COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
THE CITY OF EL PASO, §
No. 08-12-00309-CV
Appellant, §
Appeal from the
v. §
County Court at Law No. 5
GUADALUPE RAMIREZ, NORMA §
RAMIREZ, RAMIREZ PECAN FARMS, of El Paso County, Texas
LLC, WILLIAM H. BOUTWELL, §
JACKIE BOUTWELL, RAUL (TC#2007-2568)
ZAMORANO, JR., AMY K.
ZAMORANO, GEORGE WYNN, §
PATRICIA WYNN, LARRY R. WEBB,
MARIA L. WEBB, JAMES R. RALEY, §
YARIELA G. RALEY, RUSSELL T.
STURGEON, KERRY L. STURGEON, §
KENNETH A. JOHNSON, AND JULIE
R. JOHNSON, §
Appellees. §
OPINION
Appellant, the City of El Paso (“the City”), brings this accelerated interlocutory appeal
following the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2008); TEX.R.APP.P. 28.1(a) (stating an appeal from an
interlocutory order, when allowed, is accelerated). The City raises three issues for our review.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has been before us on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
See City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tex.App. – El Paso 2011, no pet.)
(“Ramirez I”). As set forth in Ramirez I, the following are the underlying facts. The City has
owned and operated the Clint Landfill, a solid waste disposal site, since the early 1980’s.
Appellees own land within one mile of the landfill’s southwestern boundary. In July 2006,
after a series of rainstorms, the City and surrounding areas experienced extensive flooding. As
a result of the heavy rainfall, the retention ponds at the Clint Landfill overflowed and caused
significant damage to Appellees’ property.
In June 2007, Appellees sued the City asserting claims for inverse condemnation,
nuisance, trespass, Texas Water Code violations, and requesting a permanent injunction. The
City filed its first plea to the jurisdiction challenging the sufficiency of Appellees’ pleadings.
When the trial court granted the City’s plea as to Appellees’ Water Code violation claims, and
denied the plea as to all the other claims, the City filed its first interlocutory appeal.
In Ramirez I, this Court reversed the trial court’s partial denial of the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d at 187. We determined that Appellees’ pleadings alleged
property damage due to omissions by the City, and even when construed liberally their pleadings
failed to rise to the level of an inverse condemnation claim. Id. We further concluded
Appellees’ remaining claims were barred by sovereign immunity because those claims were
brought under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Id. However, because there
was no indication that the defects in Appellees’ pleadings were incurable, we remanded the case
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to the trial court to allow Appellees the opportunity to amend their pleadings. Id.
On remand, after Appellees filed several amended petitions, the City filed its second plea
to the jurisdiction. In response, Appellees filed their Eighth Amended Original Petition, the
live pleading in this case. The City subsequently filed a reply and supplemented its plea.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea which contests the trial court’s authority to
determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the cause of action. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). A trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is reviewed de
novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The
plaintiff has the burden of pleading facts which affirmatively show that the trial court has
jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, we determine
whether the plaintiff has met its burden by pleading facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In doing so, we construe the
pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the
factual allegations in the pleadings. Id. at 226, 228. If the pleadings are insufficient to establish
jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect, the plaintiff should be
afforded an opportunity to replead. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007); Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 226-27. However, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of the trial
court’s jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an
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opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider
relevant evidence to resolve the jurisdictional issues presented, just as the trial court is required to
do. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (citing Bland Independent School District, 34 S.W.3d at 555).
If the relevant evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial court
must not grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. On the other hand, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails
to raise a fact issue, the trial court must rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at
228; City of El Paso v. Mazie’s L.P., 408 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex.App. – El Paso 2012, pet. denied).
In the instant case, the City’s plea to the jurisdiction challenged both the sufficiency of
Appellees’ pleadings and the existence of jurisdictional facts. On appeal, the City complains
the trial court erred by denying its plea on both grounds. The City further requests that we
dismiss Appellees’ claims without further opportunity to amend their pleadings or alternatively,
that we remand the case to the trial court with an instruction that the case be dismissed.
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS
In Issue One, the City argues the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction
because Appellees’ pleadings failed to demonstrate the intent and public use elements of an
inverse condemnation claim. The City also contends Appellees’ pleadings failed to establish
causation. The City maintains that because Appellees did not plead a valid takings claim those
claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The City further argues Appellees’ nuisance and
trespass claims which were asserted under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution are also
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barred by the City’s governmental immunity. Appellees respond that they have pleaded
sufficient facts to support their claims. We agree with Appellees.
The Texas Constitution prohibits the State from taking, damaging, or destroying an
individual’s property, for public use, without adequate compensation. See TEX. CONST. art. I, §
17. To establish a takings claim, Appellees must show: (1) an intentional governmental act by
the City; (2) that resulted in the taking, damaging, or destroying of Appellees’ property; (3) for
public use. See Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598
(Tex. 2001); Park v. City of San Antonio, 230 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex.App. – El Paso 2007, pet.
denied). A person’s property may be taken, damaged, or destroyed if an injury results from
either the construction of public works or their subsequent maintenance and operation. City of
Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504-05 (Tex. 1997).
Intent
First, the City argues that Appellees’ pleadings are insufficient because Appellees failed
to allege facts showing that the discharge of water from the Clint Landfill was the result of an
intentional act. Specifically, the City contends Appellees’ allegations continue to merely allege
claims of negligence and not a valid takings claim. For purposes of Article I, Section 17, the
Texas Supreme Court has explained that a governmental entity acts intentionally if it (1) knows
that the specific act is causing identifiable harm, or (2) knows that the specific harm is
substantially certain to result from authorized government action—that is, that the harm is
necessarily incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of the government’s actions. City
of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2004). However, mere negligence that
eventually contributes to the destruction of property is not a taking. Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 505;
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see Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that intent
is the factor which distinguishes a takings claim from a negligence claim).
In their Eighth Amended Original Petition, Appellees set forth a detailed fact section
describing the history of the Clint Landfill’s construction and operation, the 2006 rainstorm and
flood, the damage to Appellees’ properties, the 2002 and 2004 rainstorms and related events.
Appellees alleged that the City owns and operates the Clint Landfill for the benefit of the public
and constructed cells at the landfill in the early 1980’s, 1999, and 2001. The following facts were
also pleaded:
20. The 2006 flooding was only the most recent of at least three similar incidents
over a four-year period in which the water-retention ponds filled with silt and
debris, then flooded nearby properties.
…
22. The 2002 storm washed a torrent of mud, water, and trash onto nearby
properties, including some owned by the Plaintiffs…. In July 2002, the City asked
George Wynn for a Right of Entry to permit removal of any debris on his property
that had migrated there from Clint Landfill due to the recent rains. As a result of
its 2002 investigation, [the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality]
concluded that the City had failed “to maintain a run-off management system from
the active portion of the landfill to collect at least the water volume resulting from a
24 hour-25 year storm.”
23. The second flooding incident occurred just two years later, in September
2004, resulting in another Commission report by Mr. Rimkus. According to that
report, waste again had “washed out of the [Clint Landfill] during a storm event and
been carried down arroyos south of the landfill.” Again, the landfill, its slopes,
and the water-retention ponds were to blame.
In its report, the Commission stressed its concerns about the continuing efficacy of
the landfill and its water-retention ponds, now twice to blame for flooding of
nearby properties….
Some of the Plaintiffs experienced runoff from the landfill during the 2004 storm,
and particularly noticed an offensive odor.
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24. Around this time, several of the Plaintiffs went before representatives of the
Clint Landfill, the City, [the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality], the
Texas General Land Office, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Rio Grande
Council of Governments to discuss what could be done to protect them from the
recurrent flooding of water, mud, and trash from the Clint Landfill. But nothing
came of those attempts. The general consensus of the governmental
representatives involved in the meeting was the flooding was inevitable due to the
location and structure of the landfill.
25. By the end of 2005, then, the City knew that the water-retention ponds had
overflowed at least twice in the preceding three years and flooded nearby properties
with water, mud, trash, and toxic waste. Indeed, the City had been informed
multiple times by area landowners of the damage. Yet the City continued to
operate and maintain the Clint Landfill, piling trash and other materials on it
regularly—essentially constructing the landfill on daily basis. After all, the whole
purpose of a landfill is to dispose of refuse. By depositing (or permitting the
deposit of) trash and other materials onto the Clint Landfill, the City was
continually constructing—or at a minimum changing the character of—the Clint
Landfill’s composition.
…
27. On July 28, the Clint Landfill once again impounded, concentrated, and
diverted the rainfall surface waters onto adjoining lower properties—just as it had
twice in the preceding four years. The huge runoff from the landfill’s surface
again caused the sandy slopes to erode. One or more of the southwestern
water-retention ponds failed, resulting in an enormous surge of water, silt, and trash
that rushed down arroyos nine, ten, and eleven below the landfill. The Clint
Landfill itself was breached, causing trash and toxic materials to escape and flow
rapidly with the waters onto or near Plaintiffs’ properties, which were inundated
with trash, toxic debris, and water—damaging property, killing vegetation and
livestock, and even destroying access roads to some of the properties.
Under the “CAUSES OF ACTION” section of their petition, Appellees alleged:
40. Constitutional Taking/Inverse Condemnation. The allegations in the
Statement of Facts are incorporated herein. [The City] has taken, damaged, or
destroyed the Plaintiffs’ properties and thereby inversely condemned them in
violation of Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by the construction, operation, or
maintenance of the Clint Landfill. Absent the City’s continued operation of the
Clint Landfill—including the continued deposit of solid waste and other
refuse—the damages would not have occurred.
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41. The City knew its construction, operation, and maintenance of the Clint
Landfill was substantially certain to damage the Plaintiffs’ properties by continuing
to flood them during heavy rain events. The City knew that damage was
necessarily a consequential action of its construction, operation, and maintenance
of the landfill. Indeed, the City knew that its construction, operation, and
maintenance of the landfill had already caused identifiable damage to certain of the
Plaintiffs’ properties. Despite this knowledge, the City continued to operate and
maintain the Clint Landfill.
42. The Clint Landfill’s operation and maintenance changed the character of that
flooding, causing an increased flow of water across the Plaintiffs’ properties. The
water arrived sooner, flowed faster, and was more forceful and longer-lasting. It
was infused with trash and toxic waste, transforming it into leachate rather than
rainwater. Neither the flooding nor the damage was temporary; indeed, it was a
permanent condition so long as the City continued operation of the Clint Landfill as
it did. The inevitable flooding would not have occurred absent the City’s
continued intentional acts.
43. The Clint Landfill was constructed, and is operated, for the benefit of the
public. The damages to the Plaintiffs’ properties arose from and were incident to
the City’s operation of this public works facility. This recurrence establishes that
the benefit to the public was neither temporal nor speculative; to the contrary, it was
inevitable in the operation of the landfill as intended. Moreover, the damage was
the result of the City’s policy calculus; the City knew its actions would necessarily
cause damage to certain private property, but apparently determined that the benefit
to the public outweighed this harm. The damages were foreseeable to the City.
44. The flooding of Plaintiffs’ properties was inevitably recurring due to the
construction and operation of the Clint Landfill. Moreover, the flooding of and
damage to Plaintiffs’ properties was the direct and necessary result of operation of
the Clint Landfill and was reasonably foreseeable by the City. Thus, the flooding
and damage was foreseeably caused as a direct result of the City’s authorized
policy of operating the Clint Landfill. For all these reasons, and those expressed
elsewhere in this petition, the City took the Plaintiffs’ properties for public use
without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution, and this conduct constituted both a taking and a taking per se.…
Plaintiffs preserve their right to proceed with their federal takings claim in federal
court by making this express reservation to disposition of the entire case by this
court, or any state court.
45. Nuisance. The City has created and is continuing an intentional nuisance that
is a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs. The intentional nuisance also allows
Plaintiffs to recover from the City under Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas
Constitution.
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46. Trespass. The City has created and is continuing a trespass against Plaintiffs
that is a proximate cause of damages to them. The trespass allows Plaintiffs to
recover from the City under Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.
…
48. Injunctive Relief. The Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction requiring the
City to abate the nuisance and trespass; specifically to do whatever is required to
prevent the Clint Landfill from gathering, diverting, concentrating, and releasing
surface waters and other materials onto or near the Plaintiffs’ properties.
The City asserts that when Appellees’ factual allegations are construed in Appellees’ favor
they merely allege that the City was aware of the potential for overflow from the landfill’s
retention ponds, and the City failed to take preventative measures to prevent such overflow.
However, we agree with Appellees that the City misconstrues their allegations as Appellees’ live
petition does not contain any allegations that the City was negligent. Rather, Appellees alleged
the City continued to operate and maintain the landfill with knowledge that nearby properties
experienced floodwater damage at least twice during the preceding three years and that the City
knew its construction, operation, and maintenance of the landfill was substantially certain to
damage Appellees’ properties as long as the City continued its intentional acts.
Next, the City contends Appellees’ sole allegation of any intentional conduct is the City
intended to operate and maintain the landfill, citing City of Arlington v. State Farm Lloyds, 145
S.W.3d 165, 168 (Tex. 2004) (mere intentional operation of a sewer system is insufficient to
support liability under Article I, Section 17). However, this case, unlike State Farm Lloyds,
involves an appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and not a review of the sufficiency
of the evidence after a jury trial. See State Farm Lloyds, 145 S.W.3d at 166-68. Moreover,
unlike the appellees in State Farm Lloyds, Appellees did not allege that occasional flooding is
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inherent in the nature of a landfill and thus, the City should bear the expense. See id. at 166.
Instead, Appellees alleged the City operated and maintained the landfill by regularly piling trash
and other materials onto the landfill, the City’s operation and maintenance changed the character
of the floodwater, and the City continued to operate and maintain the landfill knowing that its
intentional action was substantially certain to damage Appellees’ properties by continuing to flood
them during heavy rain events. Therefore, we conclude State Farm Lloyds is distinguishable
from the present case.
Lastly, the City asserts Appellees cannot make sufficient allegations of intent because the
operation of a landfill is distinct from other types of public works where inverse condemnation has
been found. Appellant then distinguishes between the operation of a landfill and the operation of
a dam/reservoir system. The City maintains that because the release of water onto downstream
properties is necessarily inherent in the operation of a reservoir system and not in the operation of
a landfill, the City would not know that flooding is substantially certain to occur from its operation
of a landfill because the City is under a duty not to release water from the landfill, and the landfill
is designed to discharge water into the surrounding drainage system.
In reply, Appellees argue that we previously rejected a similar argument in Mazie.
Appellees further contend the landfill’s design and purpose are irrelevant where the City
constructed, maintained, or operated the landfill knowing that identifiable damage to Appellees’
properties was substantially certain to result. In Mazie, we rejected the argument that a takings
claim based on the operation and maintenance of a public work requires a specific act such as the
release of water from a control gate or the unclogging of a sewer line. Mazie, 408 S.W.3d at
20-21.
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The City concedes that the operation of a landfill is a government function. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(6) (West 2005). We further note the City concedes it is
not impossible for a landfill to commit a flood-related taking, but asserts an extraordinary set of
circumstances must exist before a negligent release of water constitutes an intentional flooding of
property. However, the City fails to provide us with further elaboration of what those
extraordinary set of circumstances entail and asserts Appellees failed to plead sufficient
allegations to identify such circumstances. Because Appellees did not allege that flooding is
inherent in the nature of a landfill, but rather alleged that the City intentionally operated and
maintained the Clint Landfill knowing that nearby properties were damaged at least twice during
the preceding three years and that the City knew its construction, operation, and maintenance of
the landfill was substantially certain to damage Appellees’ properties as long as the City continued
its intentional acts, in the instance case, we conclude that the distinction between the operation of a
landfill and the operation of a dam/reservoir system is not relevant for purposes of establishing the
requisite intent. See Mazie, 408 S.W.3d at 20-21 (rejecting argument that a takings claim based
on the operation and maintenance of a public work requires a specific act such as the release of
water from a control gate or the unclogging of a sewer line); Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 (intent
can be found when physical damage to property is substantially certain to occur from the operation
of an authorized government act – that is, that the damage is necessarily an incident to, or a
consequential result of the government’s action).
Mere Recitation of Facts or Sufficient Allegations of Facts?
The City attempts to analogize the allegations contained in the Eighth Amended Original
Petition to the pleadings filed in City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tex.App. –
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Dallas 2006, no pet.). In Blanton, the issue was whether there had been a physical or regulatory
invasion of the property when the City of Dallas required the appellees pay to reroute the plumbing
on their properties. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d at 272, 273. The issue did not concern whether the
City of Dallas’s conduct was intentional. Id. at 273.
The Blanton appellees argued their pleadings were sufficient to allege a takings claim
because they tracked the language in Jennings. The Blanton court disagreed and stated:
“[m]erely designing the pleadings to track language in Jennings does not satisfy the standards
established by Miranda because we review the pleadings as well as the evidence submitted below
on the plea to the jurisdiction.” Id. In concluding that the evidence did not present a fact issue on
physical taking, the Blanton court concluded there was no claimed damage other than the appellees
having to pay to reroute the plumbing, and that the evidence did not show any physical invasion of
the properties or that any physical harm was expected to occur in the future. Id. The Blanton
court found Jennings did not contain language to support a claim for a physical invasion that had
not yet taken place. Id.
Here, the City points to paragraphs 40 through 48 of Appellees’ Eighth Amended Original
Petition and maintains that Appellees merely recite the elements of inverse condemnation
identified by the Jennings and Gragg courts. The City then argues Appellees failed to identify
facts to support their legal conclusions that the City (1) knew that its maintenance of the retention
ponds and sandy side slopes of the landfill resulted in identifiable harm to Appellees’ properties; or
(2) knew that the specific property damage (flooding of Appellees’ properties) was substantially
certain to result from an authorized government action. As such, the City asserts Appellees’
allegations are insufficient to establish the City’s intent to inversely condemn Appellees’ property.
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We disagree.
In determining whether a valid takings claim has been pleaded, our analysis is not
restrained to a single paragraph in the petition. Mazie, 408 S.W.3d at 19. Through their Eighth
Amended Original Petition, Appellees alleged that in 2002 and 2004, flooding from the landfill
damaged nearby properties which included some of Appellees’ properties, government reports
indicated the landfill was the cause of the recurrent flooding, various parties including several
Appellees and the City met to discuss how to protect Appellees from the recurrent flooding, and
the general consensus of the government representatives was that the flooding was inevitable due
to the location and structure of the landfill. More precisely, Appellees alleged that by the end of
2005, the City knew that overflowing of the water-retention ponds had occurred at least twice and
flooded nearby properties. The City had been informed of the damage by area landowners and
yet, the City continued to operate and maintain the Clint Landfill. Although Appellees’ pleadings
contain some of the language in Jennings and Gragg, we conclude Appellees alleged facts that go
beyond the mere recitation of the elements of a claim for inverse condemnation. Accordingly,
Blanton fails to support the City’s argument.
Recurrence
In an attempt to defeat Appellees’ allegation that the recurrence of flooding on their
property supports their intent allegation, the City contends that recurrence is not probative in this
case. In the case of flood-water impacts, recurrence is a probative factor in determining the extent
of the taking and whether it is necessarily incident to authorized government activity, and therefore
substantially certain to occur. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 555. Although nonrecurrent flooding may
cause damage, a single flood event generally does not rise to the level of a taking. Id. This
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assures that the government will not be liable for the taking of property when a project’s adverse
impacts, and by implication its benefit to the public, are too temporal or speculative to warrant
compensation. Id.
The City asserts that this case is factually distinguishable from Gragg because “the release
of water from the Landfill is not necessarily incident to the design or operation of the Landfill as
intended [emphasis in original].” In essence, the City is again arguing that because the release of
water from a landfill is not an inherent part of its operation, it cannot establish the requisite intent
to support an inverse condemnation claim. However, we need not address the City’s argument as
to whether recurrence is probative of the City’s intent because we have previously held that
recurrence goes to the merits of a takings claim and is not a pleading requirement to invoke the trial
court’s jurisdiction. See Mazie, 408 S.W.3d at 25.
Public Use
Second, the City argues Appellees failed to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction because
they failed to sufficiently plead that the City took (or in this case damaged) their property for a
public use or benefit. Under Article I, Section 17, compensation is provided for only if
property is damaged or appropriated for or applied to public use. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at
554-55; Mazie, 408 S.W.3d at 24. The question of what constitutes public use is one for the
court. Dyer v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 680 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex.App. – El Paso 1984, writ ref’d
n.r.e.). In general, Texas courts have narrowed the meaning of a public use to those situations
in which damages arise out of or are incident to public works. Steele v. City of Houston, 603
S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. 1980). Property is taken for a public use only when there results to the
public some definite right or use in the undertaking to which the property is devoted. Dyer, 680
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S.W.2d at 885.
To support its argument that Appellees fail to allege a public use, the City relies on City of
Borger v. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d 325 (Tex.App. – Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). However, as
correctly noted by Appellees, Garcia is distinguishable from the instant case.
In Garcia, the appellees sued the City of Borger after flooding due to heavy rainfall
damaged their homes. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d at 328. To establish the public use element of
their takings claim, the appellees alleged that: (1) the damage to their property arose out of or
was incident to a public work; (2) the City of Borger utilized cheaper materials and inadequately
planned its drainage system, which resulted in saving public funds; and (3) the design and
installation of the drainage system protected other homeowners from the flooding suffered by the
appellees.1 Id. at 329. As to the appellees’ first basis, the Garcia court generally agreed that
damage arising out of or that is incident to public works meets the public use element of a
takings claim. Id. at 330. However, the Garcia court determined that the appellees failed to
plead sufficient facts establishing the property damage they suffered arose out of or was incident
to a public work because the appellees failed to allege facts supporting their conclusion that the
drainage system somehow exacerbated the flooding and failed to allege that the City of Borger’s
redesign and installation of the drainage system caused an increased flow of surface waters
across their property. Id. As such, the Garcia court concluded the appellees failed to allege
facts “creating a causal nexus between the property damage and the [City of Borger’s] drainage
system.” Id.
As to the appellees’ allegation regarding the City of Borger’s use of less costly materials
1
Because the third basis establishing public use in Garcia is not applicable to the present case, we do not discuss it
further.
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and failure to adequately plan the drainage system leading to a savings of public funds, the
Garcia court concluded there was no evidence establishing that cheaper materials were used in
the drainage system; and while it found some evidence of inadequate planning, it determined that
the evidence, at best, presented a fact issue as to the City of Borger’s negligence in designing the
drainage system. Id. at 330-31. Even assuming that the savings of public funds was a public
use, the Garcia court found there were no allegations or evidence in the record to show a causal
connection between the alleged savings on the drainage system and the damage to the appellees’
property. Id. at 331. Accordingly, the Garcia court found the purported savings of public
funds in the design and the construction of the drainage system to be insufficient to show the
appellees’ property was taken for a public use. Id.
Based on the holding in Garcia, the City argues Appellees “have merely alleged that the
maintenance and operation of the Landfill is part of the [City’s] policy calculus (presumably to
save money by not implementing repairs),” and that there are no allegations to establish a causal
connection between the City’s policy calculus and the damage to Appellees. Initially, we note
that unlike Garcia, Appellees’ pleadings did not allege that the City undertook any actions that
resulted in the savings of public funds. Instead, Appellees alleged that the Clint Landfill was
constructed and is operated for the benefit of the public. Similar to the allegations in Garcia,
Appellees also alleged that the damage they suffered arose from and was incident to the City
operation of a public works facility. However, unlike Garcia, Appellees’ pleadings alleged that
the character of the floodwaters was changed by the City’s continued operation and maintenance
of the landfill which included the act of regularly piling trash and other materials on the landfill.
Appellees further expressly alleged that the maintenance and operation of the landfill
16
caused an increased flow of water across their properties. According to Appellees, the water
arrived sooner, flowed faster, was longer-lasting, and was infused with trash and toxic waste
transforming it into leachate rather than rainwater. Moreover, Appellees alleged the damage to
their properties was “the result of the City’s policy calculus: the City knew its actions would
necessarily cause damage to certain private property, but apparently determined that the benefit
to the public outweighed this harm.” Unlike the appellees in Garcia, Appellees in the instant
case pleaded facts that could establish that the damage to their property arose out of or was
incident to a public work. Garcia, 290 S.W.3d at 330.
The City cites to City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 820-21 (Tex. 2009)
(stating that the public-use element distinguishes a negligence claim from an inverse
condemnation claim), to argue that Appellees’ true complaint is that the flooding from the
landfill is the result of the City’s insufficient maintenance or design of the water-retention ponds.
In Pollock, plaintiffs sued the City of San Antonio for nuisance and negligence alleging property
damages to their home when benzene from a closed landfill migrated through the soil to their
home and personal injury to their daughter. Id. at 812, 815. The Texas Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the City of San Antonio “knew that subsidence, ponding, and
gas generation and migration are inherent in the operation of a landfill” was sufficient to
establish that the City of San Antonio knew that its operation of the landfill was substantially
certain to damage the plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 821. Specifically, the court observed that
there was no evidence that the City knew the plaintiffs’ property was being damaged or that
damage was a necessary consequence. Id. The court held that the governmental entity’s
awareness of the mere possibility of damage did not constitute evidence of intent. Id.
17
We find Pollock to be inapplicable to the case before us. First, Pollock is not a recurrent
flooding case nor did it expressly address the public use requirement of a takings claim.
Second, as correctly noted by Appellees, their allegation is not one of negligence. But rather,
Appellees’ pleadings alleged that the City’s continued operation and maintenance of the Clint
Landfill caused the damage to their property, and that the City knew its continued operation of
the landfill was substantially certain to damage their property. See Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314
(stating that “[t]here may well be times when a governmental entity is aware that its action will
necessarily cause physical damage to certain private property, and yet determines that the benefit
to the public outweighs the harm caused to that property. In such a situation, the property may
be ‘damaged for public use.’”).
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellees’ pleadings sufficiently alleged facts to show
public use.
Causation
Third, the City argues the Appellees’ pleadings do not allege a proximate cause between
the City’s intentional conduct and Appellees’ injuries. Specifically, the City maintains
Appellees do not identify how the operation of the landfill or the deposit of trash resulted in the
overflow of the water-retention ponds. Causation is an issue to be considered in a “takings”
cause of action. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 482 (Tex. 2012).
The true test is whether the State’s intentional acts were the proximate cause of the taking or
damaging of such property. Id. at 483. Without causation, there can be no “taking.” Tarrant
Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 43 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.App. – Waco 2001), aff’d, 151 S.W.3d at
549.
18
In Gragg, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that the State’s construction and operation
of a reservoir caused flooding that damaged farmland where construction and operation of a
reservoir changed the character of the flooding. Id. at 549, 555. Appellees’ pleadings alleged
that absent the City’s continued operation of the landfill, the damages would not have occurred,
and that the inevitable flooding would not have occurred absent the City’s continued intentional
acts. Moreover, as in Gragg, Appellees alleged the the City’s continued operation and
maintenance of the landfill changed the character of the floodwater, causing an increased flow of
water across their properties. The water arrived sooner, flowed faster, was longer-lasting, and
was infused with trash and toxic waste transforming it into leachate rather than rainwater.
Because Appellees alleged facts demonstrating how the City’s continued operation and
maintenance of the landfill changed the character of the floodwater that damaged their property,
and further alleged that absent the City’s intentional acts the damages would not have occurred,
and that the damages were forseeable to the City, we conclude Appellees’ allegations sufficiently
pleaded causation. See Brandywood Hous., Ltd. v. Tex. Dep’t. of Transp., 74 S.W.3d 421, 426
(Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (stating that cause in fact and foreseeability
are the components of proximate cause).
Nuisance and Trespass Claims under Article I, Section 17
Relying on its prior arguments, the City argues that because Appellees’ inverse
condemnation claims are barred by sovereign immunity so are their claims for trespass and
non-negligent nuisance claims. This issue is based on arguments already addressed and decided
against the City. Therefore, for the same reasons, we conclude this sub-issue lacks merit.
Taking the allegations in Appellees’ petition as true, and construing them in the light
19
most favorable to the pleader, we conclude Appellees’ Eighth Amended Original Petition states a
claim for inverse condemnation and thus, affirmatively demonstrates the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228. Issue One is overruled.
EXISTENCE OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
In Issue Two, the City argues the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction
because it introduced uncontroverted jurisdictional evidence negating Appellees’ alleged
jurisdictional facts. Specifically, the City points to the deposition testimony excerpts attached
to the supplements to its plea to the jurisdiction. The City argues that the deposition testimony
evidence shows that in 2002 and 2004, the City made significant improvements and took
remedial steps at the Clint Landfill to increase the retention capacity of the water-retention ponds
and reduce the erosion of the landfill’s side slopes. The City asserts this evidence negates the
Appellees’ allegations that: (1) the landfill operated as designed to flood Appellees’ properties,
(2) the City did not engage in any remedial repairs to prevent future flooding from occurring, (3)
the City was substantially certain future flooding would occur, and (4) the City was substantially
certain that flooding would occur on Appellees’ properties. Because the City engaged in
remedial efforts after each flooding, the City contends that the issue is one of the sufficiency of
the City’s repairs and therefore, Appellees’ true claims are for negligence, not inverse
condemnation. As such, the City argues Appellees’ claims are barred by its governmental
immunity from liability.
In response, Appellees note that their Eighth Amended Original Petition does not
complain about the City’s remediation efforts. Instead, Appellees consider those efforts to be
irrelevant to the inevitable and recurrent flooding caused by the City’s operation, construction,
20
and maintenance of the landfill. Appellees argue that the City’s evidence does not disprove the
existence of jurisdictional facts, but rather creates only a fact issue.
Appellees’ allegations are that the City took, damaged, or destroyed their property by the
construction, operation, or maintenance of the Clint Landfill which included the act of regularly
piling trash and other refuse on the landfill. Despite the City’s knowledge that the landfill’s
water-retention ponds had overflowed on two prior occasions and flooded nearby properties, the
City intentionally chose to continue to operate and maintain the landfill such that the character of
the floodwaters was changed by the City’s intentional acts. The City continued to operate and
maintain the landfill knowing that its intentional acts were substantially certain to damage
Appellees’ properties by continuing to flood them during heavy rain events. The inevitable
flooding would not have occurred absent the City’s continued intentional acts. Accordingly,
Appellees’ allegations do not concern the remedial efforts the City took in 2002 and 2004, or the
sufficiency of those efforts.
The evidence the City relies on to argue that it negated the existence of jurisdictional
facts showed that in 2002 and 2004, the City took various remediation efforts in response to
investigations conducted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) as a
result of having received complaints about flooding at the Clint Landfill.2 However, as already
noted, Appellees’ allegations relate to the City’s continued operation and maintenance of the
landfill which included the landfill’s acts of continuing to dump waste and other material on the
2
The City’s evidence showed that some of the remedial efforts at the landfill included the excavation and dredging
of the retention ponds, the construction of a perimeter berm, the construction of a new temporary containment pond,
and the incorporation of temporary design features to mitigate flooding. To prevent erosion the City also improved
the maintenance road, used asphalt millings, sprayed magnesium chloride and installed a drainage pipe to prevent
erosion. Old tires were also installed as velocity inhibitors to address the 2004 violation.
21
landfill such that the character of the floodwater was transformed into leachate rather than
rainwater, and that the inevitable flooding and resulting damages to Appellees’ properties would
not have occurred but for the City’s continued operation and maintenance of the landfill. Thus,
the evidence of the City’s efforts does not challenge the allegations asserted by Appellees, but
instead challenges any purported negligence of the City which is not an allegation made by
Appellees in this case.
In support of its argument that the City’s evidence does not negate the existence of
jurisdictional facts, Appellees assert the evidence does not show that the remedial steps were
undertaken to prevent future damage to Appellees’ properties, that they were sufficient to do so,
or that the City ever believed them sufficient to do so. The only evidence concerning the
sufficiency of the repairs is contained in the deposition testimony of TCEQ investigator, Karl
Rimkus. Rimkus testified that after his investigation in 2002, the concerns he had about the
landfill that led to the overtopping of the retention pond was sufficiently remediated. Similarly,
Rimkus agreed the City sufficiently remediated the problems at the landfill in 2004. We agree
with Appellees that the critical issue is whether the City’s continued operation and maintenance
of the landfill was substantially certain to damage Appellees’ properties. However, the
testimony of Rimkus presents a fact issue as to whether the City knew that its construction,
operation, and maintenance of the Clint Landfill was substantially certain to damage the Plaintiffs’
properties by continuing to flood them during heavy rain events. Because a fact issue exists, we
conclude the trial court did not err when it denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 227-28 (if the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial
court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction). Issue Two is overruled.
22
Having overruled the City’s first two issues, we need not address its third issue. See
TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1. (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as
practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice
March 14, 2014
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
23
the City of El Paso v. Guadalupe Ramirez, Norma Ramirez, Ramirez Pecan Farms, LLC, William H. Boutwell, Jackie Boutwell, Raul Zamorano, Jr., Amy K. Zamorano, George Wynn, Patricia Wynn, Larry R. Webb, Maria L. Webb, James R. Raley, Yariela G. Raley, Russell T. Sturgeon
Combined Opinion