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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID LEE CHRISTY
Appellant No. 92 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Dated December 11, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000309-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and WECHT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J. FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
Appellant, David Lee Christy, appeals from the order dated December
11, 2014, denying his omnibus pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Upon
review, we are constrained to reverse and vacate his convictions.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case, as presented at a
suppression hearing held on July 11, 2014, as follows:
While on patrol with Officer Robert Martz during the early
morning of January 21, 2014, Officer [Frank] Davis [of the
Slippery Rock Police Department] was in a stationary
position in his police vehicle off of Harmony Road across
from Slippery Rock University. From that position Officer
Davis was able to see the intersection of Stadium Drive and
North Road. At one point, at approximately 1:30 [a.m.],
Officer Davi[s] saw a pickup truck sitting at the intersection
with its headlights on for between five and ten minutes.
The officers then approached the truck and pulled up beside
it. At that point, the truck drove away and made a right
turn onto Harmony Road. Officer Davis and Officer Martz
continued on their patrol.
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Approximately ten minutes later the officers were on Rock
Pride Drive when they saw the same pickup truck sitting in
the middle of the road. The officers pulled behind the
pickup truck. As they were doing so, the truck began to
drive off. The officers activated their overhead lights and
conducted a stop of the truck. The officers reported the
stop at 1:54 [a.m.] The stop was not based on a suspicion
that the operator of the vehicle had violated any provision
of the Motor Vehicle Code, according to the testimony of
Officer Davis. Officer Davis, according to his testimony, had
not observed a traffic violation. The stop was conducted
solely to determine if the driver was lost or in need of
assistance, Officer Davis testified. The driver of the truck,
identified in the course of the stop as [Appellant], was not
free to leave once the overhead lights were activated,
Officer Davis testified. The truck was located on the
campus of Slippery Rock University both times it was
observed in the stationary position. There was no traffic in
either areas where the truck was observed that would have
caused it to stop, Officer Davis testified. Officer Davis
testified that he believed the students of Slippery Rock
University were still on holiday break at the time of the
incident, though he could not be sure that was the case.
While the areas where the truck was observed to be
stopped were not typically areas where vehicles park, the
truck did not impede traffic, Officer Davis testified.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/2014, at 1-2.
Appellant was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI). The Commonwealth charged Appellant with DUI general
impairment, DUI high rate of alcohol, and restrictions on alcoholic
beverages.1 On May 8, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion
arguing that the traffic stop was illegal because police lacked reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot. The
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1
75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a), 3802(b), and 3809, respectively.
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trial court held a suppression hearing on July 11, 2014 wherein Officer Davis
testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court requested legal
briefs from both parties concerning the duties of campus police. Both
parties complied. On October 14, 2014, the trial court entered an order, and
filed an accompanying opinion, denying Appellant’s pretrial motion to
suppress. On November 14, 2014, following a bench trial, the trial court
found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges. On December 11,
2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six months of intermediate
punishment, the first thirty days on house arrest, fifty hours of community
services, and a $750.00 fine. This timely appeal resulted.2
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law when it denied
[] Appellant’s [o]mnibus [p]re-[t]rial [m]otion to [s]uppress
and concluded that Officer Frank Davis, of the Slippery Rock
University Police Department, had a reasonable basis for
stopping [] Appellant’s vehicle, and that said traffic stop
was not in violation of Article One Section Eight of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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2
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 8, 2015. On January 12,
2015, the trial court entered an order directing Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant complied timely on February 2, 2015. On February 9, 2015, the
trial court filed an order under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) stating that it was relying
on its prior opinion entered on October 14, 2014, as justification for denying
suppression.
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Appellant claims that police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to stop him and, thus, suppression was warranted. In sum, he
argues:
[I]t is clear that the interaction between Officer Davis and
[Appellant] is not a mere encounter. Officer Davis did not
just approach [Appellant] to speak to him; instead he
activated his emergency lights and stopped [Appellant’s]
vehicle. It is clear that this progressed past a mere
encounter because the [o]fficer clearly stated that
[Appellant] was not free to continue on his way. If
[Appellant] would have attempted to leave without speaking
to the [o]fficer, he would have been pursued. The [t]rial
[c]ourt specifically determined that initial interaction
between Officer Davis and [Appellant] was not a mere
encounter. However, the trial court’s determination that
[Appellant] was not [the] subject of an improper detention
is unfounded.
[] Officer Davis testified there were no vehicle code
violations that were the basis of the traffic stop.
Furthermore, there were no outward signs of distress from
[Appellant’s] vehicle that would indicate he was in need of
assistance. He was on Slippery Rock University property
that is open to the public. His vehicle was not blocking
traffic and when Officer Davis pulled up to him on two
occasions he moved along not initiating contact with Officer
Davis. If Officer Davis was truly seeking to offer assistance
then there was no reason for him to activate his emergency
lights. He did so to stop and investigate the vehicle. His
words are prophetic when he stated that [Appellant] was
not free to continue on his way once he activated his lights.
This raised the interaction between [Appellant] and Officer
Davis to an investigative detention that was not based on
any type of reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 16.
This Court's well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence is as follows:
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[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court's factual findings
are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by
[those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general
classifications:
The first level of interaction is a ‘mere encounter’ (or
request for information) which need not be supported by
any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
stop or to respond. The second, an ‘investigative detention’
must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a
suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not
involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally an arrest or
‘custodial detention’ must be supported by probable cause.
Police must have reasonable suspicion that a person seized
is engaged in unlawful activity before subjecting that person
to an investigative detention.
Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led
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him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that
criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped
was involved in that activity. Therefore, the fundamental
inquiry of a reviewing court must be an objective one,
namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the
moment of intrusion warrant a person of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305-306 (Pa. Super.
2011) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
Our Supreme Court recently affirmed this Court’s memorandum
decision by per curiam order in Commonwealth v. Barnes, -- A.3d --,
2015 WL 5033572 (Pa. 2015) which examined a similar factual scenario and
issue as presented herein. In Barnes, while on routine patrol at 3:00 a.m.,
police officers observed Barnes make a left turn, pull off the roadway near a
car dealership, and shut her headlights off. The arresting officer testified
that he thought the driver may be experiencing vehicular problems, but also
thought it was suspicious that the vehicle pulled over near the car
dealership. This Court determined that the encounter amounted to an
investigative detention because the officer admitted that Barnes was not free
to leave. Barnes also testified that upon activation of the police’s overhead
lights, she believed she was not free to go. Our Court determined that in
such a scenario a reasonable person would not think she was free to leave.
Thus, we determined that the use of overhead police lights constituted a
seizure requiring reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Because the officer in Barnes had only a particularized hunch that criminal
activity was occurring, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of
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suppression. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed our
Court’s decision by per curiam order.
In this case, Officer Davis testified as follows:
I told [my partner,] Officer Martz [do] you see that truck
sitting over there[?] He’s been there for sometime, and he
said, yeah, I noticed it, too, and I said let’s go over and see
if it’s lost, see what the deal is because it’s not normal for a
vehicle to sit that long at an intersection. So, we pulled up
beside it and as soon as we did, we didn’t even get a
chance to communicate with the driver. The truck took off.
Made a right onto North Road and went back towards
Harmony Road. We didn’t think anything of it. We figured,
okay, he found his way or whatever, everything’s all right
so we continued on our patrol. It was again I didn’t look at
the clock or anything. I’m just guessing it was probably
another ten, probably another ten minutes after our initial
contact with that vehicle we were on another road on
campus called Rock Pride Drive. We were coming down it,
and we see the pickup, exact same pickup truck just sitting
there same thing in the middle of the road. So, and I asked
Officer Martz I said is that the same truck, and he said,
yeah, I think it is, so I said, well, let’s go see what’s going
on. He’s obviously lost or something is wrong. So, again
we went to pull up behind him. As soon as he saw us, again
he started, he made a right-hand turn onto it’s like all
stores, shop parking, it loops back onto Rock Pride Drive.
He made a right-hand turn into that and at that point that’s
when I turned on the lights, and approached him just to ask
if he was all right, if he needed directions, and that’s when I
came into contact with [Appellant].
N.T., 7/11/2014, at 5-6.
When asked why Officer Davis initiated the traffic stop, he responded:
Just to see if he was lost, if everything was okay, because
this was the second time in under half an hour that he was
stopped in the roadway, you know, for an extended period
of time just sitting there. So, I was making an inquiry to
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see if he needed any type of help, if he needed directions,
whatever, you know.
Id. at 6-7.
Officer Davis further testified that he did not observe Appellant commit
any traffic violations. Id. at 8, 12-13. He had no reason to believe
Appellant was involved in criminal activity. Id. at 13. Officer Davis stated
that once he activated the overhead police emergency lights, Appellant was
not free to leave. Id. at 13. In fact, Officer Davis would have pursued
Appellant if he had not stopped. Id.
In light of Barnes were are compelled to find that the interaction
between the police and Appellant constituted a seizure requiring reasonable
suspicion. Appellant moved his car twice when police approached in their
marked vehicle and stopped only after they activated their overhead lights.
A reasonable person in Appellant’s position would not have felt free to leave.
Thus, Officer Davis’ interaction with Appellant constituted an investigatory
detention. As previously stated, Officer Davis did not witness any motor
vehicle code violations. Further, he did not point to any specific
observations that would have led him to reasonably believe that criminal
activity was afoot. As such, police did not have reasonable suspicion to
support the traffic stop. Hence, suppression was warranted. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s denial of suppression and vacate Appellant’s
convictions.
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2015
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Com. v. Christy, D.
Combined Opinion