In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00082-CR
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EX PARTE AMIR TAVAKKOLI
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-26808
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of an application for writ of
habeas corpus in which Amir Tavakkoli, a legal resident alien, alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise him of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.09 (West
2005). We affirm the trial court’s order denying Tavakkoli’s application for writ
of habeas corpus.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant, Amir Tavakkoli, was born in Iran on July 10, 1988. He moved
to the United States in 2002 and became a legal permanent resident. On December
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8, 2006, Tavakkoli was arrested for reckless driving. After he was placed in
custody, the arresting officer conducted an inventory of the car and found drug
paraphernalia and marijuana. Tavakkoli was charged with reckless driving and
possession of marijuana. At the time of his arrest, he was an eighteen-year-old
college student. On December 11, 2006, Tavakkoli was appointed legal counsel.
On December 15, 2006, appointed counsel met with Tavakkoli during the jail
docket. On the same day, Tavakkoli pled guilty to possession of marijuana in
exchange for a twenty-day jail sentence and dismissal of the reckless driving
charge. After serving his twenty-day sentence, he was released.
In July 2012, Tavakkoli left the United States to attend a family wedding in
Sweden. Upon his return to the United States, he was denied reentry because of
his 2006 guilty plea to possession of marijuana. In January 2013, Tavakkoli filed
an application for writ of habeas corpus under article 11.09 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading
guilty to the drug possession charge in 2006. At the time of the filing of his
application for habeas relief, Tavakkoli was a second-year law student working at
the Texas House of Representatives as a Texas Legislature Intern. After a hearing,
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the trial court denied Tavakkoli’s application for writ of habeas corpus and filed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny relief on a writ of habeas corpus is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Ex parte Klem, 269 S.W.3d 711,
718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the trial court’s
decision, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling
and afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court’s findings of fact are
based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We apply this deferential
standard of review regardless of whether the trial court’s findings are explicit or
implied, or based on affidavits or live testimony. Ex parte Fassi, 388 S.W.3d 881,
886 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). When the resolution of the
raised issue turns on an application of legal standards, we review the trial court’s
determination de novo. Id. To obtain habeas relief an applicant must prove his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
In his application for habeas corpus, Tavakkoli alleged that his appointed
counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences prior to him entering
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a guilty plea. Tavakkoli’s affidavit was attached to his application for habeas relief.
In his affidavit, Tavakkoli asserted that while in the Montgomery County Jail
following his arrest, he learned that he could not be released on bond because of an
immigration hold. Tavakkoli stated that when he met with his trial counsel during
the jail docket, he informed counsel that he was not able to bond out because of an
immigration hold even though he was a legal permanent resident. Tavakkoli
testified that he had college final exams coming up, and he was nervous he would
not be able to take them. According to Tavakkoli, counsel stated, “‘as long as you
are here legally don’t worry about it.’” In addition, Tavakkoli stated that counsel
did not advise him in any way that he “would be deported, removed, or
inadmissible to the United States upon reentry if [he] plead guilty to possession of
marijuana.” Tavakkoli alleged that counsel told him he could “‘get out of jail today
or tomorrow’ in exchange for a plea of guilty to the possession of marijuana
charge; and further that the reckless driving charge would be dismissed.’”
According to Tavakkoli, no other consequences were disclosed. In his application
for writ of habeas corpus, Tavakkoli argued that under Padilla v. Kentucky, his
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
On appeal, Tavakkoli argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and
unknowing, and that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the
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potential immigration consequences of his plea, by giving him affirmative
misadvice, and by encouraging him to plead guilty though plausible defenses could
have been pursued.1
A. Ineffective Assistance under Padilla
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
defendant effective assistance of counsel in a plea hearing. Ex parte Harrington,
310 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In Padilla, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that the defense attorney
for a criminal defendant provide advice about the risk of deportation that arises
from a guilty plea. 559 U.S. at 374. Recognizing that immigration law is complex,
the Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward
. . ., a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.” Id. at 369. But when the deportation consequence is clear, defense
counsel has a duty to give correct advice regarding the deportation consequences
of defendant’s plea. Id. “[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must
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Tavakkoli also argues on appeal that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation, failed to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, and failed to
pursue other viable plea options for a better outcome. Tavakkoli did not raise these
arguments in the trial court. We decline to address these arguments on appeal. See
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.” Id. at 372.
In Chaidez v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Padilla is not
applied retroactively. 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013). “[D]efendants whose
convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its
holding.” Id. The Court issued its decision in Padilla on March 31, 2010. See
Padilla, 559 U.S. 356. Tavakkoli’s conviction became final on December 15,
2006. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4; Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (holding that when there is no evidence that a defendant ever filed a
notice of appeal, a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing).
Therefore, the holding of Padilla is not applicable to Tavakkoli’s case. See
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113.
On appeal, Tavakkoli argues that the trial court erred in applying the holding
of Chaidez to the present case because Chaidez does not apply to habeas
proceedings. Tavakkoli urges this Court to apply Padilla retroactively to state
habeas cases on collateral review. In Ex parte De Los Reyes, petitioner filed a writ
of habeas corpus relying on Padilla and alleging he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the deportation
consequences of his guilty plea. 392 S.W.3d 675, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, under the United States Supreme
Court’s analysis in Teague v. Lane, “because Padilla imposed a ‘new rule’ of
constitutional criminal procedure, . . . a defendant whose conviction was already
final at the time that Padilla was handed down may not benefit from that decision
in a habeas or similar proceeding.” Id. at 679 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 301 (1989)). The Court recognized that it “could accord retroactive effect to
Padilla as a matter of state habeas law.” Id. (citing Danforth v. Minnesota, 552
U.S. 264 (2008) (holding that Teague does not constrain “the authority of state
courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by
that opinion”)). But, it expressly declined to do so. Id. The court stated, “[w]e
adhere to the retroactivity analysis in Chaidez and its holding that Padilla does not
apply retroactively.” Id. Because Padilla does not apply retroactively, we will not
apply Padilla in analyzing Tavakkoli’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. See id.; see also Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113.
B. Ineffective Assistance under Pre-Padilla Law
To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Klem,
269 S.W.3d at 718. An involuntary plea violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
right to due process. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Burke v. State, 80 S.W.3d 82,
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93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). A plea is not voluntarily and
knowingly entered if it is made as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ulloa v. State, 370 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet.
ref’d). To prevail on a claim that a plea was involuntary because it was entered
upon ineffective advice of counsel a defendant must show (1) counsel’s advice was
not within the wide range of competence required of criminal defense attorneys,
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant
would have pleaded “not guilty” and insisted on a trial. Id. (citing Ex parte
Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “There is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable
representation.” Id. To obtain relief, counsel’s ineffective assistance “must be
firmly founded in the record[.]” Id.
“Affirmative misadvice by counsel regarding a material issue that the plea
hearing reflects was key to the defendant’s plea decision may constitute deficient
performance.” Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2013, no pet.). In Arjona, we recognized that even when counsel has no initial
duty to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea
because of the non-retroactive effect of Padilla, when counsel gives advice
regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, he becomes obligated to
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provide the defendant with accurate information. Id. Without such a rule, counsel
would be free to mislead a defendant merely because there was no initial duty. Id.
The only evidence presented by Tavakkoli regarding counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance was Tavakkoli’s testimony and affidavit.2 Tavakkoli alleged
in his affidavit that counsel made the following affirmative representations:
I informed [counsel] that I was not able to bond out because of an
immigration hold. He asked me if I was here legally. I told
[counsel] that I was not a United States citizen, but I was here
legally as a permanent resident with a resident alien/green card. .
. . He stated, ‘as long as you are here legally don’t worry about it.’
....
[Counsel] then stated ‘All you have to do is plead guilty to possession
of marijuana and the reckless driving charge will be dismissed;’ and
he also said ‘you will get out today or tomorrow.’ I thought that was
odd so I informed him immediately that I did not have or possess any
marijuana. [Counsel] said ‘What do you want to do? You can take it
to trial, but it may take a long time, they will probably take the police
officer’s word over yours and you will be in jail for some time
pending trial.’ I then said, ‘I just want to get out, I have class.’
[Counsel] responded by stating[,] ‘Just plead guilty, it’s not a big deal.
You will get out tonight or tomorrow night.’ No other options were
discussed.
Tavakkoli’s testimony at the hearing comported with the allegations set forth in his
affidavit.
2
Tavakkoli’s immigration attorney also testified at the habeas hearing
regarding Tavakkoli’s immigration case and the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea.
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At the habeas hearing, Tavakkoli’s trial counsel testified that he had no
independent recollection of representing Tavakkoli. Counsel stated that he has
many Hispanic clients, both legal and illegal, and he is familiar with the
immigration consequences for both in controlled substance cases. He stated that if
a client charged with only a misdemeanor was still in jail at the time of the jail
docket call, he would inquire of the client as to why he was still in jail as bond is
usually set very low for misdemeanor charges. In this case, Tavakkoli was unable
to bond out of jail due to an immigration hold. Tavakkoli was concerned with
getting out of jail because of his impending college semester final exams. Counsel
testified that when a client has an immigration hold, while they are still entitled to
bond, once the client bonds out, immigration officials normally transport them to
an immigration center. Counsel was adamant that he would never tell a client
under the circumstances alleged in this case, “don’t worry about it.”
Counsel testified, based on his review of the allegations in the offense
report, he saw no valid defenses to the charged offenses. He explained that
probable cause for the stop existed, Tavakkoli was arrested, and an inventory
search was conducted during which the police found “a pipe with some debris in it
and . . . a baggy with marijuana[,]” according to the police report. Counsel
explained that he would have advised Tavakkoli that the prosecutor would have to
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bring the marijuana to court, they could have it tested, and the jury could look at it
and decide if it was a usable amount of marijuana. Counsel disputed Tavakkoli’s
assertion that counsel failed to pursue plausible defenses, stating that if Tavakkoli
had stated it was not his marijuana, they would have explored that defense.
Counsel further explained that if Tavakkoli had told him the baggie only contained
“‘stems and seeds[,]’” he would have encouraged him to “fight ” the possession
charge because “you have to have a usable amount of marijuana” to be convicted
of possession of marijuana.
Regarding an assertion by Tavakkoli in his affidavit that at the time of the
plea he did not understand English well, counsel testified that he would not have
represented someone who was unable to understand him, that Tavakkoli would
have been entitled to an interpreter if he did not understand English, and that
notably, at the time of the plea hearing Tavakkoli was a college student. Though
he did not recall the details related to Tavakkoli’s case,3 counsel testified it is the
practice of the court to have the parties stand before the court, and for the court to
ask the defendant “‘Did you read the admonishments and fully understand them
and did you have them explained to you by an attorney’” inserting the attorney’s
3
We note that in this case we are without the benefit of a transcript of the
plea hearing. Compare Arjona, 402 S.W.3d at 318 (A plea hearing may show
relevant circumstances surrounding the entering of the plea).
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specific name into the sentence. Counsel characterized several of Tavakkoli’s
allegations as “blatant lie[s].” Regarding Tavakkoli’s allegation that counsel told
him, “‘Just plead guilty. It’s not a big deal’” counsel testified, “I wouldn’t do that.
No way.” When asked if he could have totally failed to discuss immigration
consequences of the plea with Tavakkoli counsel responded, “[a]bsolutely not.
And especially given the fact that he was a legal resident.” Counsel testified as
follows:
When you go through the admonishments, they are set up fairly early
in the admonishments. And the judge – all the county court judges –
all the judges in Montgomery County and have for years and years
and years asked, “Are you a citizen[?]” And if they say no, they dwell
on that and they make sure that they understand it clearly before they
accept their plea. And when I go through it, especially when I have a
young legal resident, I explain it very, very thoroughly, tell them that
they do have a bond and then also that a drug charge can trip them up.
The written admonishments signed by Tavakkoli appear in the record before us
and state: “I understand . . . that if I am not a citizen of the United States, my plea
of guilty or nolo contendere may result in my deportation, exclusion from
admission to this country, or denial of naturalization under federal laws[.]”
Counsel further testified Tavakkoli’s assertion that counsel told him “‘[y]ou
will get out today or tomorrow[]’” was a “blatant lie.” Counsel explained, “if
somebody has an immigration hold on them, they are not going to get out until
immigration deals with them.” Counsel stated, “[t]ypically what I tell them when
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they’re --- when they’re here and there’s an immigration hold on them is if they
plead guilty after they serve their time in jail, if that’s the offer that they took, then
immigration is going to transfer them from jail to the immigration proceeding.”
Counsel testified that if his client is a legal resident and facing a drug charge, theft
charge, or felony charge and has an immigration hold on him, he advises them to
get advice from an immigration attorney. Counsel was adamant that with regard to
his clients who have an immigration hold on them, he explains that if they plead
guilty and serve time, once they finish their sentence, they will be transferred to the
immigration facility.
Counsel disputed Tavakkoli’s statement that he did not inform Tavakkoli of
his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty. Counsel maintained that he
would have advised Tavakkoli, and any similarly situated clients, that they were
entitled to a bond both at the jail and the immigration center. Counsel reiterated
that the admonishments explain the immigration consequences of pleading guilty
and that he reviews those with clients:
I go through the admonishments and admonishments that he signed
and I dwell on them. And one of the things that I dwell on is, look, a
possession of marijuana charge counts just like a cocaine charge for
immigration purposes . . . I say, look, as it stands right now they’re
going to want to deport you for a drug charge. It could be that you
could hire an attorney and they may be able to straighten it out but
you’re going to need to consult with an immigration attorney about
that.
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Counsel testified, “I told [Tavakkoli] what was going to happen if he . . . pled
guilty. I mean, because it’s a conversation that takes place with everybody that has
an immigration hold on them.” Counsel further testified that he represents many
Mexican Nationals who do not have immigration holds on them and it is his
practice to advise his non-citizen clients that if they plead guilty, they cannot return
to their home country because if they leave the United States and try to come back
“you’re not coming back in.” When asked if he would have had a conversation
with Tavakkoli about the difference between removability and admissibility after
voluntarily leaving the country, counsel stated, “[a]bsolutely.”
Counsel maintained throughout his testimony that he did not make the
affirmative representations set forth in Tavakkoli’s affidavit, and that he advises all
of his non-citizen clients of the deportation and admissibility consequences of
pleading guilty. Counsel also stated that he would not have discouraged Tavakkoli
from going to trial, would not have told him trial would take a long time, and that
he is not afraid to try a case in which it is his client’s word against an officer’s.
Counsel explained that he has tried “many cases” for non-citizen clients, the bulk
of his trials have involved illegal immigrants, that he would not tell them a jury
was going to believe the police officer over them, and that during such trials he
attacks the credibility of the testifying officer.
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In reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant or deny Tavakkoli’s
application for habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling and defer to the trial court’s implied factual findings that are
supported by the record. Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 325-26 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion.
Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam),
overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the trial court’s
fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.
Tavakkoli alleges that trial counsel failed to advise him regarding
immigration consequences, told him “not to worry about” the immigration hold
that was purportedly placed on him while in jail, advised him to plead guilty to
possession of marijuana because it would be his word against the police officer’s,
and failed to evaluate and pursue plausible defenses. As the fact finder, the trial
court was entitled to disbelieve Tavakkoli’s testimony, even though it was
supported by his affidavit. See Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d at 325-26. Likewise, it was
within the trial court’s discretion to believe trial counsel’s testimony that he would
have properly advised Tavakkoli regarding his right to bond out, any relevant
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defenses, and the deportation and inadmissibility consequences of pleading guilty.
See Ulloa, 370 S.W.3d at 771-72 (Even where trial counsel could not recall his
specific conversation with defendant, the trial judge was entitled to believe trial
counsel’s testimony that it was his policy to give special attention to informing
clients that successful completion of sex-offender counseling typically requires an
admission of guilt and that he would not have told defendant that a “no contest”
plea was the same as a “not guilty” plea.).
We cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
Tavakkoli failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. Tavakkoli has not met his burden of showing that his state
or federal constitutional rights were violated. We overrule Tavakkoli’s appellate
issues. On the record before us we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
__________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on July 11, 2013
Opinion Delivered September 25, 2013
Do not publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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