FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 16 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD ERNEST ANAYA, No. 11-17688
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00029-GGH
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ROSANNE CAMPBELL, Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **
Submitted January 15, 2013 ***
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Richard Ernest Anaya appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anaya’s deliberate
indifference claims because Anaya failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent in treating his chronic knee
injuries and rectal prolapse. See id. at 1060-61 (“Deliberate indifference is a high
legal standard. A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to
establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.”); Jackson v.
McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (to establish that a difference of
opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the
defendants’ chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable and in
conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anaya’s
Americans with Disabilities Act claim because Anaya did not raise a triable dispute
as to whether he was discriminated against by reason of a disability. See O’Guinn
v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (listing elements of
claim under Title II of the ADA); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d
2 11-17688
1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of
disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 11-17688