[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14130 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar APRIL 2, 2009
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00475-CR-T-26-MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ORLANDO MATISAS MESA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 08-14134
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00475-CR-T-26-MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDUARDO DIAZ-SOLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
(April 2, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eduardo Diaz-Soler and Orlando Matisas Mesa (“the defendants”) appeal
from their convictions for conspiracy to manufacture 1,000 or more marijuana
plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), 846. On appeal, they argue
that: (1) the government breached their plea agreements by objecting to the
application of the safety valve; and (2) the district court clearly erred in denying
them safety valve and acceptance of responsibility sentencing reductions and in
applying an obstruction of justice enhancement. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review “the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). “Whether the government has breached a plea agreement[,
however,] is a question of law that [we] review[] de novo.” United States v.
Mahique, 150 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). We review for clear error a
district court’s factual determinations and subsequent denial of safety valve relief.
United States v. Camacho, 261 F.3d 1071, 1073 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
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The relevant facts are these. Diaz-Soler and Mesa pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement to a conspiracy charge. Subsequently, the government alleged that
the defendants changed their stories relating to their codefendants’ roles in the
offense of conviction and, at the government’s request, a revised presentence
investigation report recommended that they be denied safety valve relief and an
acceptance of responsibility reduction and receive an enhancement for obstructing
justice. As a result, Diaz-Soler moved to withdraw his guilty plea and Mesa
moved for specific performance of the plea agreement in relation to the application
of the safety valve. The district court denied those motions and, at sentencing,
denied them safety valve relief and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement, and sentenced them to the
mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. They now timely appeal.
First, we find no merit in the defendants’ claim that the government
breached their plea agreements. It is undisputed that a material promise by the
government, which induces the defendant to plead guilty, binds the government to
that promise. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Whether the
government violated a plea agreement is judged according to the defendant’s
reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time he entered the plea. United
States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 988 (11th Cir. 1992). If the government disputes the
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defendant’s understanding, however, we determine the terms of the agreement
according to objective standards. Id. When analyzing a plea agreement: (1) we do
not apply a hyper-technical and rigid construction of the language; (2) the written
agreement should be viewed against the background of the negotiations and should
not be interpreted to contradict directly an oral understanding; and (3) an
ambiguous plea agreement must be interpreted against the government. Id. When
a breach of an agreement by the government has been established, we may remand
the case to the district court, which may order specific performance of the
agreement or allow withdrawal of the plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63.
“Efforts by the Government to provide relevant factual information or to
correct misstatements are not tantamount to taking a position on the sentence and
will not violate the plea agreement.” United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 1086,
1090-91 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (discussing a plea agreement where the
government promised not to take a position on the sentence).1 “A prosecutor has a
duty to insure that the court has complete and accurate information concerning the
defendant. . . .” Id. at 1091. “Thus if an attorney for the Government is aware that
the court lacks certain relevant factual information or that the court is laboring
under mistaken premises, the attorney, as a prosecutor and officer of the court, has
1
Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that Unit B
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent in this Court).
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the duty to bring the correct state of affairs to the attention of the court.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). “[T]he Government does not have a right to make an
agreement to stand mute in the face of factual inaccuracies or to withhold relevant
factual information from the court.” Id. at 1092.
A district court shall impose a sentence pursuant to the guidelines, without
regard to any statutory maximum if, inter alia, the court finds that “the defendant
has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2(a)(5). In Mahique, the government “agreed not to oppose Mahique’s
request to be sentenced under the safety-valve provision ‘if he is eligible, and the
Court makes appropriate findings regarding the criteria . . . .’” 150 F.3d at 1331.
“Mahique made a full confession, but then attempted to retract part of his
admissions during his interview for the presentence report,” and the government
opposed application of the safety valve. Id. Mahique moved to withdraw his plea
based on the government’s breach. We found that the government had not
breached the plea agreement by opposing application of the safety valve:
The government’s promise in the plea agreement not to oppose
Mahique’s request to be sentenced under the safety-valve provision
was conditioned on him being eligible for the provision and the
district court finding that he met all criteria for application of the
provision. . . . Because the government argued that Mahique was
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ineligible for the safety-valve provision since he did not meet the
criteria -- a condition of the plea agreement -- there was no breach.
Id. at 1332.
Here, the district court did not err by denying the defendants’
challenges to their plea agreements. The government had a duty to inform
the district court of the defendants’ inconsistent statements, and it
specifically reserved in their plea agreements the right to report relevant
factual information to the district court in connection with sentencing. See
Block, 660 F.2d at 1091-92. Those statements made them ineligible for the
safety valve, and the government’s promise to not oppose their request for
application of the safety valve was conditioned on their first qualifying for
the safety valve. See Mahique, 150 F.3d at 1330-32.
We also reject the defendants’ challenge to the district court’s
application of the Guidelines provisions. Section 5C1.2(a) of the Sentencing
Guidelines provides that, for offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841, among others,
if the defendant meets five criteria, the court may impose a sentence in
accordance with the applicable guidelines range without regard to any
statutory mandatory minimum sentence. The record supports, and the parties
do not dispute, that Diaz-Soler and Mesa meet four of the criteria. The fifth
criterion requires that:
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not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence
the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the
fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to
provide or that the Government is already aware of the information
shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has
complied with this requirement.
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5).
The last prong of the safety-valve provision places on the defendant
“an affirmative responsibility to truthfully disclose to the government all
information and evidence that he has about the offense and all relevant
conduct.” United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quotation omitted). A district court may not apply the safety valve if it
determines that the defendant withheld or misrepresented information even
if the information would not have aided further investigation or prosecution
if properly disclosed. United States v. Figueroa, 199 F.3d 1281, 1282-83
(11th Cir. 2000). In determining the honesty of a defendant, the district court
must independently assess the facts and may not rely on the government’s
assertion of dishonesty. United States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795, 797 (11th
Cir. 1999).
Conspiracy to commit an offense carries the same penalty as
prescribed for the offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846. The statutory minimum
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sentence for possessing 1,000 or more marijuana plants is 10 years. 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). If the statutorily required minimum sentence is
greater than the maximum applicable guideline range, the statutorily
required minimum sentence becomes the guideline sentence. U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.1(b). Where “the district court correctly imposed the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence, any error in the guidelines calculations is
harmless and we need not address” challenges to the guidelines calculations.
United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).
The district court did not clearly err in denying Diaz-Soler and Mesa
the safety valve because the district court found that both defendants had
changed their stories, and because these inconsistent statements to the
government made them ineligible. See Figueroa, 199 F.3d at 1282-83;
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). Moreover, since the district court correctly
sentenced Diaz-Soler and Mesa to the mandatory minimum sentence, we
decline to address their challenges to the imposition of an obstruction of
justice enhancement and denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction.
See Raad, 406 F.3d at 1323 n.1.
AFFIRMED.
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