[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 18, 2009
No. 07-14079 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 90-00950-CR-WMH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NELSON MANTECON-ZAYAS,
a.k.a. Nelsito,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 18, 2009)
Before BLACK, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nelson Mantecon-Zayas appeals his 240-month sentence imposed for one
count of conspiracy to import marijuana and two counts of attempt to import
cocaine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. Mantecon-Zayas argues that the
district court committed harmful Booker1 error.2 For the reasons set forth below,
we vacate and remand for re-sentencing.3
I.
In a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), a probation officer outlined the
drug importation activities for which Mantecon-Zayas was charged and other
activities learned by the government before and during trial. The probation officer
used the drug amounts associated with this offense conduct and (1) set Mantecon-
Zayas’s base offense level at 40, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, because he was
responsible for 162,404 kilograms of marijuana; (2) applied a 4-level
1
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
2
Mantecon-Zayas also argues that the district court erred in sentencing him when he was
not present and in failing to verify that he had reviewed the presentence investigation report
(“PSI”). Because we must vacate and remand on the Booker issue, however, we need not
address these arguments.
3
We note that the district court originally sentenced Mantecon-Zayas in 1993. However, pursuant
to a granted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, the district court
vacated Mantecon-Zayas’s original sentence and imposed an identical sentence, on August 29,
2007. The purpose of the amended judgment was to allow Mantecon-Zayas to file a technically
out-of-time direct appeal, under United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the instant notice of appeal, filed on August 30, 2007, was timely, and we have
jurisdiction.
2
enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, because Mantecon-Zayas was an
organizer and leader of the conspiracy; (3) set Mantecon-Zayas’s criminal history
category at II; and (4) determined that, given these calculations, Mantecon-Zayas’s
guideline imprisonment range was life. Mantecon-Zayas objected to, inter alia,
(1) the calculation of the drug amount for which he was responsible; (2) the
calculation of his criminal history category; (3) the consideration of Fed.R.Evid.
404(b) evidence learned before and during trial, and (4) the refusal to grant a
downward departure based on Mantecon-Zayas’s substantial assistance.
At a sentencing hearing, Mantecon-Zayas argued, with regard to his Rule
404(b) objection, that the activities were not charged or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the Supreme Court repeatedly had held that a sentencing
court should not use such uncharged, unproven evidence. Mantecon-Zayas also
objected to receiving a four-level role enhancement. The district court
(1) sustained the criminal-history-category objection, reasoning that the
appropriate category was I; (2) overruled the Rule 404(b) objection, reasoning that
the amounts of drugs associated with the charged drug-importation activities were
sufficient to support the base offense level; (3) denied the downward-departure
request, reasoning that government had not filed a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion; and
(4) sustained the role-enhancement objection, reasoning that, though there was
3
evidence that Mantecon-Zayas organized the conspiracy, there also was evidence
that Mantecon-Zayas played a lesser role and the sentences contemplated already
were large. The district court acknowledged that sustaining the criminal-history-
category objection was a “stretch,” but stated that it believed the “mild stretch” was
warranted because it was “bother[ed]” that Mantecon-Zayas was subject to
approximately 25 years’ or more imprisonment while one of his co-conspirators
only was subject to less than half that term of imprisonment.
The district court determined that, given its rulings, Mantecon-Zayas’s base
offense level was 40, criminal history category was I, and guideline imprisonment
range was 292 to 365 months. The district court sentenced Mantecon-Zayas to 300
months’ imprisonment. The district court indicated that, while another district
court might sentence Mantecon-Zayas to a harsher sentence given the amount of
cocaine involved in the offense, it “[did not] believe in burying someone” and was
influenced to be lenient by Mantecon-Zayas’s age and family. The district court
also indicated that it would not be too lenient because it recognized that whether
Mantecon-Zayas deserved a harsh or lenient sentence could be “argued both
ways.” Pursuant to Mantecon-Zayas’s motion to modify his sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in 1997, the district court re-sentenced Mantecon-Zayas to 240
months’ imprisonment.
4
II.
In Booker, decided in January 2005, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a
jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 543 U.S. at 243-44, 125 S.Ct. at 755-56. The Supreme Court
also determined that the then-mandatory nature of the Guidelines implicated the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and excised those provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory and binding on
federal courts and held that courts of appeals must review sentences for
“unreasonableness.” Id. at 244-245, 259, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57, 764.
Under Booker, there are two types of error that a district court might commit
in sentencing a defendant: constitutional and statutory. United States v. Lee, 427
F.3d 881, 891 (11th Cir. 2005). A constitutional Booker error under the Sixth
Amendment “occurs when extra-verdict enhancements are used to reach a result
under [the Guidelines] that is binding on the sentencing judge.” Id. A statutory
Booker error “consists in sentencing a defendant under the Guidelines as if they
were mandatory and not advisory, even in the absence of a Sixth Amendment
violation.” Id.
5
A defendant who wishes to argue that a district court committed a Booker
error may preserve such an argument in a number of ways. See United States v.
Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1374 (11th Cir. 2005). For example, a defendant
successfully preserves a Booker claim when he objects before the district court that
a fact relevant to a sentencing enhancement “should go to the jury” or be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Dowling, 403 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2005).
When the defendant successfully preserves the issue, we review the Booker
claim under a harmless error standard. United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289,
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005). There are two applicable harmless error standards: one
standard that applies to constitutional Booker errors and one standard that applies
to statutory Booker errors. Id. A constitutional Booker error is harmless if the
government can show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute
to the defendant’s ultimate sentence. A statutory Booker error is harmless if we
determine that, viewing the proceedings in their entirety, the error did not affect or
had a very slight effect on the defendant’s sentence. Id.
III.
The district court committed a Booker error that affected Mantecon-Zayas’s
sentence. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 891; Mathenia, 409 F.3d at 1291-92. First, the
6
district court committed at least statutory Booker error, as it sentenced Mantecon-
Zayas before the Guidelines were rendered advisory only. See Booker, 543 U.S. at
244-245, 259, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57, 764; Lee, 427 F.3d at 891. It is not clear if the
district court also committed constitutional Booker error. We need not determine,
however, if the district court committed a Sixth Amendment violation because
Mantecon-Zayas merits relief based on the statutory Booker error alone, as
discussed below.
Also, Mantecon-Zayas preserved the Booker-error claim, as he argued at
sentencing that the extra-verdict activities were not charged or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and, therefore, should not be used in determining his sentence.
See Munoz, 430 F.3d at 1347; Dowling, 403 F.3d at 1245.
Furthermore, this statutory Booker error does not pass harmless error
review, since the record viewed as a whole does not suggest that it did not affect or
had a very slight effect on Mantecon-Zayas’s sentence, as the district court
indicated some desire to impose a sentence lower than the guideline imprisonment
range. See Mathenia, 409 F.3d at 1291-92. Specifically, the district court
sustained the role-enhancement objection, although it was a “stretch” to do so, in
part because it believed that Mantecon-Zayas’s sentence already was large enough
and in part because it was bothered that Mantecon-Zayas’s guideline imprisonment
7
range was higher than that of a codefendant. The district court thereby indicated
that it did not believe that a Guideline sentence was entirely appropriate for the
circumstances presented. Therefore, because the district court committed a
harmful Booker error, we vacate the sentence imposed and remand for re-
sentencing under an advisory Guidelines scheme. 4
VACATED and REMANDED.
4
The government agrees that Mantecon-Zayas should be resentenced and we appreciate
such candor.
8