In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
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No. 07-13-00442-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 242nd District Court
Hale County, Texas
Trial Court No. B38935-1211; Honorable Ed Self, Presiding
April 11, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, J.C.C.E., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his son, Z.C., (hereinafter “the child”) and appointing Appellee, the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services, sole permanent managing conservator.1
By a single issue, he contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. We affirm.
1
To protect the parent's and child's privacy, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2013). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
BACKGROUND
The child, the subject of this proceeding, is a male born in April 2007. In
December 2012, the Department received a referral of neglectful supervision. The
referral was related to an auto accident in which Appellant, while driving a vehicle,
chased the child’s pregnant mother while she was in her vehicle with the child and an
aunt as passengers. Appellant intentionally collided with the mother’s vehicle forcing it
off the road and killing her and causing injuries to the child which required
hospitalization. The aunt also suffered injuries. After his release from the hospital, the
child was placed with maternal relatives who wish to adopt him.
Pursuant to plea agreements, Appellant was convicted of murdering the child’s
mother and her unborn child and also convicted in two separate causes of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon for injuries sustained by the child and the aunt. He was
sentenced to sixty years confinement on the murder conviction and twenty years
confinement for each of the two convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon.
By a single issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of
his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. He asserts the Department’s
caseworker thwarted his effort to communicate with the child by failing to deliver
appropriate correspondence and drawings to the child. Appellant argues her conclusion
that termination was in the child’s best interest is “just plain wrong.”
2
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN TERMINATION CASES
The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional
dimension. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). See also Holick v.
Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, termination proceedings are
strictly construed in favor of the parent. In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012).
Parental rights, however, are not absolute, and it is essential that the emotional and
physical interests of a child not be sacrificed merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H.,
89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and section 161.001
of the Texas Family Code require application of the heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. See In
re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.
2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2008).
See also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25-26.
In applying the clear and convincing standard onto our legal sufficiency standard,
we review the evidence by considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its finding was true. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 (citing In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 266). To give appropriate deference to the fact finder’s conclusions, we
must assume the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
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fact finder could do so. Id. As a corollary to this requirement, an appellate court should
also disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
to been incredible.2 Id. If, after conducting a legal sufficiency review, a court
determines that no reasonable fact finder could form a firm belief or conviction that the
matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally insufficient. Id.
In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to
the evidence the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In
re C.H., 98 S.W.3d at 25. We determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s
allegations. Id. In doing so we consider whether disputed evidence is such that a
reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact
finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact finder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is
factually insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
The Family Code permits a trial court to terminate parental rights if the
Department proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent committed an
action prohibited under section 161.001(1) and termination is in the child’s best interest.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1), (2) (West Supp. 2013); Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976).
2
This does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding.
To do so could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence. See In re E.N.C.,
384 S.W.3d at 802.
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Appellant’s parental rights to the child were terminated on the grounds
enumerated in section 161.001(1)(L), (Q) and (T)(i). He does not challenge any of the
grounds for termination. Thus, we will proceed to analyze the trial court’s best interest
finding.
BEST INTEREST
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under
section 161.001(1), we must also find clear and convincing evidence that termination of
the parent-child relationship was in the child’s best interest. See § 161.001(2).
Evidence that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also
constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. See also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249-50 (Tex. 2013). A
non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in deciding best interest is found at section
263.307(b) of the Family Code. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
The only two witnesses at the final hearing were Appellant and the caseworker.
Appellant, aided by an interpreter, acknowledged his three criminal convictions related
to the auto accident that killed the child’s mother. He testified he loved his son and did
not want him taken away. He acknowledged that due to his incarceration, he would be
unable to provide support for the child.
The caseworker testified the child was placed with a maternal great aunt and
uncle and was happy and doing well. His relatives were pursuing adoption and were
committed to providing a permanent and stable home. Adoption would provide the child
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with permanency and his relatives were seeking better medical benefits, tuition waiver
and other benefits to assist them in caring for the child.
Furthermore, at the time of the hearing, the child was in counseling. The
caseworker admitted that Appellant had written the child a letter and made some
drawings which she forgot to deliver to the child’s counselor. No evidence was
presented concerning the child’s desires or his feelings toward Appellant.
From a review of the entire evidentiary record, including the facts from the auto
accident which led to Appellant’s convictions for murder and aggravated assault, we find
that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly,
Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights as to his son is
affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
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