In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00470-CV
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IN THE ESTATE OF CHAD ERIC MCDONALD
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 108647
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
After receiving a notice of appeal in this probate proceeding, we stayed
further proceedings in the trial court while the parties briefed whether we had
jurisdiction to consider Johnsye McDonald’s appeal from an order allowing
Johnsye to participate in the case as a creditor of the estate, but not as a person
interested in the welfare of Chad Eric McDonald’s child. We conclude the order
does not deny that the appellant, Johnsye McDonald, has standing to participate in
the trial court as a person interested in Chad’s estate, as the order expressly allows
Johnsye the right to participate as a creditor in the proceedings before the court.
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Thus, the orders at issue do not conclude a discrete phase of litigation regarding the
estate and are not subject to interlocutory review on appeal. We dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
Chad Eric McDonald died from injuries received in an industrial accident. In
applications for letters of administration and to determine heirship, Kaylen Brooke
Rankin alleged that she is Chad’s wife and the mother of his child. Kaylen
subsequently gave birth to another child, who may also be shown in further
proceedings to be a beneficiary of Chad’s estate. Kaylen also filed an application
for a determination that she and Chad had an informal marriage.
In a competing application for independent administration and an application
to determine heirship, Johnsye alleged that Chad was never married. Johnsye also
alleged that he is interested in the estate because he was given possession of
Chad’s minor child by court order and because he paid Chad’s funeral bills. Over
Kaylen’s objection, Johnsye applied to be the temporary administrator of Chad’s
estate. Johnsye demanded a jury trial. The County Judge transferred the case to the
County Court at Law, and Kaylen filed a motion challenging Johnsye’s standing to
participate in the probate court proceedings. Kaylen also filed a motion to deposit
funds into the registry of the court, in which the trial court was asked to use funds
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Kaylen deposited into the court’s registry to reimburse Johnsye for the expenses he
advanced for Chad’s funeral.
After finding that Johnsye had standing as a creditor of the estate to
participate in the probate proceedings, the trial court signed an order denying
Kaylen’s motion to dismiss; but, in the same order, the trial court granted Kaylen’s
claim that Johnsye lacked standing to proceed as a person interested in the welfare
of Chad’s minor child. Subsequently, the trial court stayed all further discovery
and ordered the county clerk to deposit the funds tendered by Kaylen into an
account for Johnsye’s use and benefit. In an order signed on October 9, 2013, the
trial court struck Johnsye’s jury demand. Johnsye filed a notice of appeal.
The general test for appealing probate orders states that if an express statute
declares the phase of the probate proceedings at issue to be final and appealable,
the statute controls. Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).
“Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be
considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise
issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.” Id. We
are to avoid constructions that defeat bona fide attempts to appeal. See id.
Kaylen contends that Johnsye’s appeal is premature because the trial court
has not yet entered a judgment declaring heirship. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §
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55(a) (West 2003). Johnsye argues that the trial court’s various orders finally
disposed of his claimed interest in Chad’s estate. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 3(r)
(West Supp. 2013).
An order sustaining a challenge to an applicant’s interest in an estate may be
appealed because it disposes of the merits of the issue of interest. Womble v.
Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. 1960) (“A judgment of no interest . . . is in no
sense interlocutory.”). “To avoid ambiguity, if the motion to dismiss is granted, the
order should reflect that the claim is dismissed.” In the Estate of Chapman, 315
S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.).
In this case, the trial court’s order does not dismiss Johnsye’s claim; rather,
it allows him to participate as a creditor in the probate proceedings involving
Chad’s estate. The trial court’s orders with respect to whether Johnsye has a right
to participate as a party interested in the estate of Chad’s child are not final, as the
trial court could change its mind regarding its ruling on that matter prior to the
trial. For instance, the trial court neither struck McDonald’s pleadings nor
dismissed his application to determine heirship or his application to administer
Chad’s estate. Because those claims are still before the trial court, the orders
disposing of Johnsye’s claims remain interlocutory. See Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at
783; Chapman, 315 S.W.3d at 165.
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Because the trial court’s orders have not disposed of all issues, and no
statute declares the phase of the probate proceedings at issue to be final and
appealable, we conclude that the orders Johnsye seeks to appeal are interlocutory.
We hold that we do not have jurisdiction of Johnsye’s appeal. We withdraw our
order of October 23, 2013, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Opinion Delivered November 27, 2013
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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