[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-13856 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 18, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00103-CR-ORL-13KRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WALLACE RAY SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 18, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wallace Ray Smith appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
the intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(b)(1)(A)(vii). He raises a single issue on appeal, namely whether the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy.
Smith argues his conviction was not supported by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt because the Government failed to establish Smith had knowledge of the
conspiracy. Smith further contends the district court, in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal, essentially allocated to him the burden of proving what he
did not know and relied on impermissible inferences.
“Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law that we review de novo.”
United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1193 (11th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, we consider “the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government.” United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.
2005). We also make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of
the Government and the jury’s verdict. Id. We must affirm “unless, under no
reasonable construction of the evidence, could the jury have found the [defendant]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “The evidence need not exclude every
hypothesis of innocence or be completely inconsistent with every conclusion other
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than guilt because a jury may select among constructions of the evidence.” United
States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1391 (11th Cir. 1997).
To support a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the Government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the
defendant had knowledge of it, and (3) he voluntarily joined it. United States v.
Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he existence of an
agreement in a conspiracy case is rarely proven by direct evidence that the
conspirators formally entered or reached an agreement. . . . The more common
method of proving an agreement is through circumstantial evidence.” United
States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562, 1274 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). “A
defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy may be established through
proof of surrounding circumstances such as acts committed by the defendant
which furthered the purpose of the conspiracy.” United States v. Bain, 736 F.2d
1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1984). In addition, “the defendant’s own statements may be
used to infer his participation in a conspiracy.” United States v. Cooper, 873 F.2d
269, 272 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, a defendant’s presence in a vehicle with drugs
combined with evidence the defendant made conflicting statements or related
implausible stories to authorities may support a conviction for conspiracy. United
States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 1994). Finally, there is a
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general principle that, in cases involving large amounts of narcotics, “a prudent
smuggler is not likely to suffer the presence of unaffiliated bystanders.” United
States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
In this case, Smith does not argue there was no conspiracy to distribute
marijuana; rather, he contends he was unaware of the conspiracy. The cumulative
effect of the circumstantial evidence, however, belies Smith’s contention that he
lacked knowledge of the conspiracy. See Morales, 868 F.2d at 1274. Smith
traveled from Texas to Florida in a truck that carried a 600-pound marijuana
shipment and had a strong odor of marijuana emanating from it. He was present at
the initial delivery of the truck containing the hidden marijuana. After the truck
was unloaded, Smith made inculpatory statements to the confidential informant
acknowledging the contents of the truck and the presence of a chase car. See
Cooper, 873 F.2d at 272. Moreover, the jury was entitled to view Smith’s trial
testimony and statement to law enforcement that he did not meet with anyone
during the trip as substantive evidence tending to prove guilt because the
statements were inconsistent with surveillance video that showed Smith meeting
with two Hispanic men from the chase car. See Stanley, 24 F.3d at 1320–21.
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As further support of his arguments, Smith cites the district court’s order
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and the court’s observation of the
possibility he was not a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Smith argues the
court’s observation demonstrates his guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. This contention, however, is without merit because the evidence need not
exclude every hypothesis of innocence. Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1391.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we
conclude a reasonable jury could have found Smith knowingly participated in the
conspiracy. The cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
sustain Smith’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute
marijuana. Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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