IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 02-60559
Summary Calendar
____________________
KMN SARWAR IQBAL
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL
Respondent
_________________________________________________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A73-178-328
_________________________________________________________________
March 10, 2003
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kmn Sarwar Iqbal petitions this court for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying him political
asylum and the withholding of deportation. Iqbal argues that the
Immigration Judge (IJ) “completely ignored” the most significant
reason for his request for asylum -- “the fear of death for what
I was repeatedly threatened by Mr. Nikhil Ranjan Das, my main
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
02-60559
2
enemy.” He also argues that the IJ erred in finding that he did
not suffer from past persecution.
The BIA’s factual finding that an alien is not eligible for
asylum will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Gomez-Mejia v. INS, 56 F.3d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1995). The
substantial evidence standard requires only that the BIA’s
conclusion be based on the evidence presented and that the
decision is substantially reasonable. Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS,
78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). The petitioner has the burden
to “‘show that the evidence he presented [is] so compelling that
no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear
of persecution.’” Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992)).
With respect to Iqbal’s claim of past persecution, the IJ
determined that, although there was evidence that Iqbal was
mistreated during his fifteen days in custody, the mistreatment
did not rise to the level of past persecution as contemplated by
the BIA in other decisions. A review of several cases involving
past persecution reveals no error in the IJ’s determination that
the mistreatment did not rise to the level of persecution. See
Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 304 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting
the lack of “claims of past persecution [that] have been
sustained based on personal suffering alone or based on a
combination of personal and family suffering”). As for Iqbal’s
02-60559
3
claim that he should be granted asylum based on a fear of future
persecution, the IJ expressly addressed the threat of future
persecution posed by Das. Compare Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d
579, 587 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the BIA erred in
concluding that a finding that the petitioner suffered no past
persecution was sufficient to demonstrate that he also lacked any
well-founded fear of future persecution). Iqbal has failed to
meet his burden of proving that his subjective fear of Das is
such that a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find that
he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Mikhael, 115
F.3d at 304.
Iqbal also argues that, had the immigration hearing “taken
place today,” his argument for asylum would be stronger because
the Das’ party, the Bangladesh National Party, is again in
control of the government. To the extent that this information
would bear on the decision to grant asylum or a withholding of
deportation, Iqbal’s remedy is to present these arguments to the
BIA through a motion to reopen the case. See Faddoul v. INS, 37
F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 1994).
Iqbal’s petition for review of the BIA’s order is DENIED.
Iqbal v. Ashcroft
Combined Opinion