FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 14 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL TREGLIA, No. 12-15830
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:10-cv-05502-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
M. C. SAYRE, Chief Medical Officer
(CMO) at PBSP; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2013**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Daniel Treglia appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Treglia failed
to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent in their treatment of his chronic foot and back pain. See id.
at 1057-58 (neither negligence nor mere difference of opinion concerning the
course of treatment amounts to deliberate indifference); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90
F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (to establish that a difference of opinion amounted to
deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that defendants chose a medically
unacceptable course of treatment in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the
prisoner’s health).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Treglia’s motion to
compel additional discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (discovery requests must
be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”); Hallett
v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review and
explaining that the district court’s “broad discretion . . . to permit or deny
discovery . . . will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of
discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
2 12-15830
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying without prejudice
Treglia’s motion to appoint an expert because Treglia failed to show that
appointment of an expert was necessary. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long
Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (appointment of expert
is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
AFFIRMED.
3 12-15830