[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-13212 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 25, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-21129-CV-RLD
CLINTON J. MOORE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Michael J. Astrue,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 25, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clinton Moore appeals a decision that affirmed the denial of his application
for supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration. 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Moore argues that the administrative law judge
failed to account for all his past relevant work and erred by finding that he had the
residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work. We affirm.
We review the decision of the administrative law judge “‘to determine if it is
supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.’”
Crawford v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
Moore argues that the administrative law judge based his finding of no
disability on Moore’s light work as a head cashier and excluded his more strenuous
responsibilities, but we disagree. The administrative law judge posed to the
vocational expert various hypothetical questions that included Moore’s restrictions
and his job duties. Those questions took into account that Moore was not required
to perform tasks classified as medium work. The administrative law judge
formulated his questions based on Moore’s testimony that, as head cashier, he was
required to operate the cash register but had authority to assign other tasks, such as
stocking coolers and mopping the floor, to other employees. See Jackson v.
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Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (To establish a prima
facie case of disability, the claimant must prove that he can no longer “perform his
past kind of work, not that he merely [is] unable to perform a specific job he held
in the past.” (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e)).
Substantial evidence supports the finding by the administrative law judge
that Moore was not disabled. Moore complained of back injuries, gout, and
alcohol abuse, but none of those conditions is a listed impairment. Moore failed to
present any evidence of alcoholism. Medical reports established that Moore’s gout
was cured in 2001 and his back injuries substantially improved with medication
and physical therapy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d
1169, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). An independent physical
examination and residual functional capacity assessment established that Moore
was capable of light work. Moore’s complaints were also inconsistent with his
testimony that he drove his car and performed household chores such as laundry,
sweeping his room, and making his bed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i).
The denial of Moore’s application for benefits is AFFIRMED.
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