Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 30, 2014
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00653-CR
No. 05-13-00655-CR
JESUS ANTONIO DE SANTIAGO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 401-83076-2011 & 401-83077-2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Myers
Opinion by Justice Francis
Jesus Antonio De Santiago appeals his convictions for possession with intent to deliver
one gram or more but less than four grams of cocaine and the murder of Ashton Williams. After
finding appellant guilty of both offenses and that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during
commission of Williams’s murder, the jury assessed punishment at fifteen years and seventy-five
years in prison, respectively.
In each case, appellant claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
convictions because the State failed to prove he committed the offenses. Appellant specifically
contends no reliable evidence establishes he drove the truck that struck Williams and no witness
testified to seeing appellant deliver drugs. We affirm.
In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The
jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part
of a witness’s testimony. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We do
not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence but “determine
whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force
of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16−17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A person commits an offense if he knowingly possesses with intent to deliver one gram
or more but less than four grams of cocaine. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
481.102(3)(D) 481.112(c) (West 2010). Intent to deliver a controlled substance is a question of
fact for the jury to resolve, and it may be inferred from the acts, words, or conduct of the
accused. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2003, no pet.). It may be
established by circumstantial evidence, including the quantity of drugs possessed or the manner
in which the drugs are packaged. Smith v. State, 737 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. App.―Dallas 1987,
pet. ref’d). A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an
individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011). The indictments charged
appellant with intentionally and knowingly (1) possessing, with intent to deliver, one gram or
more but less than four grams of cocaine and (2) causing Williams’s death by driving a motor
vehicle over Williams and using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle.
The record shows appellant and several witnesses lived at the Creek Walk Apartments in
Plano. An African-American male known as J.J. told fourteen-year-old Roberto Trevizo he
needed to talk to appellant. Trevizo delivered the message, then headed home. Later, Trevizo
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heard gunshots and saw appellant running toward his white Ford Explorer. Trevizo and
appellant both got in the vehicle, and appellant said he was looking for “the other black dude that
was with J.J.” Trevizo knew the “other black dude” was Williams because Williams was with
J.J. when he asked Trevizo to deliver the message to appellant.
Appellant exited the apartment complex parking lot onto 16th Street. He then turned
onto Alma Drive where he saw Williams. Trevizo said Williams was looking back and laughing
at them as he ran away. Appellant followed him and drove into a field off Alma. He ran over
Williams, then spun around, and hit him again. According to Trevizo, appellant ran over
Williams about six times. Appellant stopped the truck and began walking toward Williams.
When another car pulled in, appellant got back in the car and drove off.
Yamara Mendizabal was the manager of Creek Walk Apartments on September 19, 2011.
Although appellant had previously lived with Alberto Gonzalez at the apartments, he leased an
apartment for his wife and family a few weeks before Williams’s death. After leaving work on
the 19th, Mendizabal was putting her daughters in the car when she heard gunshots. A black
man she did not recognize ran by her into a field. She then saw appellant driving a white Ford
Explorer through the parking lot. Trevizo was in the passenger seat. They turned onto 16th
Street, then right on Alma toward the field.
Stephenson and his wife were driving on Alma Drive when they saw a white SUV in a
vacant lot “doing doughnuts.” Stephenson then saw a person trying to get off the ground. He
pulled into the lot and got out of his car. There were two people outside the SUV but they turned
and got back in when they saw Stephenson. The SUV drove away, and Stephenson called 9-1-1.
The record also shows that once police suspected appellant was involved, they began
monitoring appellant’s apartment. Officer Kevin Gendron was on watch around four in the
morning the day after Williams’s death when a white Ford SUV approached. Appellant exited
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the vehicle and made his way toward the apartment. Gendron identified himself, asked appellant
for identification, and patted him down. Other officers arrived, and someone asked appellant if
he had any drugs. Because appellant admitted having cocaine and some crack, they searched
him and discovered a large plastic bag containing smaller plastic bags, $120 cash, white powder,
and white rocks, which was later determined to contain 3.77 grams of cocaine. Gendron said the
manner in which the drugs were packaged was consistent with drugs packaged for sale.
Appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance.
Later that afternoon, Detective Mark McClendon went to interview appellant. The forty-
five-minute interview was videotaped and admitted into evidence. McClendon first read
appellant his Miranda rights. He then told appellant what information they had and asked him
what happened; appellant said it was “a drug deal gone bad.” According to appellant, two black
guys called him about buying some drugs but got “real skiddish about the money.” One guy
grabbed the “two ounces of coke and ran away with [it].” Appellant got in his vehicle, chased
Williams, caught him, and ran him over, “four, five, six, seven times.”
Medical examiner William Rohr testified Williams’s death was the result of blunt force
injuries consistent with being run over by a motor vehicle. He sustained sixteen fractured ribs,
abrasions, lung contusions, and maceration of the liver. DNA analyst Tisha Kacer testified a
tissue sample from the underside of appellant’s SUV was consistent with Williams’s DNA
profile and the probability of selecting an unrelated person at random who could be the source of
the DNA profile was one in 6.868 sextillion.
Appellant took the stand and testified that after Williams stole the cocaine, he ran to his
apartment and hid. He claimed he did not run Williams down and he lied to the police when he
told them he did. He also claimed the cocaine he had on the night of his arrest was for his
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personal consumption only. Nevertheless, he conceded he had been selling drugs for about four
months at the time Williams died.
The jury was able to assess the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses who testified at
trial, and most importantly, was able to assess appellant’s credibility and demeanor when he gave
his version of events. From the guilty verdict, it is clear that the jury rejected appellant’s
exculpatory explanations given at trial. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 779. We conclude a rational
juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant ran over Williams, causing his death,
and that he possessed cocaine with intent to deliver. The evidence is legally sufficient to support
his convictions.
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 /Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
130653F.U05 JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JESUS ANTONIO DE SANTIAGO, On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District
Appellant Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-83076-2011.
No. 05-13-00653-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
Justices Bridges and Myers participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 30th day of October, 2014.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JESUS ANTONIO DE SANTIAGO, On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District
Appellant Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-83077-2011.
No. 05-13-00655-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
Justices Bridges and Myers participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 30th day of October, 2014.
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Jesus Antonio Desantiago v. State
Combined Opinion