one year after
sentencing; or
(C) information the usefulness of which could not
reasonably have been anticipated by the
defendant until more than one year after
sentencing and which was promptly provided
to the government after its usefulness was
reasonably apparent to the defendant.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.
4
Eason does not qualify for relief under § 3582(c) and Rule 35. The district
court’s judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.
5