IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0038-14
CHRISTOPHER ADRIAN MILLER, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
TARRANT COUNTY
M EYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
The majority states that “strict application of the corpus delicti rule is unnecessary”
when the multiple crimes confessed to “are sufficiently proximate that the underlying policy
reason for the rule is not violated.” Really? Just two months ago, this same majority was
called upon in Butcher v. State, No. PD-1662-13, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tex.
Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2015), to look at the “underlying policy reason” of the safe release
provision of the kidnapping statute. There, however, the majority was quick to avoid any
Miller dissent - Page 2
resolution of that particular question and dispatched with any attempt to apply the
legislature’s actual intent with the provision, to promote the safe release of kidnapping
victims.
There is no valid reason to erode the corpus delicti rule here and now. It has been a
tenet of our state’s judicial system and still serves the important purpose of protecting those
who, for any number of reasons, may give a false confession. While changing the rule in the
way the majority does might be an attractive solution in this case, I believe it largely
removes the protection that the rule was meant to ensure.1
Unfortunately, just as they have done in the past, the majority is retroactively applying
their new doctrine in Appellant’s case.2 I disagree with the majority’s altering of the corpus
delicti rule and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Meyers, J.
Filed: April 15, 2015
Publish
1
The facts of this case and the nature of the crimes make loosening the corpus delicti rule
particularly appealing here. However, in the big picture, we should not erode a rule that provides
so important a protection. I believe that doing so will result in exactly what the rule is supposed
to guard against–the conviction of innocent individuals.
2
For example, in Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), this
court held, for the first time, that the statute of limitations is a rule that must be implemented
only upon the request of the defendant, rather than an absolute requirement for the State to prove
in every prosecution. The court had no problem applying that rule to the appellants’ cases
retroactively. Id. at 845.