FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODRICK I. SATRE; BONITA SATRE No. 11-16099
DALEY,
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01405-JSW
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM *
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, a.k.a.
America’s Servicing Company, a.k.a.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Robert I. Satre and Bonita Satre Daley (“the Satres”), appeal pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging violations of the Fair Debt
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law claims in connection with
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Kearner v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 643 (9th
Cir. 2009) (dismissal based on Noerr-Pennington and grant of motion to strike
under California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136,
1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on Rooker-Feldman). We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly determined that Wechsler is immune from
FDCPA liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because the Satres’s factual
allegations in their amended complaint failed to establish that Wechsler, who was
defending his client from litigation initiated by the Satres, was a “debt collector.”
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” as one who “regularly collects
. . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); Sosa v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006) (under Noerr-Pennington, “those who
petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from
statutory liability for their petitioning conduct” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly granted Wechsler’s special motion to strike the
state law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, because the claims against
Wechsler were based on protected activity, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e),
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and the Satres failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits, see Kearner,
590 F.3d at 650 (discussing California’s litigation privilege).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to
Wechsler. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c).
The district court incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Satres alleged in their complaint illegal acts and
omissions by defendants, not an error by the state court. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140
(“Rooker-Feldman . . . applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her
injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from
the state court judgment.”).
We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, see Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 .2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), or any documents that
are not part of the district court record. See Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842
F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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