COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00065-CR
NO. 02-14-00066-CR
NO. 02-14-00067-CR
FRED LEE MORGAN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1319282D, 1331032D, 1341383D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Fred Lee Morgan entered open pleas of guilty to the offenses of
burglary (trial court cause numbers 1319282D and 1341383D) and bail jumping
(trial court cause number 1331032D) and entered an open plea of true to the
repeat offender paragraph in each case. In each case, the trial court found
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Morgan guilty and found the repeat offender paragraph true. The trial court
sentenced Morgan to twenty-five years’ confinement for each burglary conviction
and twenty years’ confinement for the bail-jumping conviction, ordering that the
sentences run concurrently.
Morgan’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California2 by presenting a professional evaluation
of the records demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. In
compliance with Kelly v. State,3 counsel notified Morgan of his motion to
withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him of his right to file a pro
se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek discretionary review should
this court hold the appeal is frivolous, and took concrete measures to facilitate
Morgan’s review of the appellate record by providing him with a copy of the
clerk’s and reporter’s records. This court afforded Morgan the opportunity to file
a brief on his own behalf, but he has not done so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
records to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeals
are frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no
2
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
3
436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
2
pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the records and counsel’s brief. We agree
with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit; we find
nothing in the records that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment in each case.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, DAUPHINOT, and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 26, 2015
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