[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-14163 MARCH 13, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A97-197-619
BEATRICE MUKANGANYAMA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(March 13, 2009)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Beatrice Mukanganyama, a citizen of Zimbabwe, challenges the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s order denying her
application for withholding of removal and relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (“CAT”).1
We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts
the IJ’s decision. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision, so our review is limited to
the BIA’s order. We review the BIA’s factual determinations under the highly
deferential “substantial evidence” test. Forgue v. United States Att’y Gen., 401
F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). Under that test, we “must affirm the BIA’s
decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. We will reverse the
BIA’s findings of fact “only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that
the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of
administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
“An alien seeking withholding of removal under the INA must show that
[her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
1
Mukanganyama had also applied for asylum, but her petition was denied because she
filed it more than one year after she arrived in the United States. She does not dispute that
determination in this appeal.
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Mendoza v. United
States Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A)). The alien “bears the burden of demonstrating that [she]
more-likely-than-not would be persecuted or tortured upon [her] return to the
country in question.” Id. “If the alien establishes past persecution in [her] country
based on a protected ground,” there is a rebuttable presumption that the alien’s
“life or freedom would be threatened upon return to [her] country.” Id. “An alien
who has not shown past persecution, though, may still be entitled to withholding of
removal if [she] can demonstrate a future threat to [her] life or freedom on a
protected ground in [her] country.” Id.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Mukanganyama has not
suffered past persecution. Mukanganyama’s claim is based on involvement in the
Movement for Democratic Change political party. Specifically, she testified about
several instances of verbal harassment and one instance when she was arrested
during a political rally, detained, and beaten by the police. She also testified about
the death of her husband under suspicious circumstances. Persecution, however, is
“an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation.” Silva v. United States Att’y. Gen., 448 F.3d 1229,
1237 (11th Cir. 2006). We have held that a petitioner’s thirty-six hour detention,
during which the petitioner was beaten and suffered minor injuries similar to those
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alleged by Mukanganyama, was insufficient to compel a finding of persecution.
See Djonda v. United States Att’y. Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008).
Mukanganyama argues that we also must consider her testimony that her husband
was killed while in police custody because of similar political beliefs. The BIA
appears to have discounted that testimony because her husband’s death certificate
listed his cause of death as due to illness, not physical injury. But even under
Mukanganyama’s version of the events, her husband was killed because of his
political beliefs, not because of hers. His murder therefore did not directly threaten
her. That leaves us with only the instances of verbal harassment and the single
detention, which are insufficient to compel us to reverse the BIA’s determination.
See id.; Silva, 448 F.3d at 1237.
There is also substantial evidence to support the BIA’s finding that it is not
likely that Mukanganyama will suffer persecution in the future. She was a minor
member in the Movement for Democratic Change party and she never voted in an
election. It is therefore doubtful that the government remembers her after her
several-year absence, much less that it will seek her out upon her return. See
Sepulveda v. United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that threats of future violence based on prior political activity are
insufficient to compel a finding of future persecution where the evidence does not
indicate that the petitioner’s notoriety would outlast her four-year absence).
4
Finally, Mukanganyama has waived her claim for CAT relief by failing to
make any argument on that issue. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881
F.2d 1570, 1573 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that an issue is waived where the
party fails to provide an argument on the merits of that issue).
PETITION DENIED.
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