IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00314-CR
No. 10-14-00315-CR
LAMARCOS RASHUN LIGGINS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 26457 and 26459
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant LaMarcos Rashun Liggins pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to two burglaries of a habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West
2011). The trial court deferred an adjudication of guilt and placed Liggins on
community supervision for ten years. The State later moved to proceed to an
adjudication of guilt. The amended motion in each case alleged that Liggins violated
his conditions of community supervision by, among other things, committing a new
burglary offense and violating his curfew. Liggins pled “not true” to all of the
allegations. The trial court found that Liggins did violate his conditions of community
supervision by committing a new burglary and by violating his curfew. Accordingly,
the trial court adjudicated Liggins guilty and sentenced him to fifteen years’
imprisonment in each case, to be served concurrently.
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d
493 (1967), Liggins’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and motion to
withdraw, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which
an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders; it
presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to
advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if
counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural
history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), Liggins’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this
Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance
on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Liggins;
Liggins v. State Page 2
and (3) informed Liggins of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response. 1
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
Liggins has filed a pro se response that raises two issues. 2 In his first issue,
Liggins contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel
failed to comply with his request to perform an independent investigation by contacting
certain witnesses, to investigate the scene of the alleged crime, to comply with his
request to retrieve his cell phones that were confiscated during his arrest,3 and to
adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses. To overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s actions and decisions were reasonably professional and motivated by
sound trial strategy, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the
record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. See
Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d
808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When the record is silent regarding the reasons for
counsel’s conduct, a finding that counsel was ineffective would require impermissible
speculation by the appellate court. Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.
1 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “‘the pro se response need not comply with the rules of
appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those
issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any meritorious issues.’” Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23 (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d
693, 696-97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
2 Liggins’s counsel states in his motion to withdraw that he provided Liggins a copy of the appellate
record, and Liggins’s pro se response cites to the record.
3 Liggins asserts that the cell phones contained exculpatory evidence.
Liggins v. State Page 3
App. 1994)). The record is silent in this case as to trial counsel’s reasons for his actions
and decisions. To conclude that trial counsel was ineffective would therefore call for
speculation, which we will not do. See Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; Gamble, 916 S.W.2d at
93. Liggins’s complaint about ineffective assistance of counsel is not an arguable
ground to advance in this appeal.
In his second issue, Liggins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
revoking his community supervision because the State failed to meet its burden of proof
in showing that he violated conditions of his community supervision. In a hearing on a
motion to revoke community supervision, the State must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a defendant violated the terms of his community supervision. Rickels
v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Liggins first complains that the State failed to prove that he committed a new
burglary because he has not been convicted of a new crime and because the State
presented no physical evidence placing him inside the residence that was burglarized.
But a defendant’s unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary
permits an inference that the defendant is the one who committed the burglary. Poncio
v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Here, Liggins conceded in his
closing argument that he was “found in recent, unexplained possession of stolen
property.” And three witnesses each testified that the property identified as being in
Liggins’s possession was taken from their residence without permission on the night in
question. Our review of the record therefore reveals that the evidence presented at the
revocation hearing was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Liggins v. State Page 4
Liggins committed the new burglary offense. Liggins also complains that the State
failed to prove that he violated his curfew, but if the State’s proof is sufficient to prove
any one of the alleged community supervision violations, the revocation should be
affirmed. Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d).
Liggins’s complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence is therefore not an arguable
ground to advance in this appeal.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). We have reviewed the entire
record, counsel’s brief, and Liggins’s pro se response and have found nothing that
would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that
it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error
but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
In accordance with Anders, Liggins’s attorney has asked this Court for
permission to withdraw as counsel for Liggins. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at
1400; see also Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (quoting Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776,
779-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous,
he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation,
the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing
Liggins v. State Page 5
the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”)). We grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to
send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Liggins and to advise him of
his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 23, 2015
Do not publish
[CR25]
4No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Liggins wish to seek further review of this case by the
Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or
must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of this opinion or from the date the last timely motion for rehearing was
overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition and all copies of the petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. at R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of rule 68.4 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 68.4; see also Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.
Liggins v. State Page 6