COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§ No. 08-15-00042-CR
IN RE: SHANNON MARK DOUTHIT,
§ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
Relator.
§ ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
§ MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Shannon Mark Douthit, a Texas inmate, has filed a petition for writ of
mandamus against the Honorable Roy Ferguson, Judge of the 394th District Court of Presidio
County, Texas, alleging that the court has not ruled on Relator’s pending motion for nunc pro
tunc judgment filed in cause number 2076. We deny mandamus relief.
To obtain mandamus relief, Douthit must establish both that he has no adequate remedy
at law to redress his alleged harm, and that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act not
involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial District Court
of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). To be entitled to a writ
of mandamus compelling a trial court to consider and rule on a properly filed motion, Douthit
must establish that the trial court: (1) had a legal duty to rule on the motion; (2) was asked to rule
on the motion; and (3) failed or refused to rule on the motion within a reasonable time. In re
Molina, 94 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding); see In re Layton,
257 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2008, orig. proceeding).
In 1987, Douthit waived his right to a jury trial, pled guilty to capital murder in cause
number 2076, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Ex parte Douthit, 232 S.W.3d 69, 70
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007)(stating the underlying facts). In 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals
denied habeas corpus relief, concluding that Douthit’s claim that he could not waive the right to
a jury trial by pleading guilty to capital murder was not cognizable in a post-conviction writ of
habeas corpus because Douthit did not claim that he did not intend to waive his right to a jury
trial. Id. at 74-75. Douthit raises a similar claim in his mandamus petition but asserts that he
“was manipulated into signing waivers prior to trial so the DA could impose a Capital Murder
charge in disregard of the laws prohibiting defendants from pleading guilty to Capital murder by
waiving trial by jury in a capital murder case to placate the victims’ family.” He argues that
Respondent should grant his motion for judgment nunc pro tunc and change the judgment to
reflect a conviction of murder because the law in effect in 1987 did not permit him to waive his
right to trial by jury in a capital murder case.
A trial court does not have authority to correct a judicial error by means of a judgment
nunc pro tunc after it loses its plenary power. See State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309
(Tex.Crim.App. 1994). A trial court has authority to correct the judgment to reflect what
actually happened at trial, “but correction can be only as to what was done and not as to what
should have been done.” Ex parte Dopps, 723 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Because
Douthit is effectively asking the trial court to correct the judgment as to what should have been
done, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by Douthit by means
of a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, we conclude that Respondent did not
have a legal duty to rule on the motion. The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
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STEVEN L. HUGHES, Justice
February 11, 2015
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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