In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-11-00464-CR
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CHARSTON LOUIS MEACHUM, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-04-03884 CR
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Charston Louis Meachum of six counts of aggravated
robbery and sentenced Meachum to life in prison on each count. In three appellate
issues, Meachum challenges the denial of his motion for directed verdict and
contends that he received ineffective assistance at trial. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
1
Factual Background
The aggravated robberies occurred at a pharmacy and a bank branch located
inside a Kroger grocery store. LeAnndria Crawford, a bank teller, testified that
someone jumped over the counter, ordered her to open the safe, and put a gun in
her face. Dirk Strouse, the branch supervisor, testified that another gunman
approached him. The man told Strouse not to “do [anything] stupid” and to turn
around or he would shoot Strouse.
Another gunman approached the pharmacy window and pointed a gun at
Kayla Aleman, a pharmacy employee. The man told Aleman to get off the
telephone and get on the floor. Customers Maraia Paogoa and Mark Alexander and
pharmacy technician Kathy Martin testified that the man also pointed a gun at them
and told them to get down on the floor. In the bank, the gunman again told
Crawford to open the safe and shoved the gun onto her lip.
Officer Ralph Craig testified that the sheriff’s department aired an attempt to
locate a BMW, occupied by African-American men, that had been involved in a
bank robbery. Detective Ricky Cathey testified that he saw an African-American
male run from a blue van parked on the shoulder of the road and jump into a BMW
that was parked in the center of the road. The BMW then sped away. Officers later
discovered the van had been reported stolen and the BMW belonged to Meachum.
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Detective Ben Mitchell testified that Kroger’s surveillance system captured images
of the van in the Kroger parking lot.
Cathey followed the BMW, traveling in excess of one-hundred miles per
hour. William Smith testified that the BMW sped past him, swerved, struck the
curb, and spun around, and that several African-American men ran from the scene.
Detective Jason Waller testified that he searched the surrounding woods and saw
an African-American male crouching down in a wooded area in an apparent
attempt to hide. Waller testified that the man was sweating and appeared tired and
afraid. After two or three commands from Waller, the man finally complied with
Waller’s orders to exit the wooded area. Waller identified the man as Meachum.
Officers investigating the accident scene located firearms, clothing, gloves,
and a duffle bag. Detective Ben Mitchell testified that one of the suspects inside
Kroger wore red pants and carried a firearm. Mitchell believed this suspect to be
Meachum because the clothing that he obtained after Meachum’s capture matched
the clothing that the suspect wore. Jennifer Moreno, a forensic scientist, testified
that the DNA profile from the red pants is consistent with Meachum’s DNA profile
and that Meachum was the major contributor to DNA found on gloves and a jacket.
Crawford testified that, during the robbery, she believed the gunman planned
to shoot her. Aleman and Paogoa also feared being shot and, thus, followed the
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gunman’s instructions. Strouse, Martin, and Alexander each testified to feeling
threatened. The witnesses could not identify the gunmen, but testified that the men
wore masks.
Motion for Directed Verdict
In issues one and two, Meachum challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motion for directed verdict. “We treat a point of error complaining about a trial
court’s failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence.” Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996). Under a legal sufficiency standard, we assess all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of
fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979);
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to
the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicting testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
At trial, the defense moved for a directed verdict on grounds that no
reasonable juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State proved its
case. The trial court overruled the motion. On appeal, Meachum contends that the
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State failed to prove that anything of value was taken from the complaining
witnesses or that Meachum was the person who committed the offenses. Meachum
further contends that the evidence failed to demonstrate that he acted as a
participant in the offenses.
The charge authorized the jury to convict Meachum either as a principal or
as a party to the aggravated robbery offenses. A person commits aggravated
robbery if (1) “in the course of committing theft” and “with intent to obtain or
maintain control of the property,” he “intentionally or knowingly threatens or
places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death[;]” and (2) “uses or
exhibits a deadly weapon[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a), 29.03(a) (West
2011). “‘In the course of committing theft’ means conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01(1) (West 2011). “A person is criminally
responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct,
by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.” Id. §
7.01(a) (West 2011). “Each party to an offense may be charged with commission
of the offense.” Id. § 7.01(b). Under the theory of party liability applicable to this
case, the jury must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) acting with
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, (2) Meachum solicited,
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encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the
offense. See id. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011).
The jury may consider “‘events occurring before, during and after the
commission of the offense, and [] rely on actions of the defendant which show an
understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.’” Ransom v. State, 920
S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh’g) (quoting Cordova v. State,
698 S.W2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “Evidence is sufficient to convict
under the law of parties where the defendant is physically present at the
commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other
agreement.” Id. “[C]ircumstantial evidence may be used to prove party status.” Id.
While a suspect’s presence at the scene of an offense is not alone sufficient to
support a conviction, it is “a circumstance tending to prove guilt which, combined
with other facts, may suffice to show that the accused was a participant.” Valdez v.
State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on reh’g).
The jury heard evidence that placed Meachum at the scene of the offenses,
that Meachum’s BMW was used in the robbery, that Meachum’s DNA profile was
consistent with that found on clothing collected by law enforcement, that this
clothing matched that of one of the gunmen in the robbery, that firearms were
recovered from the accident scene, and that Meachum was found hiding in the
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woods near the area where the crashed BMW was found. The jury also heard
evidence from the witnesses that firearms were used during the robbery and that
the witnesses were in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. That no taking of
property occurred is irrelevant, as the law does not require a completed theft before
a person can be convicted of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§
29.01(1), 29.03(a); see also Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554, 559-60 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999). The jury could reasonably conclude that Meachum, while in the
course of attempting to commit theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control
of another’s property, used a firearm to place six individuals in fear of imminent
bodily injury or death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.01(1), 29.02(a), 29.03(a).
The jury could also reasonably conclude that Meachum acted with intent to
promote or assist commission of the aggravated robberies by aiding or attempting
to aid the assaults of Strouse, Martin, Paogoa, Alexander, Aleman, and Crawford.
See id. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2); see also Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302; Valdez, 623
S.W.2d at 321. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Meachum
committed aggravated robbery. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; see also Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule issues one and two.
7
Ineffective Assistance
In issue three, Meachum argues that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offenses of
aggravated assault and attempted robbery. To establish ineffective assistance,
Meachum must satisfy the following test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); see Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 892-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Any
allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record
must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9
S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “Appellate review of defense counsel’s
representation is highly deferential and presumes that counsel’s actions fell within
the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance.” Bone v. State, 77
S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Under normal circumstances, the
record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation
was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decisionmaking as to
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overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and
professional.” Id.
The record does not indicate that Meachum filed a motion for new trial to
allege ineffective assistance. The record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategies and
tactics. See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Moreover, Meachum cannot demonstrate that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the
outcome of his trial would have been different. See Graves v. State, 310 S.W.3d
924, 929 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, pet. ref’d). Nor is this a case in which trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record. See Freeman v. State, 125
S.W.3d 505, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Under these circumstances, Meachum
cannot defeat the strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance. See
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. We overrule Meachum’s third issue and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on May 13, 2013
Opinion Delivered June 26, 2013
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.
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