[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-12196 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 16, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00288-CR-2-KD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TARLTON JAY FISHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 16, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Tarlton Jay Fisher appeals his 262-month sentence for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
On appeal, Fisher argues that the district court erroneously classified the
drugs attributed to him as “ice,” instead of methamphetamine, for sentencing
purposes.1 But the government argues that we need not reach the drug purity issue:
the district court noted that it would impose the same sentence even if it calculated
the guidelines range incorrectly, and the government contends that Fisher’s
ultimate sentence is reasonable.
In cases involving disputed guidelines issues, we have invited lower courts
to state on the record whether they would have imposed the same sentence even if
they have decided the guidelines issue incorrectly. United States v. Keene, 470
F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). If a district court makes such a statement, we
will uphold the sentence as long as it is reasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors; and in determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we assume that the
district court decided the guidelines issue incorrectly and that the advisory
1
“Ice” is a certain kind of methamphetamine that is of at least 80% purity. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c) (n. (C)).
2
guidelines range should be reduced accordingly. Id.
Here, because the district court stated that it would impose the same
sentence even if it had made a guidelines calculation error about the quality of the
drugs involved, we review Fisher’s ultimate sentence for reasonableness. And we
assume that the district court concluded incorrectly that the methamphetamine
attributable to Fisher was “ice.” So Fisher’s advisory guidelines range should be
reduced from 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment to 135 to 168 months’
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1), (3).2
We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence -- whether inside
or outside the guidelines range -- under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The party challenging the
reasonableness of the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is
unreasonable in the light of both the record and the section 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). Briefly stated, under section
3553(a), a district court should consider, among other things, the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
need for the sentence to provide adequate deterrence, respect for the law, and
2
This range is based on a base offense level of 34, a 2-level enhancement for gun
possession, a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and a criminal history category
of I.
3
protection of the public, policy statements of the Sentencing Commission,
provision for the medical and educational needs of the defendant, and the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
We conclude that, even if the district court erred in its drug purity
determination, Fisher’s ultimate sentence is reasonable. Although his sentence
varied upward from the correctly calculated advisory guidelines range by 94
months, it was well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment that he
faced. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241,
1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (comparing, as one indication of reasonableness, the actual
prison term imposed against the statutory maximum). In addition, the district court
stated that the sentence was appropriate because of Fisher’s disrespect for the law
and the need to protect the public from his violent conduct. Furthermore, the court
noted that it would have imposed the same 262-month sentence, no matter a
guideline calculation error, based on Fisher’s violent nature and his history.
Based on the evidence in the record -- including the sentencing testimony of
15 witnesses about the extensiveness of Fisher’s drug operation and his violent
tendencies -- we conclude that the district court justified an upwardly variant
sentence. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (explaining that a sentencing judge “must
consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
4
compelling to support the degree of the variance”). Fisher, on many occasions,
resorted to violence to further his drug activities, including shooting into houses of
those who had failed to pay him for drugs. He also harassed a police officer
assigned to investigate his drug activities, possessed contraband items in his prison
cell after his arrest, and threatened to beat up a corrections officer. Thus, several
section 3553(a) factors -- including Fisher’s history of violence, promoting respect
for the law, and protecting the public from Fisher -- warranted an above-guidelines
sentence. See § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (C).
Here, the district court adequately justified its sentence in the face of any
guideline calculation error. On this record, we see no abuse.3
AFFIRMED.
3
Because we conclude that Fisher’s ultimate sentence is reasonable even in the light of
guideline calculation error, we decline to address whether the district court clearly erred in
classifying the methamphetamine attributable to Fisher as “ice.”
5