In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00357-CV
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IN RE COMMITMENT OF RONNIE RAY BROOKS
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On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-11-11615 CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State of Texas filed a petition to commit Ronnie Ray Brooks as a
sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151
(West 2010 & Supp. 2013). A jury found that Brooks is a sexually violent predator
and the trial court rendered a final judgment and an order of civil commitment. In
two appellate issues, Brooks challenges the admission of certain evidence and the
factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Admission of Evidence
In issue one, Brooks complains of testimony that the State elicited from Dr.
Michael Arambula regarding the details of Brooks’s charged and uncharged sexual
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offenses. Brooks argues that admission of this evidence violated Rules of Evidence
403 and 705. However, Brooks either wholly failed to object to the complained-of
testimony or failed to object on the basis of Rules 403 and 705. Accordingly, issue
one is not preserved for appellate review. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see also
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied).
Factual Sufficiency
In issue two, Brooks contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. Under factual sufficiency review, we weigh the evidence
to determine “whether a verdict that is supported by legally sufficient evidence
nevertheless reflects a risk of injustice that would compel ordering a new trial.”
Day, 342 S.W.3d at 213. In an SVP case, the State must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a person is a sexually violent predator. Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 841.062(a) (West 2010). A person is a “sexually violent predator” if
he is a repeat sexually violent offender and suffers from a behavioral abnormality
that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Id. §
841.003(a) (West Supp. 2013). A “behavioral abnormality” is “a congenital or
acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity,
predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the
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person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Id. §
841.002(2) (West Supp. 2013).
The jury heard evidence regarding Brooks’s criminal history, including his
sexual offenses. Brooks admitted having been convicted of aggravated rape,
robbery by threats, false claims against the government, failure to identify, and
sexual assault. In his responses to requests for admissions, Brooks admitted that he
does not believe that he is a sex offender or needs sex offender treatment and that
he believes his victims are to blame for his sexual offenses. During his testimony,
Brooks admitted losing control of his sexual urges in the past, and he testified that
although he has changed, he still needs sex offender treatment.
Dr. Arambula testified that Brooks suffers from a behavioral abnormality
that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Arambula
diagnosed Brooks with sexual deviance, mood disorder not otherwise specified,
psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, polysubstance dependence by history,
and antisocial personality disorder. He testified that Brooks’s sexual deviance is a
chronic condition and is a “bad cocktail” when combined with a mental illness and
antisocial personality disorder. Arambula explained that Brooks has the following
risk factors: sexual deviance, antisocial personality, use of physical force,
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humiliation, offending while on supervision, failure to accept responsibility,
callousness, substance abuse, and treatment failure.
Dr. John Tennison testified that Brooks does not have a behavioral
abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.
He testified that Brooks’s substance abuse appears to be in remission, he would not
have diagnosed Brooks with psychotic or mood disorders, he did not believe that
Brooks’s antisocial behavior rose to the level of an actual disorder, the evidence
does not support a diagnosis of sexual sadism, and sexual paraphilias tend to
decrease in manifestation as a person ages. Tennison conducted the Static-99R
actuarial test and Brooks’s score fell within a zero to seven percent rate of
recidivism.
According to Brooks, Dr. Arambula’s testimony was based on “incorrect
legal standards[.]” 1 Arambula testified that “likely” is “not just a mere possibility,
that something probably will occur.” Brooks argues that this testimony “does not
resemble the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that involuntary civil commitment is
limited to those who are ‘dangerous beyond their control.’” This Court has found
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In his motion for new trial, Brooks challenged the factual sufficiency of the
evidence on grounds that the State failed to proffer sufficient reliable evidence that
Brooks had a behavioral abnormality that made him likely to engage in a predatory
act of sexual violence. We construe this argument to include that presented on
appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2).
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that expert testimony defining “likely” as “probable” and “beyond a mere
possibility” is “consistent with how dictionaries commonly define that term and
with the Bohannan Court’s construction of the statute[.]” In re Commitment of
Weatherread, No. 09-11-00269-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9757, at **8-10 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Nov. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Brooks also complains of Arambula’s description of emotional or volitional
capacity:
Arambula: [I]t’s basically how the illness affects the brain and what it
does. So sometimes people have a -- because of their limbic system,
their emotional -- the emotional part of their brain is so charged that
they can’t control themselves, that’s how I look at that. And the
volitional part means, basically, decision-making, and, you know,
should I do it, do you think I -- can I get away with it? That’s a
person, should I do that anyway to a person? All of those things are
involved in brain function. And when an illness like this exists, it
interferes with that normal functioning.
State: Okay. And is there evidence that we’ve discussed that Mr.
Brooks’s emotional or volitional capacity has been affected?
Arambula: I think the offenses speak for themselves, because in
medicine, we study pathology, so, in other words, we study how a
disease behaves. So if I study how a disease behaves, in this case, the
inference, the reverse inference is that when someone is normal, that
they don’t do that.
...
Arambula: So only a person that’s diseased would do what Mr.
Brooks did.
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State: Is it your understanding that if a person has a behavioral
abnormality, as we’ve just discussed, that they automatically are
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence?
Arambula: [I]t’s a definition and everything is included. So it’s all
together.
Brooks contends that “Arambula’s belief that a person who knows the
consequences of a certain behavior but engages in that behavior anyway is
volitionally impaired does not comport with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that
involuntary civil committees must have ‘serious difficulty in controlling [their]
behavior.’” Whether a person suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes
him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence is a single, unified issue.
In re Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 303 (Tex. 2012). Thus, whether a person suffers
from an emotional or volitional defect so grave as to cause behavior that makes
him a menace is included in the determination of whether he has serious difficulty
in controlling behavior. In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 505-06
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). “A condition which affects either
emotional capacity or volitional capacity to the extent a person is predisposed to
threaten the health and safety of others with acts of sexual violence is an
abnormality which causes serious difficulty in behavior control.” Id. Arambula’s
testimony is not contrary to these rulings. The jury could infer serious difficulty
controlling behavior based not only on Arambula’s testimony, but also on Brooks’s
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past behavior and Brooks’s own testimony. See In re Commitment of Burnett, No.
09-09-00009-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9930, at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re Commitment of Grinstead, No.
09-07-00412-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 228, at *20 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan.
15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury could
reasonably conclude that Brooks suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes
him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See In re Commitment of
Bernard, No. 09-10-00462-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4681, at **6-7 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont June 14, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Almaguer, 117
S.W.3d at 505-506; Burnett, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9930, at *13; Grinstead, 2009
Tex. App. LEXIS 228, at *16; In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 887
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). That Brooks has serious difficulty
controlling his behavior and is likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence
directed toward individuals for the primary purpose of victimization are implicit in
this finding. See In re Commitment of Bailey, No. 09-09-00353-CV, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6685, at **12-14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 19, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also Grinstead, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 228, at *16. Weighing all
of the evidence, the verdict does not reflect a risk of injustice that would compel
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ordering a new trial. See Day, 342 S.W.3d at 213. We overrule issue two and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on March 3, 2014
Opinion Delivered March 13, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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