[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14164 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 20, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
Agency No. A98-870-624
SO HON KWEE,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(April 20, 2009)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
So Hon Kwee, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
denial of asylum. Kwee sought asylum alleging that she suffered past persecution
and has a well-founded fear of future persecution by Indonesia’s Muslim majority
based upon her status as an ethnic Chinese Christian. The IJ denied her request
concluding that she had not established past persecution and also that she failed to
show a nexus between her religious beliefs and her fear of future persecution.
When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257
F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision without
a separate opinion, thus we review the IJ’s decision.
To the extent that the IJ’s decision was based on a legal determination, our
review is de novo. Nreka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 408 F.3d 1361, 1368 (11th Cir.
2005). The IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence
test, and we will affirm the IJ’s decision “if it is supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”
De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted). We will not reverse a factual determination unless the records compels a
contrary conclusion. Id.
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
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asylum. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). To be eligible for asylum,
the applicant must prove that she is a “refugee” within the meaning of the INA.
INA § 208(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish refugee status, the
applicant must show, with specific and credible evidence, either past persecution
or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b); Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir.
2007). “[A]n applicant can establish eligibility for asylum as long as he can show
that the persecution is, at least in part, motivated by a protected ground.” Sanchez
Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1232 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also 8
U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring in post-REAL ID Act cases that the claimed
protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant”). A showing of past persecution creates a presumption of a
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well-founded fear of future persecution. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d
1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005).
If an applicant fails to establish past persecution, he can prove eligibility for
asylum by showing (1) a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of
persecution that is (2) on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(i); De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007. The subjective component
can be satisfied by the applicant’s credible testimony that she genuinely fears
persecution. De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007. The objective prong can be
satisfied by establishing that the applicant has a good reason to fear future
persecution. Id.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that Kwee has not shown that the
incidents which she alleges constitute past persecution, e.g. being in a group of
people who were pulled off of public transportation by Muslims, being run out of
her pastor’s home, and receiving threatening phone calls, were “on account of” her
religious beliefs or ethnicity. As to the phone calls and the incident at her pastor’s
house, she was unable to identify who the perpetrators were or why they targeted
her. Kwee also testified that Muslims tried to prevent her neighbors from using
public transportation, but this applied to both Christians and Muslims. Thus, even
were we to conclude that these incidents constitute past persecution, which we
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need not do, Kwee has not presented evidence linking them to a protected ground.
Likewise, we conclude that she has not shown a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of her religious beliefs.
PETITION DENIED.
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