AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 27, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00011-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF S.Y., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 12-1206-X-305
OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Lewis
The mother of S.Y. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights. Following
a bench trial, the court found that (1) Mother had committed one statutory predicate act
supporting termination, and (2) termination of Mother’s parental rights was in S.Y.’s best
interest. On appeal, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting both of those findings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Background
Mother, her husband (“Father”), and a teenaged cousin were detained and arrested on
November 7, 2012, for shoplifting at a Walmart store. Security cameras showed them placing
items in S.Y.’s stroller and then walking past the check-out area without paying. While they
were being detained at the store, S.Y. needed a diaper change. A police officer accompanied
Mother to change the diaper; the officer noticed S.Y. had “a really bad diaper rash.”
Police attempted to locate a relative who could take care of S.Y.—who was five months
old at the time—while her parents were in police custody. When calling from Walmart was not
successful, a police officer took S.Y. to the Department of Family and Protective Services (the
“Department”). In a telephone conversation with a Department representative, S.Y.’s paternal
grandmother offered to take S.Y., but the grandmother refused to allow someone from the
Department to visit her home, a mandatory requirement for Department placement. Without a
family member to act as caregiver, the Department took custody of S.Y. and placed her in foster
care. Meanwhile, Mother pleaded guilty to theft and spent three days in jail.
Two days after the arrest, S.Y.’s foster mother took the baby for a physical examination.
Dr. Joel Brandon Brock examined S.Y., and his report identified three conditions as “abnormal”:
a skin rash on her torso, a diaper rash, and cradle cap. The examination form asks whether “the
patient show[s] evidence of child abuse,” and Brock answered “Yes —> Neglect.” Brock
described the torso rash as covering the lower part of S.Y.’s face, over her neck, in the fat rolls,
and in the upper torso. He stated the rashes were “things that we typically see whenever food or
feces or some other fluid is left on the body for too long and not cleaned off.” He testified the
rash had turned into a “probable candida infection or yeast infection” in several places. Brock
believed S.Y. was in a state of medical neglect because:
[a]ny time that you have a child that is very easy to give basic care needs, just
clean them off and make sure that food and feces are not left on them for an
extended period of time – it takes time [for the rashes to get this bad] and it’s not
easy for those kinds of rashes to occur.
At a hearing on November 19, 2012, the trial court signed temporary orders appointing
the Department as Temporary Managing Conservator of S.Y. Mother and Father were both
ordered to participate in a parenting class, a psychological evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation,
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DNA testing to determine parentage of S.Y., 1 and a drug/alcohol assessment. They were also
ordered to follow through with all recommendations made by any service providers arranged by
the Department. The Department then created a Family Service Plan, which had as its goal the
reunification of the family within one year.
A little over a year later, however, the Department brought suit to terminate both parents’
rights to S.Y. based on three statutory grounds: family code sections 161.001(1)(D),
161.001(1)(E), and 161.001(1)(O). Witnesses at trial described the efforts made by the
Department and by both parents—how the parents had succeeded and where they had failed. 2
Mother’s counselors and caseworker testified that during the year between the arrest and trial,
Mother completed her required parenting classes, counseling sessions, and therapy sessions. She
did not undergo the required psychiatric evaluation or a drug test ordered by the Department the
week before trial.
Testimony established Mother visited S.Y. regularly, and all reports of those visits
indicated she and her daughter had a loving bond. Mother was not employed, but testified at trial
that she had recently begun telling fortunes and she could do that to earn money if necessary.
Overall, though, she depended upon Father to support the family, which included Father’s
mother and sister. Father did automobile body repair work; he would approach people in parking
lots and offer to fix their cars for less than the owners’ insurance deductible. He testified he
earned enough to support his family in this way. Both parents experienced problems related to
their limited formal education; over the course of the year, Mother’s caseworker learned Mother
could not read or write. One recurring problem for both parents was the lack of official
1
There was some confusion at the time of the arrest as to Mother’s relationship with S.Y. Officers testified that Father told them S.Y.’s
mother was in California and that Mother was his sister. At trial, Father testified they had simply misunderstood him.
2
Although both parents’ rights were terminated in the trial court, only Mother appeals. We discuss Father’s conduct and his testimony
when it helps illuminate Mother’s own conduct and testimony.
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identification, which was necessary for most employment opportunities and for government
assistance. By the time of trial, Father—but not Mother—had obtained identification. Mother
and Father had moved to Texas from California in August 2012, some three months before the
November arrest, and had lived in various motels since then. By the time of trial, they had
leased an apartment.
However, on May 25, 2013, both Mother and Father were again arrested for theft.
Mother again pleaded guilty; this time she spent a week in jail. Father’s multiple prior offenses
resulted in an enhanced charge. He spent three months in jail and was serving a deferred three-
year sentence at the time of trial. Their sentences—especially Father’s extended sentence—kept
both parents from attending some sessions and visits with S.Y.
Moreover, Mother’s visits with S.Y. sometimes raised concerns. S.Y.’s caseworker, who
generally supervised the parents’ visits, testified the parents were loving and engaged with S.Y.
They brought the baby presents, including clothes and toys. However, at times it appeared they
did not understand safety issues involved with her care. The parents allowed S.Y. to eat food
that had been dropped on the floor and to put things in her mouth that could be harmful. They
did not appear to understand fundamental notions of feeding S.Y.; the child had repeated choking
incidents when her parents failed to cut her food into small enough bites and when they gave her
access to an entire banana that S.Y. then shoved into her mouth. The foster parents learned S.Y.
was allergic to citrus fruits. But despite being told that, Mother allowed S.Y. to sip on orange
juice “because [S.Y.] reached for it.” Nor did Mother seem capable of making reasonable
decisions concerning S.Y.’s future: when asked about her plans for S.Y.’s education, Mother
replied that she thought she would home school her daughter.
S.Y.’s caseworker testified that the Family Service Plan required S.Y.’s parents to make
“actual life changes.” She testified the baby’s condition when she came to the Department was
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not so bad that the parents could not have regained custody if they had made those life changes.
But she testified their ability to parent S.Y. was the same before and after parenting classes. She
opined it was in S.Y.’s best interest to terminate the parents’ rights.
The supervisor of S.Y.’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) made similar
observations. She testified she did not see any change in the parents’ behavior after the
parenting classes. She stated:
They certainly were very loving with her. That can’t be denied. They just didn’t
seem to understand the kind of things that she needs emotionally and physically
and really encouraging her development in a very positive way.
The CASA advocate herself related that Mother had said she was “not interested” when
presented with a list of agencies that could provide services to the family, including medical care
for S.Y. and literacy programs for Mother. The advocate testified she was upset by Mother’s
reaction:
[b]ecause CASA had tried several times to support them and to help them address
some significant concerns, so reunification would be possible. And every time
they showed either a lack of capacity to understand that, or just a disinterest in
even addressing the problem.
Finally, Mother’s counselor testified she had concerns about Mother’s ability to provide
for S.Y. She explained that Mother was relying on her husband to provide financially and was
unable to get a job herself. This lack of independence was considered dangerous by the
professionals involved in the case because of the risk presented by Father’s pattern of criminal
history and incarceration. The counselor was concerned that Mother was not able to verbalize
any specific plan or goals for taking care of S.Y. and living independently. She did not believe
that Mother had made progress toward the goals of her therapy, and she did not believe Mother
was capable of providing for a child on her own.
The trial judge initially took the case under advisement, expressing a desire to go back
through the evidence. The next day, having done so, the judge found that the parents had
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committed the conduct defined by family code section 161.001(1)(O), but declined to make
findings under sections 161.001(1)(D) or (E). He spoke on the record to the concern that
termination not be based on poverty, misfortune, or lack of training. But he stated that after
considering all the evidence, he was “convinced that apart from having someone to be with these
parents, pretty much all the time, that they are not going to be able to care for this baby.”
Addressing the best-interest issue, the judge cited what he acknowledged were “simplistic”
examples of problems: the baby choking on large pieces of food, Mother giving her citrus
despite her allergy, Mother believing she could home school S.Y. He concluded that it would be
“a real problem” for the parents to take care of S.Y. themselves, and he ultimately concluded it
would be in the child’s best interest for both parents’ rights to be terminated.
Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment.
Standard of Review
A court may order involuntary termination only if the court finds that (1) a parent has
committed one or more of the statutory enumerated predicate acts or omissions, and (2)
termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014).
Given the constitutional magnitude of the interests at stake, the trial court’s findings must be
made by clear and convincing evidence to reduce the risk of erroneous terminations. Id.; In re
B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 351–52 (Tex. 2003).
The supreme court has identified the appropriate standards for appellate courts reviewing
the legal and factual sufficiency of findings made under this heightened burden of proof. See In
re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002) (defining the standard of review for legal
sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (defining the standard of review for
factual sufficiency). In both instances, we ask whether the evidence is such that a factfinder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the State
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bears the burden of proof. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265–66; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25.
However, in In re J.F.C., the supreme court explained that we must approach the body of
evidence differently in legal and factual sufficiency reviews. When reviewing legal sufficiency,
we traditionally look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. In the clear-and-
convincing context, this means we must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in
favor of its finding, if a reasonable factfinder could do so. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We
must disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
incredible. Id. We do not, however, disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding.
Id. When reviewing factual sufficiency, we must give “due consideration” to any evidence the
factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. This means we must
look at the disputed evidence and adjudge whether a reasonable factfinder could have resolved
that evidence in favor of the finding. The evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the
entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor
of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction. Id.
Termination of Parental Rights
In seven issues, Mother contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to
support the termination of her parental rights. Mother challenges the evidentiary support for
both the statutory predicate act and the trial court’s best-interest conclusion.
Section 106.001(1)(O)
In her fourth issue, Mother argues there was not clear and convincing evidence that she
committed one or more statutory predicate acts identified as grounds for termination. The trial
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court found by clear and convincing evidence that both parents had committed the conduct
defined by section 161.001(1)(O). 3 Thus, the trial court found that Mother:
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established
the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been
in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of
Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the
child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the
child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O).
Mother challenges the finding that she failed to comply with certain Court-ordered
services that were incorporated into the trial court’s order. She argues the services “were
basically completed,” and she contends the parents “should be commended for progressing from
practical homelessness to a home in [their] names.” However, undisputed evidence established
that neither parent had undergone the required psychiatric evaluation or submitted to a drug test
required by the Department. Mother had explanations for both failures. She and her husband
testified they were unable to undergo the psychiatric evaluation because of requirements at the
Metrocare facility: first for identification and then for income verification. And as to the drug
test, Mother testified that she did not want to take it, but also that her attorney told her not to take
it. Regardless of these explanations, section 161.001(1)(O) does not “make a provision for
excuses” for a parent’s failure to comply with the trial court’s order. In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368,
374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Nor does it “provide a means of evaluating partial or
substantial compliance with a plan.” In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d 863, 877 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2013, no pet.).
3
The court specifically declined to make findings under the other two grounds urged by the Department, i.e. sections 161.001(1)(D) and
161.001(1)(E), which involve placing a child in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s well-being or engaging in conduct that
endangers the child’s well-being. Mother’s brief challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support violations of sections D and E. Because
the trial court rejected these grounds for termination, we do not address them.
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Mother conceded she had not undergone the psychiatric evaluation or taken the drug test;
indeed, there is really no dispute on this issue. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence
established that Mother failed to complete those court-ordered services. Thus, the violation of
section 161.001(1)(O) is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, and we overrule
appellant’s fourth issue. 4
Best Interest of the Child
In her third and seventh issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best
interest of S.Y. As we examine the evidence concerning S.Y.’s best interest, we remain mindful
of the strong presumption that a child’s best interest is served by keeping custody in the natural
parent. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). 5
When deciding whether termination is in the best interest of a child, we consider the
following factors: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child
now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist
these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed
placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-
child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
4
Mother does not challenge any other elements of a section O violation. Nevertheless, we note that the evidence was undisputed that S.Y.
had been in the Department’s custody for more than nine months. And as to the cause of S.Y.’s removal from her parents, the Department’s
Family Service Plan cites its original referral alleging “neglectful supervision,” given that both parents were arrested and could not care for S.Y.
In addition, two days after the parents’ arrest, S.Y.’s medical condition was classified as “neglect” by her examining doctor.
5
This presumption is stressed by appellant in the first “issue” in her brief. We agree with the legal premise appellant raises there: the
constitutional dimension of the parental relationship requires strict scrutiny of termination proceedings. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 302
(Tex. 2002). However, appellant’s first issue does not contain a legal or factual question for us to answer—it contains only a statement of the
law. Thus, we need not make a ruling on the issue.
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S.Y. was five months old when she entered the Department’s care; she was
approximately eighteen months old at the time of the court’s decree of termination. Although
she was not old enough to express preferences, the record supports the conclusion that S.Y.
experienced a positive bond with her natural parents and with her foster parents. Given the
presumption in favor of the natural parents, the first Holley factor weighs against termination.
The second and third factors address emotional needs and dangers for the child and
physical needs and dangers for the child. The record substantiates a loving relationship between
Mother and her daughter. There is reason to believe mother would provide the emotional
support S.Y. needed and would not endanger her emotionally. However, along with the
significant demands that any young child makes on a parent in terms of physical needs, S.Y. also
has issues involving unusually sensitive skin and at least one food allergy. The record provides
reasons for concern as to whether Mother understands these physical needs of her daughter and
whether she is capable of meeting them. S.Y. will be completely dependent on adult care for her
health, hygiene, and safety for many years. Although the skin-care issues from which she
suffered at the time of the first arrest were not life-threatening, the medical testimony at trial
explained the neck rash could have caused serious injury to S.Y. had it gone untreated. 6 Mother
did not believe then that S.Y. needed to see a doctor. And professionals who observed Mother
interact with S.Y. over the course of a year expressed concern that Mother would still not
recognize when the child needed medical attention. Therefore, while Holley factors related to
6
Brock testified S.Y. healed well under foster care, but when asked about whether she needed follow up care, he testified she did:
because the lesion was bad enough where I thought it was actually going to penetrate completely through the fat roll. And
I was worried about there becoming exposure into the upper thorax or in the actual neck. And so when you get the topical
fungal infection, it’s possible at time to get staph or strep in there. So I gave a topical, I think I gave a statin cream which
was for yeast. But I was wanting to monitor that. It was so bad, it was so excoriated that it’s possible for – in the natural
crease line for the infection to get so deep that that will completely tear in half as if somebody has almost been hatched
across the neck. So I was very, very concerned about the thinness of the tissue. So I asked for multiple follow ups. And I
believe – I know I gave at least one medication, maybe even two, to make sure that infection did not completely destroy
that tissue.
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emotional care weigh against termination, factors related to physical needs and care weigh in
favor of termination.
The next two factors speak to Mother’s parental abilities. Here again, the observations
and evaluations of the professionals who worked with Mother argue for termination. Mother did
not seem to be able to apply what she was taught in parenting classes, or what she learned in
counseling, to her dealings with S.Y. She was repeatedly offered sources for programs that
would help her to promote S.Y.’s best interest directly (including government assistance,
medical services, food pantries) and indirectly by helping Mother to improve her own skills
(including literacy programs, job training). And at trial Mother testified she would take
advantage of those programs. But the record indicates she never took advantage of them during
the year S.Y. was in the Department’s care, and she actually told those trying to help her she was
“not interested” in a list of those providers. If Mother were self-sufficient, we would not be
concerned at her rejection of assistance, but she is not. These factors argue in favor of
termination.
The sixth and seventh factors address Mother’s plans for S.Y. and the relative stability of
Mother’s home and the proposed placement. One criticism of Mother’s lack of growth was her
inability to articulate a plan for S.Y. The record does not indicate Mother was able to make
reasonable decisions concerning the future for her daughter. For example, given that Mother
could not read and write, and had not taken advantage of free literacy programs when
encouraged by the caseworker to do so, we consider her stated plan to home school her child an
example of poor judgment and unreasonable decision-making. Much of the evidence in favor of
termination relates to the lack of stability in Mother’s life. By contrast, S.Y.’s year with the
foster family has been stable: she lives with her foster parents and two other foster siblings; her
health care needs have been attended to; her foster parents have the economic means to provide
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for her; and she is clearly loved in that home. The Department recommends placing S.Y.
permanently with her foster family. The foster mother testified at trial to the bond between S.Y.
and her foster parents and to their desire to adopt S.Y. We conclude these factors also weigh in
favor of termination.
The eighth factor addresses the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that
the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one. We have addressed Mother’s failure to
grow in her understanding of S.Y.’s needs. The Family Service Plan stressed that the parents
would need to make a number of changes to regain custody. One specifically enumerated
change was: “Parent will stop participating in criminal acts and accept responsibility for prior
criminal activity.” Mother’s second arrest indicates she was not able to effectuate this critical
change. By choosing to steal again, she failed to make reunification with S.Y. her priority. This
factor weighs most heavily in favor of termination.
Finally, Holley directs us to consider “any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent”
as part of our best-interest analysis. Id. Appellant’s sixth issue argues that:
Termination of the parent-child relationship is not justified when the evidence
shows that a parent’s failure to provide a more desirable degree of care and
support of the child is due solely to misfortune or the lack of intelligence or
training, and not to indifference or malice.
The issue is taken from the opinion in Clark v. Dearen, 715 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). In Clark, the court of appeals reversed the termination of a father’s
parental rights when it concluded the evidence of his endangering his son did not rise to the level
of clear and convincing. The father was illiterate and totally disabled from a back injury and
serious burns. Id. at 367. He depended on social security and food stamps; he was unable to
procure a driver’s license because of his inability to read. Id. There was evidence the child was
dirty, but no expert evidence indicating he had suffered physical or emotional harm. Id. The
court of appeals stated:
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Although these facts indicate that appellant might lack some of the attributes of
the ideal parent, this Court finds that the harsh and irrevocable remedy of
termination of the parent-child relationship is not justified where the evidence
shows merely that a parent’s failure to provide a more desirable degree of care
and support of the child is due solely to misfortune or the lack of intelligence or
training, and not to indifference or malice.
Id. 7
Certainly there are factual similarities between the father in Clark and Mother in our
case: both labor under disadvantages from lack of education and both experience a level of
economic hardship. However, the differences between the two parents outweigh their
similarities. Despite his illiteracy, the father in Clark succeeded in doing what he needed to
obtain appropriate government assistance for himself and his child. Nothing in Clark indicates
the father ever considered criminal conduct as a solution to economic difficulty. Mother,
however, did not take advantage of services offered to help her get the identification necessary to
seek employment or appropriate government assistance for herself or S.Y. Instead—despite
knowing that S.Y. had been placed in foster care following the November arrest for theft—
Mother was again arrested and jailed for theft the following May.
We recognize that termination should never be used as a way to reallocate a child to
“better” or more prosperous parents. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d at 207. “[P]arental rights may not
be terminated merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere.” In re C.R., 263
S.W.3d at 375. The trial court specifically evaluated the evidence to be sure Mother’s
termination was not based solely on factors such as misfortune or lack of training. In this case,
however, the record establishes that Mother has continued to make choices that do not put her
child’s safety and welfare first. We conclude the trial court did not terminate Mother’s rights
7
We note that misfortune or a lack of education or training are not affirmative defenses that would negate all the evidence showing
termination is in S.Y.’s best interest. Instead, they are just one factor to be considered in making and reviewing the best-interest determination.
See In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 89–90 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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solely because of Mother’s “misfortune or the lack of intelligence or training.” We overrule her
sixth issue.
When we consider all the Holley factors, and the record as a whole, we conclude clear
and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in S.Y.’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third and seventh
issues.
In her second issue, Mother challenges the factual sufficiency of the overall conclusion to
terminate. And in her fifth issue, she argues the Department’s level of proof in favor of
termination did not rise to the level of clear and convincing. We have concluded that both
prongs of the termination statute are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly,
we overrule Mother’s second and fifth issues as well.
Conclusion
We have resolved all of Mother’s issues against her. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/David Lewis/
DAVID LEWIS
JUSTICE
140011F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Y., A CHILD, On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-00011-CV Trial Court Cause No. 12-1206-X-305.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis,
Justices Francis and Lang-Miers
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 27th day of June, 2014.
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