In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00219-CV
LUIS S. LAGAITE, JR., APPELLANT
V.
GREGORY C. BOLAND, ET AL, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 251st District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 97,061-C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding
November 13, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Luis S. Lagaite, Jr. (Lagaite) appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against
Gregory C. Boland and other prison employees or officials. Through three issues, he
contends that the trial court erred by 1) denying sua sponte the motion to recuse that he
filed, 2) denying him the “fundamental right of due process and equal protection,” and 3)
dismissing his original petition and complaint. We address only the first issue and, upon
addressing it, reverse.
Issue One—Motion for Recusal
On September 9, 2011, Boland filed a motion to declare Lagaite a vexatious
litigant. On January 5, 2012, Lagaite filed a motion to recuse the trial judge from
proceeding. He alleged that the court had demonstrated a strong bias and prejudice
against him. At the hearing upon Boland’s motion, Lagaite objected to the proceeding
because of his pending motion to recuse. In response, the trial court neither recused
herself nor requested the administrative presiding judge to assign another jurist to hear
the recusal motion; she denied the motion herself.
Once a motion to recuse is filed against a particular jurist, that judge only has two
options on how to proceed. He may recuse himself or request the administrative
presiding judge to assign another judge to hear the motion. Victor Enters., Inc. v.
Holland, No. 05-10-01592-CV, 2013 WL 329034, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 836, at *4-5
(Tex. App.—Dallas January 13, 2013, no pet.); Bourgeois v. Collier, 959 S.W.2d 241,
246 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ). The trial judge at bar was not authorized to take
any action other than that described above. Because she did not comply with that
procedure, she erred. Consequently, we reverse the order denying the motion to
recuse, without ruling on its merits. Furthermore, because the trial judge was without
authority to continue to hear the case, any orders or judgments made subsequent to the
denial of the recusal motion, including the order declaring Lagaite a vexatious litigant,
are void. Victor Enters., Inc. v. Holland, supra.
Accordingly, we sustain the first issue, reverse the order denying the motion to
recuse, reverse the order dismissing the cause, and remand the proceeding to the trial
court.
Per Curiam
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