COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00586-CR
CYNTHIA GAIL PRIDDY APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 52,948-B
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Cynthia Gail Priddy appeals the judgment revoking her
community supervision. We will affirm.
In April 2013, the trial court convicted Priddy of felony DWI and sentenced
her to five years’ confinement but suspended imposition of the sentence and
placed her on five years’ community supervision. Later that same year, in
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
October 2013, the State filed a motion to revoke Priddy’s community supervision,
alleging that she had violated several terms and conditions of her community
supervision. At a hearing on the State’s motion, Priddy pleaded true to three of
the State’s allegations, the State called Priddy’s community supervision officer to
testify, Priddy called her boyfriend to testify, and both sides had an opportunity to
give closing argument. The trial court found true the same three allegations that
Priddy had pleaded were true, revoked Priddy’s community supervision, and
sentenced her to two years’ confinement—three years less than the original
sentence that was imposed.
Priddy asserts the following single issue on appeal:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion through its
cursory and perfunctory treatment of Appellant’s case at a motion to
revoke hearing during which the trial court consistently misapplied
the rules of evidence such that the court’s conduct rose to the level
of deprivation of due process requiring remand.
In thoroughly criticizing both the State’s and the trial court’s conduct at the
revocation hearing, Priddy contends that the “trial court’s cumulative rulings on
motions and admissibility of testimonial evidence combined with a pattern of
flouting the rules of evidence and procedure by the prosecutor deprived
Appellant of Due Process at the revocation hearing.” We construe Priddy’s issue
to complain that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors committed by the trial
court during the revocation hearing denied her due process as guaranteed by the
federal constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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The doctrine of cumulative error provides that the cumulative effect of
several errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible error, even though no
single instance of error would. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000). However, for the doctrine
to apply, the alleged errors complained of must actually constitute error.
Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reasoning that
although it is possible for a number of errors to cumulatively rise to the point that
they become harmful, non-errors may not, in their cumulative effect, cause error);
see also United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470‒71 (10th Cir. 1990)
(addressing same).
In subpart B of her issue, Priddy argues that the trial court improperly
allowed the State to introduce her prior testimony, which was hearsay. In
portions of subpart C of her issue, Priddy complains of instances in which the trial
court permitted the State to give “de facto testimony.” In subpart D of her issue,
Priddy argues that the trial court erred by sustaining a State’s objection on the
ground that “because there were other violations before it, how it ruled on a
specific objection . . . was not important.” In part of subpart A of her issue, Priddy
complains about the trial court permitting the State to question her boyfriend
about an alleged assault committed by her against him. Priddy does not cite a
single authority in support of any of these arguments. Consequently, they are
inadequately briefed and cannot be considered for purposes of a cumulative
error analysis. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585.
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In the remaining portion of subpart C of her issue, Priddy argues that the
trial court improperly allowed the State to ask a hypothetical question, but she
objected that the question called for speculation. Because Priddy’s argument
does not comport with the objection that she raised at the revocation hearing, no
error is shown and the trial court’s ruling cannot be considered for purposes of a
cumulative error analysis. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 171 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (requiring argument on appeal to comport with the objection at
trial to preserve error); see also Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585.
In subpart A of her issue, Priddy argues that the trial court improperly
introduced evidence of extraneous offenses by referencing her previous
misdemeanor community supervision for DWI. The State asked about Priddy’s
prior probation on several other occasions throughout the hearing, but Priddy did
not assert any objection thereto. Because Priddy did not object each time the
alleged inadmissible evidence was offered or obtain a running objection, no error
is shown, and the trial court’s rulings cannot be considered for purposes of a
cumulative error analysis. See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509–10 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003); see also Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585.
In subpart E of her issue, Priddy argues that the trial court improperly
frustrated her attempt to show that the State was at fault for her failure to check
in for weekend jail time. Priddy asked the probation officer, “Would you agree
with me that most probationees are generally behind a little money or a little
community service?” The State objected to relevance, and the trial court
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sustained the objection. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining
the objection because whether other probationers had failed to comply with their
terms and conditions had no bearing on Priddy’s failure to comply with her terms
and conditions. See Tex. R. Evid. 401; Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review to ruling
admitting evidence). Thus, this argument cannot be considered for purposes of a
cumulative error analysis. See Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585.
Because non-errors may not, in their cumulative effect, cause error, and
because Priddy’s arguments complaining of alleged error either were not
preserved for appellate review or are without merit, there is no error of which to
cumulate. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Priddy’s community supervision. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard). We overrule
Priddy’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 16, 2014
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