IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-20390
Summary Calendar
ANTONIO ARTURO HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H–01-CV-527
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March 11, 2003
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Antonio Hernandez, Texas prisoner # 840523, appeals the
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, in which he challenged
his conviction for possession of heroin. Because his claims were
addressed by the state courts on the merits, Hernandez must show
that the adjudication of the claims “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-20390
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Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411-12 (2000).
Hernandez asserts that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by having him admit to the elements of the
offense before the jury in the guise of challenging the validity
of the arrest. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant typically must show: (1) that his
counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689-94 (1984). Under the circumstances of this
case, Hernandez has not established that counsel’s actions could
not be considered “sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (citation
and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, given the weight of
evidence against Hernandez in this case other than his
admissions, he has not established that “the result of the trial
[was] unreliable.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372
(1993). The state court’s denial of relief did not constitute an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
Hernandez also asserts that he was denied his right to a
speedy trial based on the length of time between his arrest and
the issuance of the state indictment. He has not established
that the state court’s denial of relief was an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law as determined by
No. 02-20390
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the Supreme Court, as there is no such law regarding whether the
date of arrest or the date of indictment should be considered for
speedy trial purposes in a multiple-jurisdiction case. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S.
1, 8-10 (1982). Consequently, the judgment of the district court
denying Hernandez habeas relief is AFFIRMED.