IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30334
Summary Calendar
LAWYER WINFIELD, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-3596-E
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March 18, 2003
Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lawyer Winfield, Jr., Louisiana prisoner # 83494, appeals
the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition
challenging the reasonable doubt jury instruction at his trial.
Winfield argues that the jury instruction for reasonable doubt
given to the jury in his criminal trial was unconstitutional under
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). He notes that the
instruction in his case contained all three phrases found
objectionable in Cage, i.e., “grave uncertainty,” “moral
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30334
-2-
certainty,” and “substantial doubt,” as well as the articulation
requirement condemned in Humphrey v. Cain, 120 F.3d 526, 530-31
(5th Cir. 1997), adopted in relevant part, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir.
1998)(en banc).
Winfield’s reliance on Humphrey is misplaced. This court
cannot consider the “articulation requirement” to be problematic
“as the Supreme Court has never expressed disfavor with such
language.” Mulheisen v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840, 844 n.2 (5th Cir.
1999). The AEDPA allows application only of Supreme Court rulings.
See id.; 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Pursuant to § 2254(d), a federal
court must defer to a state court’s resolution of both pure
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact unless the
state court’s determination was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application” of clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court. See Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th
Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Although Winfield’s instruction contained the three
problematic phrases contained in the Cage instruction and in the
unconstitutional instruction in Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581 (5th
Cir. 1999), it also contained the alternative definition, “abiding
conviction” of the defendant’s guilt, which was lacking in both
Cage and Morris. This alternative definition of reasonable doubt
places Winfield’s instruction within the realm of the instructions
found suitable in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1994).
Accordingly, Winfield’s reasonable doubt instruction passes
No. 02-30334
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constitutional muster. See id. The state court’s denial of relief
on this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law
as determined by the Supreme Court. 2254(d)(1).
AFFIRMED.
Winfield v. Cain
Combined Opinion