J-S38005-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN ALLEN MUMMERT
Appellant No. 1635 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on August 28, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-01-CR-0000291-2014
CP-01-CR-0000528-2013
CP-01-CR-0000882-2013
BEFORE: WECHT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
Steven Mummert appeals his August 28, 2014 judgments of sentence,
which were entered at the three docket numbers noted above (hereinafter
291 of 2014, 528 of 2013, and 882 of 2013, respectively). The sentences
consisted of one new sentence imposed upon a negotiated guilty plea and
two revocation sentences of the intermediate punishment sentences imposed
at 528 and 882 of 2013, which arose from violations caused by the new
crime charged at 291 of 2014. In lieu of an advocate’s brief, counsel for
Mummert has filed an Anders/Santiago brief1 averring that Mummert has
____________________________________________
1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). In Santiago, our Supreme Court
developed certain rules to ensure compliance with the principles underlying
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S38005-15
no non-frivolous issues to pursue on appeal. As well, counsel has filed a
petition to withdraw as counsel. After careful review, we grant counsel’s
petition to withdraw and affirm Mummert’s judgments of sentence.
The facts underlying the issue presented are immaterial to our
disposition of the instant appeal. Accordingly, we relate only the case’s
procedural history, which the trial court fully related in its first Rule 1925(a)
opinion:
This appeal raises, in a consolidated fashion, challenges to two
separate Orders.1 On appeal, [Mummert] raises a boilerplate
claim that the sentencing court manifestly abused its discretion
in sentencing [Mummert]. To aid in disposition of the appeal,
the procedural history of each case will be separately discussed.
______________________
1
[Mummert], in his Notice of Appeal, challenged three
separate orders including the sentencing order in [291 of
2014] in addition to those captioned hereinabove[, i.e.,
528 and 882 of 2013]. In his Concise Statement of
[Errors] Complained of on Appeal, [Mummert] challenges
only the sentencing orders in [528 and 882 of 2013].
Accordingly, any claims raised in [291 of 2014] are
waived. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co.,
804 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. 2002).[2]
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the Anders decision. Thus, it is common practice in this Court to refer to
briefs filed thereunder as “Anders/Santiago briefs.”
2
In 291 of 2014, Mummert entered a negotiated guilty plea to forgery
as a felony of the third degree. As per the terms of the plea agreement, the
trial court sentenced him to 36 months of probation consecutive to any other
sentence for which he was under supervision. Consistently with the trial
court’s account, before this Court Anders counsel identifies a challenge only
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2-
J-S38005-15
In [528 of 2013, Mummert] originally pled guilty on September
16, 2013, to receiving stolen property as a misdemeanor of the
first degree.2 Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, [Mummert]
was sentenced to 24 months in the county intermediate
punishment program. While under supervision, [Mummert] was
convicted of forgery as a felony of the third degree.3 As a result
of his conviction on the new charge, [Mummert] was revoked
from his sentence of intermediate punishment and resentenced
on August 28, 2014, to serve a sentence of no less than one
year nor more than five years [incarceration] to run concurrently
with the sentenced imposed in [882 of 2013], however,
consecutive to any other sentence [Mummert] was serving.
[Mummert] filed a Post-Sentence Motion for Reconsideration on
September 8, 2014, claiming that the imposition of the sentence
consecutive to a sentence of probation on the new felony
conviction resulted in an excessive sentence totaling eight years
of supervision. The motion was denied by the sentencing court
[on September 9, 2014] without a hearing.
______________________
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(3).
In [882 of 2013], [Mummert] was originally convicted of
terroristic threats as a misdemeanor of the first degree4 on
November 18, 2013, following a plea of guilty which was entered
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to that
agreement, [Mummert] was sentenced to 24 months of county
intermediate punishment. Following his conviction on the new
forgery charge, which occurred while on supervision, [Mummert]
was also revoked in this matter. On August 28, 2014,
[Mummert] was resentenced [to incarceration] in a state
correctional institution of no less than one year nor more than
five years to run concurrent with the sentence imposed in [528
of 2013], however, consecutive to any other sentence
[Mummert] was serving. Once again, [a] timely Post-Sentence
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
to the aggregate effect of the sentences entered at 528 and 882 of 2013.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 1.
-3-
J-S38005-15
Motion for Reconsideration was filed which was denied by [the
sentencing court] without [a] hearing.
______________________
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1)
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/31/2015, at 1-2 (citations modified).
Mummert filed a unitary notice of appeal at the three above-captioned
docket numbers on September 26, 2014. On October 6, 2014, the trial
court entered an order directing Mummert to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-
one days of the date of that order. When no concise statement was filed
within the prescribed time period, or at all, the trial court, on December 23,
2014, issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Therein, the trial
court, correctly noting that the failure to file a concise statement when
directed to do so typically results in waiver pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii),
expressed uncertainty as to what issues Mummert might intend to raise, and
opined that this appeal should be quashed or dismissed due to waiver
issues. See T.C.O., 12/23/2014, at 2-3 (citing Everett Cash Mut. Ins, Co.
v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 804 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. 2002)).
These events prompted this Court to remand Mummert’s appeal,
rather than deem it waived, for the proper filing of a Rule 1925(b) concise
statement nunc pro tunc and the trial court’s preparation of an opinion on
the merits of the issues raised by Mummert, as required by Rule 1925(a).
See Commonwealth v. Mummert, 1635 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. June 22,
-4-
J-S38005-15
2015) (unpublished memorandum) (outlining detailed reasoning in support
of remand).3
The trial court complied with our order, ordering Mummert to file a
concise statement nunc pro tunc. Mummert timely complied. Notably, in his
concise statement, Mummert challenged only his one to five-year sentences
in each of his revocation cases, docketed at 528 and 882 of 2013, upon the
basis that imposing them consecutively to his probation sentence at 291 of
2014 rendered his aggregate sentence manifestly excessive. Thus, as noted
in the trial court’s August opinion, Mummert waived any intended challenge
to his sentence at 291 of 2014 for purposes of appeal. Furthermore, in his
nunc pro tunc concise statement, Mummert’s asserted error was entirely
consistent with the issue raised and discussed in the Anders/Santiago brief
that had already been filed in this Court.
In response to Mummert’s timely nunc pro tunc concise statement, the
trial court issued its opinion on the merits on December 23, 2014, from
which the above procedural history has been drawn. Therein, the trial court
squarely addressed the issue presented, observing that trial court enjoys
broad discretion to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively,
____________________________________________
3
Our remand was consistent with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3), which provides
that, “[i]f an appellant in a criminal case was ordered to file a Statement and
failed to do so, such that counsel has been per se ineffective, the appellate
court shall remand for the filing of a Statement nunc pro tunc and for the
preparation and filing of an opinion by the judge.”
-5-
J-S38005-15
explaining that bald statements of excessiveness arising from consecutivity
do not present a substantial question under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and
concluding that Mummert’s challenge did not warrant relief. See T.C.O.,
12/23/2014, at 3-4.
Our earlier memorandum remanding the case did not direct that the
parties file additional briefs following the completion below of all Rule 1925
procedures. The nunc pro tunc concise statement, the trial court’s opinion in
response thereto, and the briefs filed by Mummert and by the
Commonwealth all fully address the lone issue identified by counsel as
pertinent in this appeal. Consequently, only delay would result were we to
direct further briefing. The procedural irregularities having been cured, this
case now is ripe for our review.
In his Anders/Santiago brief, counsel for Mummert raises the
following question:
Did the sentencing court manifestly abuse its discretion when it
sentenced [Mummert] to serve a sentence of no less than 1 year
nor more than 5 years in a State Correctional Institution on [528
and 882 of 2013], to run concurrently with one another, but
consecutive to any other sentence?
Brief for Mummert at 5.
Because counsel for Mummert proceeds pursuant to Anders and
Santiago, this Court first must pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw
before reviewing the merits of the sentencing issue counsel presents.
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
-6-
J-S38005-15
banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel under Anders, counsel must file a
brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme Court in
Santiago. Pursuant thereto, the brief must provide the following
information:
(1) a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) reference to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.
Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his rights to
“(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal;
or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”
Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007); see
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010). Finally,
to facilitate our review of counsel’s satisfaction of his obligations, he must
attach to his petition to withdraw the letter that he transmitted to his client.
See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
-7-
J-S38005-15
Our review of counsel’s petition to withdraw and the accompanying
brief demonstrates that counsel has satisfied Santiago’s requirements.
Counsel has provided a procedural history detailing the events relevant to
this appeal with appropriate citations to the record. See Brief for Mummert
at 6-7. Counsel also has articulated Mummert’s stated issue and has
analyzed the information presented to the sentencing court that is favorable
to Mummert’s appeal. Ultimately, counsel has concluded that Mummert has
no non-frivolous bases upon which to challenge his sentence, nor any other
non-frivolous issues to raise, because the essence of Mummert’s argument
for establishing that his revocation sentences at 528 and 882 of 2013
reflected an abuse of discretion would be the trial court’s failure to consider
mitigating factors, which does not, without more, establish grounds for relief
from the discretionary aspects of his sentences. See id. at 10-13.
Counsel also sent Mummert a letter informing him that counsel
identified no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal; that counsel filed an
application to withdraw from Mummert’s representation; and that Mummert
could elect to find new counsel or to proceed pro se.4 Counsel has attached
the letter to his petition to withdraw, as required by Millisock. See Petition
to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/28/2014 (letter dated 7/24/2014). Accordingly,
____________________________________________
4
Mummert has not filed any documents with this Court through retained
counsel or pro se.
-8-
J-S38005-15
counsel has complied with Santiago’s technical requirements. See
Millisock, 873 A.2d at 751.
Before we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, however, we must
conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether this
appeal is, as counsel claims, wholly frivolous, or if Mummert has any non-
frivolous issues that warrant advocacy by counsel. Santiago, 978 A.2d at
355 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744) (“[T]he court—not counsel—then
proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether
the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw . . . .”). As noted, the lone such issue identified by counsel
concerns the alleged excessiveness of Mummert’s aggregate sentence,
where the two challenged sentences at 528 and 882 of 2013, while imposed
concurrently with each other, were imposed to be consecutive relative to the
three-year sentence of probation that was imposed in 291 of 2014.
Sentencing is a matter that is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. Commonwealth v. Dykes, 541 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 1988).
To constitute an abuse of discretion, a sentence must either exceed the
statutory limits or be patently excessive. Commonwealth v. White, 491
A.2d 252 (1985).
We have held as follows:
-9-
J-S38005-15
The imposition of sentence following the revocation of
probation[5] is vested within the sound discretion of the trial
court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be
disturbed on appeal. An abuse of discretion is more than an
error in judgment—a sentencing court has not abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill[ ]will.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). “Our standard of review is limited to
determining the validity of the probation revocation proceedings and the
authority of the sentencing court to consider the same sentencing
alternatives that it had at the time of the initial sentencing.”
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 322-23 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Upon revocation of intermediate punishment, “the sentencing
alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the
time of initial sentencing.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771. A court may impose a
sentence of total confinement for a revocation under the following
circumstances:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another
crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
imprisoned; or
____________________________________________
5
The legal standards that apply to revocations of parole and probation
apply equally to revocations of county intermediate punishment. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013).
- 10 -
J-S38005-15
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
authority of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c).
A claim that a sentence is excessive presents a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentence. Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d
884, 886 (Pa. Super 2008). “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right
to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849
A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004). To obtain review of the merits of a
challenge to the discretionary aspects of a particular sentence, an appellant
must include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his or her brief.6 Therein,
“the appellant must show that there is a substantial question that the
sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” McAfee,
849 A.2d at 274. A substantial question requires a demonstration that “the
sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set
forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying
____________________________________________
6
In pertinent part, Rule 2119 provides the following:
(f) Discretionary aspects of sentence. An appellant who
challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal
matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence. The statement shall
immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect to
the discretionary aspects of sentence.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
- 11 -
J-S38005-15
the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365
(Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627
(Pa. 2002)). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is
sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary
only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.
Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc)) (emphasis in
Goggins).
The Rule 2119(f) statement enables this Court to determine whether
the appellant has raised a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Kiesel,
854 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa. Super. 2004). Counsel has provided such a
statement in this matter. Therein, counsel asserts that the imposition of the
two appealed sentences consecutively to his three-year probationary
sentence for forgery was “contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process.” Brief for Mummert at 9 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 528 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
Accordingly, our independent review must begin with an examination
of whether a substantial question may be raised in connection with the
challenged sentences. As thoroughly documented by the Commonwealth,
this Court generally has found that no substantial question lies when the
challenge asserted is based upon blanket claims of excessiveness, or a trial
court’s exercise of discretion in determining whether and to what extent to
impose a given sentence concurrently to or consecutively with another
sentence. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 13-23; see Commonwealth
- 12 -
J-S38005-15
v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“A challenge to the
imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences does not present
a substantial question regarding the discretionary aspects of sentence.”
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877, 880
(Pa. Super. 2008)). But see Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808
(Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.2d 365,
372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc)) (“[T]he imposition of consecutive, rather
than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in . . . the most
extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly
harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of
imprisonment.”).
Mummert’s available arguments sound variously in propositions that
that Pennsylvania courts generally have found do not present substantial
question. First, while allegations of excessiveness due to consecutivity may
present a substantial question, they do so only in cases where such a
sentence “raises the aggregate sentence to[] what appears upon its face to
be[] an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.”
Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Matromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Also of note, we have held as follows:
[A]n allegation that the sentencing court failed to consider
mitigating factors generally does not raise a substantial question
for our review. Moreover, where . . . the sentencing court had
the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, we can
assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information
- 13 -
J-S38005-15
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.
Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 918-19 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mummert’s sentence for a felony of the third degree at 291 of 2014
was three years’ probation, despite the fact that it was at a third offense.
His original sentences for two misdemeanors of the first degree (528 and
882 of 2013) were, at each charge, two years’ of intermediate punishment.
Following his plea at 291 of 2014, the trial court imposed concurrent
revocation sentences of one to five years’ incarceration, set to run
consecutively to his probationary sentence at 291 of 2014. Thus, his
aggregate sentence could amount to two years’ incarceration followed by
three years’ parole followed by three years’ probation, for a minimum
aggregate sentence of eight years’ supervision, with as few as two years
served in a state correctional institution, and, in its harshest scenario, would
involve five years’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. The
maximum sentence of confinement for one misdemeanor of the first degree
is five years, and Mummert pleaded guilty to two such charges. See 18
Pa.C.S. § 1104(1). The maximum sentence for a felony of the third degree
is seven years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). Thus, in the aggregate, the trial
court could have sentenced Mummert to a maximum sentence of up to
seventeen years’ incarceration. Although at 528 and 882 of 2013, the trial
court imposed maximum sentences that were the longest allowed by law,
- 14 -
J-S38005-15
the minimum sentences were considerably lower. Furthermore, the
sentences were imposed concurrently rather than consecutively. And finally,
those sentences were imposed only after Mummert failed to avoid re-
offending while serving two sentences of intermediate punishment.
In light of the above principles, we find that Anders counsel correctly
concluded that no substantial question could be established in this case.
Due to Mummert’s new offense, the trial court had a sound statutory basis
for sentencing Mummert to total confinement. As well, the aggregate
sentence duly imposed in the instant matter after Mummert failed to serve
two two-year sentences of intermediate punishment did not approach the
maximum sentence available to the court. Furthermore, there were no
discernible irregularities in the revocation proceedings, and the court both
had a presentence investigation report to consider as well as Mummert’s
own testimony in mitigation. Finally, after thoroughly reviewing the record,
we find no other non-frivolous issue Mummert might raise on appeal.
Accordingly, Mummert is entitled to no relief.
- 15 -
J-S38005-15
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel
granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015
- 16 -