NUMBER 13-15-00035-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
____________________________________________________________
BERNADETTE MORALES AND
SANDRA GONZALEZ, Appellants,
v.
OMAR H. SAENZ, ELIZABETH
M. SAENZ, MARGARITA LOPEZ
PEREZ, AND ALFREDO MORALES, Appellees.
____________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 139th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
____________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam
Appellants, Bernadette Morales and Sandra Gonzalez, attempted to perfect an
appeal from an order denying an application for temporary injunction entered by the 139th
District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, in cause number C-6646-14-C. We dismiss for
want of jurisdiction.
By written order signed on December 23, 2014, the trial court denied appellant’s
application for temporary injunction. Appellants filed a request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law on December 23, 2014. Notice of appeal was filed on January 20,
2015. On January 22, 2015, the Clerk of this Court notified appellants that it appeared
that the appeal was not timely perfected. Appellants were advised that the appeal would
be dismissed if the defect was not corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of
the Court’s directive. Appellants failed to respond to the Court’s notice.
Section 51.014(a)(4) of the civil practice and remedies code permits an
interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or refuses a temporary injunction. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon 2008). Appeals from
interlocutory orders, when allowed by statute, are accelerated appeals. TEX. R. APP. P.
28.1. In order to perfect an accelerated appeal of an interlocutory order, the party is
required to file a notice of appeal “within 20 days after the judgment or order is signed.”
Id. at R. 26.1(b). The filing of a motion for new trial, request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or any other post-judgment motion, except for a motion for extension
of time filed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, “will not extend the time to
perfect an accelerated appeal.” Id. at R. 26.3, 28.1(b).
The trial court’s order was signed on December 23, 2014. Under the civil practice
and remedies code, the order was subject to an accelerated interlocutory appeal. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). Accordingly, appellants were required
to file their notice of accelerated appeal within twenty days of the trial court’s December
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23, 2014 order. The record does not reflect that appellant filed a motion for extension of
time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3. See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser
v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646–47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should
be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied
by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
Because appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, appellants have failed to
perfect their appeal and we therefore lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See In re K.A.F.,
160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005); Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Davenport, 85 S.W.3d 837,
839 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
PER CURIAM
Delivered and filed the
26th day of February, 2015.
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Bernadette Morales and Sandra Gonzalez v. Omar H. Saenz, Elizabeth M. Saenz, Margarita Lopez Perez and Alfredo Morales
Combined Opinion