[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-13272 APRIL 9, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 94-06003-CR-DTKH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT LEWIS SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 9, 2009)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Robert Lewis Smith, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack
cocaine offense, through counsel, appeals the district court’s grant of his pro se
motion for a reduced sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Smith’s
motion was based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which
lowered the base offense levels associated with crack cocaine offenses, as well as
an argument that the district court could further reduce his sentence under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), and
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 558, 169 L. Ed. 2d 481
(2007). The district court granted the motion in part, recalculated the guideline
range applying Amendment 706, and imposed a sentence at the corresponding
point near the middle of the amended guideline range.
On appeal, Smith argues that Booker and Kimbrough apply to § 3582(c)(2)
proceedings, and that the district should further reduce his sentence after
considering his post-sentence rehabilitation and the continuing crack/powder
disparity. He argues that the district court should impose a sentence below the
amended guideline range, but that, based on the factors he presented, the district
court should at least reduce to the low end instead of the middle of the amended
guideline range. Smith also argues that he was denied assistance of counsel
because the district court ruled on his motion without allowing appointed counsel
to present arguments on his behalf.
2
Discretion to impose a sentence within the amended guideline range
“We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the sentencing
guidelines, for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343
(11th Cir. 2003). In addition, in the § 3582(c)(2) context, “we review de novo the
district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the
Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. White, 305 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.
2002).
The district court must engage in a two-part analysis when determining
whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
motion. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). The court
must: (1) recalculate the sentence under the amended Guidelines, and (2) decide, in
its discretion, whether it will choose to impose a new sentence or retain the original
sentence. Id. at 780-81. The second part of the analysis “should be made in light
of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 781. While a district court must
consider the § 3553(a) factors, it “commits no reversible error by failing to
articulate specifically the applicability–if any–of each of the section 3553(a)
factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into
account by the district court.” United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322
3
(11th Cir. 1997).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o),
upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added).
The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings is U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10, which instructs courts how to determine the amended guideline range.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (2008). The policy statement provides in relevant part
that “the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement to a term that is less than the
minimum of the amended guideline range determined under [§ 1B1.10(b)(1)].”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).
In United States v. Melvin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (11th Cir. February 3, 2009)
(No. 08-13497), we held that § 3582(c)(2) only allows a district court to reduce
sentences in a manner “consistent with the applicable policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission.” Id., at 9. We noted that the policy statement applicable
4
to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings prohibited the district court from reducing a term of
imprisonment below the low end of the amended guideline range. Id. at 5, 9; see
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). We further held that Booker and Kimbrough do not
apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, and that the district court could not rely on
Booker or Kimbrough to reduce the defendant’s sentence below the low end of the
amended guideline range. Melvin, ___ F.3d at ___.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing a reduced sentence within the amended guideline range.
Furthermore, the district court did not err in declining to reduce Smith’s sentence
further pursuant to Booker and Kimbrough because Booker and Kimrough do not
apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s sentence.
Assistance of Counsel
Proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) “do not constitute a full resentencing of the
defendant,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3), or a de novo resentencing,. United States v.
Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreno, 421 F.3d at 1220. Citing
Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(3) and (b)(4), we have held that, although the defendant must
be present at his initial sentencing, he “need not be present at proceedings
involving the correction or reduction of sentence under . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).”
United States v. Parrish, 427 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
5
Because Smith was not entitled to a hearing, and the district court granted
his motion for a reduced sentence, we conclude that Smith was not denied
assistance of counsel.
AFFIRMED.
6