In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-14-00175-CR
________________
SHACOBI DESHANE YATES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 10-08451
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Shacobi Deshane Yates of aggravated robbery
and assessed punishment at twelve years of confinement. In four appellate issues,
Yates contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict, he
suffered egregious harm because the trial court did not charge the jury regarding
accomplice testimony, and the trial court abused its discretion by permitting
testimony about the autopsy of the victim and admitting autopsy photographs into
evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
1
THE EVIDENCE
The victim’s brother, Gregory Pumphrey, testified that the victim had taken
medical retirement due to open heart surgery and a back problem. Pumphrey
explained that on December 10, 2009, he received a call from the victim, during
which the victim asked him to come to his home. Upon arriving at the victim’s
home, Pumphrey noticed that the victim’s head and eyes were swollen. Pumphrey
testified that the first thing he asked the victim was whether he had fallen because
the victim “had a problem sometimes walking and he would fall[.]” The victim
told Pumphrey “that a juvenile . . . had come by and brought three other guys with
him and they roughed him up, beat him up.” According to Pumphrey, the victim
told him that “[a juvenile, B.A.,] had come over and had three other guys with him
and they jumped him.” Pumphrey also learned that the victim’s cell phone and
medication were missing.
Pumphrey recognized the name of the juvenile, and Pumphrey and the
victim went to find the juvenile, whom Pumphrey knew to be fourteen-year-old
B.A. Pumphrey did not know the names of the three people who had gone with
B.A. to the victim’s home. Upon arriving at B.A.’s residence, Pumphrey asked
B.A. who the other three people were that he brought to the victim’s home, and
B.A. denied knowing what Pumphrey was talking about. Pumphrey stated that the
2
victim asked B.A., “Why did you let those guys beat me up?” Pumphrey testified
that he saw Yates hiding behind a building, apparently looking to see what was
going on. Pumphrey recalled Yates’s face after seeing his photograph, but
Pumphrey did not mention to the police that he had seen Yates. Pumphrey
explained that the victim began complaining of chest tightness, and their sister took
the victim to the emergency room. The victim went into a coma later that night and
died the next day. Pumphrey and his family learned that the cause of the victim’s
death was a brain hemorrhage caused by trauma.
Sergeant L.D. Keen of the Beaumont Police Department testified that he
received a phone call from the patrol officer who was at the scene of the
aggravated robbery. During the phone call, Keen learned of potential witness B.A.,
and he instructed the patrol officer to bring B.A. to his office. B.A. gave a sworn
statement, in which he implicated Yates and another individual, T.W. B.A. told
Keen that he saw Yates hit the victim five or six times. The next day, Keen learned
that the victim was in a coma and was not expected to survive, and Keen located
Yates and took him into custody. Yates gave a sworn statement in which he
identified a fourth suspect, M.G., and although Yates placed himself at the scene,
Yates stated that M.G. initiated the assault on the victim. Yates told Keen that the
3
victim’s cell phone was stolen during the offense. In addition, Yates indicated that
he, T.W., and B.A., fled the scene after the robbery.
Keen located T.W. and obtained a statement from him. According to Keen,
T.W. implicated the same individuals. Keen also located M.G. and obtained a
sworn statement from him. Keen explained that the authorities believed B.A.’s
original statement contained falsehoods and omissions, so Keen obtained a second
statement from B.A. Keen testified that B.A. changed his story in the second
statement, but B.A. indicated that the same four actors were involved in the
offense. B.A. told authorities that B.A. and Yates both knew the victim because
they had been at the victim’s home the day before the offense. B.A. was then taken
into custody. When T.W. was arrested, he gave a second statement that Keen
explained was inconsistent with his initial statement.
According to Keen, the authorities subpoenaed the records from the victim’s
cell phone and began tracing incoming and outgoing numbers. The authorities
determined that one of the numbers called from the cell phone was a telephone
number belonging to M.G.’s girlfriend, and the authorities took a statement from
M.G. and then arrested him. Keen received evidence from M.G.’s girlfriend that
M.G. had rings in his possession, one of which had the initial “P.” The victim’s
family told the authorities that the victim owned a ring with the initial “P.” B.A.,
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T.W., and M.G. all told authorities that the rings were in Yates’s possession, but
the authorities never located the rings. The authorities also learned that the
Beaumont Independent School District Police Department had received a
complaint that on the date of the offense, four young black men were trespassing
on the property of Ozen High School, which is near the area where the crime
occurred. Keen testified that based upon his investigation, he believes that Yates
committed aggravated robbery with M.G., B.A., and T.W.
According to Keen, in B.A.’s first statement, B.A. admitted to being with
T.W. and Yates on the day of the offense, and he stated that he had introduced
Yates to the victim. B.A. averred that Yates hit the victim with his fist six times,
and B.A. indicated that he and Yates ran out of the house and through the field at
Ozen High School after the offense. In his original statement, B.A. also averred
that Yates had the victim’s rings after the offense. Keen testified that in his second
statement, B.A. indicated that Yates had told him the victim had rings and money,
and that T.W. and Yates said, “we[’re] going to get him[.]” In the second
statement, B.A. averred that Yates and M.G. planned to be the ones who would hit
the victim and Yates planned to take the victim’s jewelry. According to Keen, B.A.
said in his second statement that Yates struck the victim’s head with his fist three
or four times, and they ran to Ozen High School. According to Keen, B.A. said in
5
his second statement that the victim said he could recall “a cock-eyed dude that
was bright-skinned[,]” and that B.A. knew the victim was referring to Yates. Keen
testified that the consistencies between the statements of B.A., M.G., and T.W.
were that each admitted that they all went to the victim’s home, someone hit the
victim, and someone stole the victim’s rings and cell phone.
At trial, T.W. admitted making a statement to Keen, and he testified that on
the day of the offense, he approached B.A. and asked B.A. why he was not in
school. T.W. testified that B.A. told him that Yates was suspended, so he and B.A.
went to Yates’s apartment. According to T.W., Yates came outside, and the group
then went to M.G.’s apartment. T.W. testified that B.A. told them he knew a man
from whom they could earn some money, and B.A. took them to the victim’s
home. T.W. explained that when the group arrived at the victim’s home, the victim
asked B.A. if he and Yates had split the money from the work they had done the
previous day. After speaking with the victim from the porch, T.W. asked the victim
if he could enter the house to use the restroom, and T.W. testified that upon
entering the house, he took some money and jewelry and went back outside.
According to T.W., the victim eventually invited them inside. T.W. testified
that he did not see what occurred in the victim’s kitchen, but he saw the victim
falling backward and M.G. standing in front of the victim. T.W. explained that
6
after realizing the victim had been hit, everyone ran outside and “split up.” T.W.
testified that he threw away the money and jewelry he had taken from the victim’s
home, and that M.G. had the victim’s cell phone. T.W. testified that he gave a
second statement to the police, and he admitted that he did not tell the truth in
either of his statements. T.W. testified that he did not know M.G. was going to hit
the victim. According to T.W., he and Yates ran out the front door after M.G. hit
the victim, and he testified that they jumped the fence onto the property of Ozen
High School.
Forensic pathologist Dr. Tommy Brown testified that he performed an
autopsy on the victim’s body. Brown identified seven photographs, State’s exhibits
12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, and 23, as depicting the victim’s body as it appeared when it
arrived for the autopsy, and the trial court admitted the photographs into evidence
over defense counsel’s objection to both the photographs and Brown’s testimony.
Brown testified that the victim “had some abrasions of his forehead[,]” “a large
hematoma around his right eye[,]” and a curvilinear abrasion “just below his right
breast on his chest.” Brown testified that State’s exhibit 12 showed the hematoma
and swelling around the victim’s right eye and cheek area, as well as a contusion
and small abrasion on his right forehead; exhibit 13 showed the abrasion on the left
side of the victim’s forehead; exhibit 20 showed “another view from the lateral
7
side of the right eye showing the hematoma of the eye[;]” exhibit 21 depicted the
curvilinear abrasion beneath the victim’s right breast; exhibit 22 showed a close-up
view of the curvilinear abrasion beneath the victim’s right breast; and exhibit 23
showed a small bruise on the left side of the victim’s forehead.
Brown explained that his internal investigation of the victim’s body revealed
a “sub scalp hemorrhage about his forehead on both left and right sides[,]” as well
as “a large subdural hematoma or blood on top of the brain along the left side of
the brain.” According to Brown, the internal examination also revealed a laceration
on the victim’s brain stem, which usually occurs “from the subdural hematoma that
puts pressure on that area and causes the laceration.” Brown further explained that
a subdural hematoma is a rupture of the small vessels in the brain, which causes
bleeding and compresses the cerebral hemispheres, and is usually secondary to
trauma. Brown opined that “the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head
with a subdural hematoma[,]” and the manner of death was homicide. Brown
testified, “I can’t tell you what [the victim] was struck with or fist, club, or
whatever, stomped on, anything.” Brown explained that the victim could have been
struck with a hand, a fist, or an object. During cross-examination, defense counsel
asked whether some of the victim’s bruises could have been caused by falling, and
8
Brown responded affirmatively. The State rested at the conclusion of Brown’s
testimony.
Yates testified that he and B.A. went to the victim’s home the day before the
offense to do some odd jobs, and they tried to help the victim install a shelf.
According to Yates, on the day of the offense, T.W. and B.A. came to his residence
and awakened him, and the group later met M.G. at the apartment complex pool.
The group eventually decided to return to the victim’s house to possibly get some
money for work. Yates denied that the group had agreed to rob the victim. Yates
testified that he, T.W., B.A., and M.G. went to the victim’s house and spoke to the
victim on the front porch. The group eventually entered the victim’s house, and
Yates testified that “[M.G.] just started hitting [the victim].” Yates testified that he
was shocked, and that he ran because he knew M.G. hitting the victim was wrong.
Yates denied hitting the victim or taking anything that belonged to the victim.
Yates explained that when he and the others fled, they ran through the grounds of
Ozen High School.
ISSUE ONE
In his first issue, Yates challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. Yates contends that “the record is completely devoid of
any evidence that [he] struck the complainant as alleged in the indictment[,]” and
9
that the only way the jury could have found that Yates was a party to the offense
was “to believe the accomplice testimony the State attempted to elicit.”
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The jury is the
ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We
give deference to the jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A person
commits the offense of aggravated robbery if, in the course of committing robbery,
he causes serious bodily injury to another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(1)
(West 2011). In this case, the indictment alleged that while in the course of
committing theft of the victim’s property, Yates intentionally and knowingly
caused serious bodily injury to the victim by hitting the victim with his hands.
Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a
defendant cannot be convicted of an offense upon the testimony of an accomplice
10
without other corroborating evidence tending to connect the defendant to the
offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (West 2005). When reviewing the
sufficiency of non-accomplice evidence under article 38.14, we determine whether
the inculpatory evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the
offense. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “The direct
or circumstantial non-accomplice evidence is sufficient corroboration if it shows
that rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect the
accused to the offense.” Id.; see also Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). No particular quantity of corroborating evidence is required.
Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “‘Tendency to
connect’ rather than rational sufficiency is the standard[;] the corroborating
evidence need not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt.” Solomon v. State, 49
S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Non-accomplice evidence need not
directly link the defendant to the commission of the crime. See id.
Although a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient
to link him to the commission of the crime, a defendant’s presence, coupled with
other suspicious circumstances, can be sufficient to tend to connect the defendant
to the commission of the crime. Id. at 361-62. Suspicious circumstances may
include the defendant’s being in the company of an accomplice near the time of the
11
offense. Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When there
are conflicting views of the evidence, we defer to the fact finder’s resolution of the
evidence. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Simmons, 282 S.W.3d at 508.
With respect to accomplice evidence, the jury heard evidence that B.A. gave
a statement in which he averred that Yates struck the victim with his fist six times,
and that Yates had the victim’s jewelry after the offense. The jury heard evidence
that B.A., T.W., and M.G. all gave statements to the authorities indicating they
went to the victim’s home, someone struck the victim, and someone stole the
victim’s rings and cell phone.
With respect to the non-accomplice evidence, Sergeant Keen testified that
after the offense, four young men were observed trespassing on the property of
Ozen High School, and Yates testified that he and T.W. fled onto the grounds of
Ozen High School after the offense. Pumphrey testified that the victim told him
that B.A. and three other guys had “jumped him” and beaten him. In addition,
Pumphrey recalled seeing Yates hiding behind a building after the offense. We find
that the testimony of Sergeant Keen, Yates, and Pumphrey corroborated the
accomplice testimony and their testimony tends to connect Yates to the offense.
See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Simmons, 282 S.W.3d at 508; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d
at 361-62; see generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.14. Viewing all of the
12
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Accordingly, we overrule issue one.
ISSUE TWO
In his second issue, Yates argues that he was egregiously harmed because
the trial court failed to charge the jury regarding accomplice testimony. “A
prosecution witness who is indicted for the same offense with which the defendant
is charged is an accomplice as a matter of law.” Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621,
631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “If a prosecution witness is an accomplice as a matter
of law, the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury accordingly.” Id. Failure to
give the accomplice witness instruction is error. Id.; see also Casanova v. State,
383 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In this case, it is undisputed that
T.W., B.A., and M.G. were charged with the same offense as Yates and are
accomplice witnesses as a matter of law. See Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at 533; see
also Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 631. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to charge
the jury regarding accomplice witness testimony. See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 631;
see also Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at 533.
The appropriate harm standard depends upon whether the defendant
preserved error by bringing the omission of the instruction to the trial court’s
13
attention. See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632; see also Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at 533-
34. If, as here, the defendant failed to preserve error by bringing omission of the
instruction to the trial court’s attention, we will reverse only if the error is
fundamental and “was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant ‘has
not had a fair and impartial trial.’” Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). Under the egregious harm standard, omission of the
accomplice-witness instruction is generally harmless unless the non-accomplice
evidence is “‘so unconvincing in fact as to render the State’s overall case for
conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.’” Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632
(quoting Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). We
must take the entire record into account in determining whether Yates was
egregiously harmed by omission of the instruction. See Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at
534.
As discussed above in our analysis of issue one, the jury heard accomplice
evidence that Yates struck the victim with his fist several times and had the
victim’s jewelry in his possession after the offense. The non-accomplice evidence
from Sergeant Keen, Yates, and Pumphrey corroborated the accomplice testimony
because it tended to connect Yates to the offense. The non-accomplice evidence
14
was not so unconvincing as to render the State’s overall case for conviction clearly
and significantly less persuasive. See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. We therefore find
that the trial court’s failure to give the accomplice-witness instruction did not
egregiously harm Yates. See Barrios, 283 S.W.3d at 350. Accordingly, we overrule
issue two.
ISSUES THREE AND FOUR
In his third issue, Yates argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting into evidence Brown’s testimony concerning his autopsy of the victim.
In his fourth issue, Yates contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
autopsy photographs into evidence. Yates argues that the probative value of
Brown’s testimony and the autopsy photographs is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice because Yates stipulated at trial that the victim suffered
serious bodily harm. We address issues three and four together.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403
objection for an abuse of discretion. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trial
court abuses its discretion only when its decision lies outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 439-40; Montgomery v. State,
15
810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). The trial judge has
wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs. Sonnier v. State,
913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When a trial court balances the
probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, a
presumption exists that favors the evidence’s probative value. Feldman v. State, 71
S.W.3d 738, 754-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 401. Under
Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a trial court may exclude relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403.
Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and presumes that relevant
evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1,
21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
In conducting an analysis under Rule 403, the trial court must balance the
following factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential to
impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way, (3) the time needed to
16
develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. Erazo v.
State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Casey, 215 S.W.3d at
880 (citing Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006)). In analyzing the autopsy photographs under Rule 403, we consider “the
number of photographs, the size, whether they are in color or are black and white,
whether they are gruesome, whether any bodies are clothed or naked, and whether
the body has been altered by autopsy.” Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 489.
In conducting its balancing test under Rule 403, the trial court determined
that Brown’s testimony and the photographs were relevant and probative as to the
issue of serious bodily injury despite Pumphrey’s testimony regarding the
appearance of the victim’s injuries and the victim’s subsequent death. The trial
judge stated that Pumphrey is not an expert and “there has been no other testimony
regarding the extent of the injuries or the cause of death or linking the serious
bodily injury to this crime specifically.” The trial judge concluded that the
testimony and photographs would not confuse or mislead the jury, the photographs
would help the pathologist explain the victim’s injuries, and the photographs were
not “gruesome or overly prejudicial.”
As discussed above, Brown testified regarding the nature of the victim’s
injuries, and he explained that the cause of the victim’s death was blunt force
17
trauma to the head with a subdural hematoma and the manner of death was
homicide. The photographs admitted as state’s exhibits 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, and
23 were 8½-inch by 11-inch color photographs. Exhibit 12 is a close-up view of a
swollen, discolored area above the victim’s right eye, which Brown testified was a
hematoma. Exhibit 13 is a close-up view of an abrasion on the left side of the
victim’s forehead. Exhibit 14 is a frontal view of the victim’s face, neck, and the
uppermost portion of his chest, and it depicts the swelling and discoloration of the
victim’s right eye and forehead. Exhibit 20 is a close-up side view of the victim’s
discolored and swollen right eye. Exhibit 21 depicts the victim’s right arm and
chest, and it shows an abrasion on the right side of the victim’s chest. Exhibit 22 is
a closer view of the victim’s chest abrasion than Exhibit 21, and Exhibit 23 is a
side view of a bruise on the left side of the victim’s face.
The State argues that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by any unfairly prejudicial effect because proof of serious bodily injury is an
element of the offense of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
29.03(a)(1). While the State does have the burden to prove serious bodily injury
beyond a reasonable doubt, Yates stipulated at trial that the victim suffered serious
bodily injury. Because Yates stipulated that the victim suffered serious bodily
injury, Brown’s testimony and the autopsy photographs have limited probative
18
value. See Petruccelli v. State, 174 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet.
ref’d). However, as previously discussed, the jury heard evidence that the victim
had a tendency to stumble and fall, and that Pumphrey initially believed the victim
might have fallen until the victim told him otherwise. In addition, defense counsel
asked Brown during cross-examination whether some of the victim’s injuries could
have been caused by a fall. Therefore, Brown’s testimony and the photographs are
relevant and probative to establish that the manner in which the victim sustained
his serious bodily injuries was not accidental, such as from a fall, but instead
resulted from intentional acts.
Because the testimony and photographs were relevant, they are admissible
unless the prejudicial impact of the pictures substantially outweighs their
helpfulness. See Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 490. As explained above, Brown’s
testimony and the autopsy photographs were probative as to the manner in which
the victim sustained his injuries. The record reflects that Brown’s testimony began
at 1:24 p.m. and concluded at 1:40 p.m., so Brown only testified for approximately
sixteen minutes. Brown’s testimony was clinical and it related solely to the
appearance of the victim’s body, the nature of the victim’s injuries, and the cause
and manner of the victim’s death. Although the photographs show bruises,
swelling, and abrasions on the victim’s head, they are not so gruesome as to
19
impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way. See id. at 489. With the
exception of two photographs showing the victim’s bare chest, the victim’s body
below the neck is either clothed in a hospital gown or not visible. The photographs
do not depict any mutilation or alteration of the body from the autopsy. The
photographs are not so disturbing that a juror of normal sensitivity would find it
difficult to rationally decide the critical issues involved in the case after viewing
them. See Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see
also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 370-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
photographs. In addition, we conclude that even if admitting Brown’s testimony
and the autopsy photographs had been erroneous, Yates has not demonstrated that
their admission contributed to his conviction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). For all
of these reasons, we overrule issues three and four and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on January 20, 2015
Opinion Delivered April 1, 2015
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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