IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00129-CR
STEPHEN LEE COTTON,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 52nd District Court
Coryell County, Texas
Trial Court No. FAM 08-19219
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this case, appellant, Stephen Lee Cotton, was charged by indictment with one
count of injury to a child, a third-degree felony, involving an offense that occurred on
December 11, 2007. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3), (f) (West Supp. 2012).
Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, appellant pleaded guilty to the charged
offense. The trial court deferred a finding of guilt, placed appellant on deferred
adjudication community supervision for a period of seven years, ordered that appellant
serve 180 days in the county jail as a condition of his community supervision with
credit for time served, and assessed a $750 fine.
On February 13, 2012, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community
supervision, alleging three violations of the terms of his community supervision.
Specifically, the State alleged that appellant failed to: (1) report in person to his
probation officer in October, November, and December 2011; (2) make payments for his
supervision fees for numerous months in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012; and (3) notify
Coryell County of his whereabouts by sending in his monthly mail-in report for
numerous months in 2010, 2011, and 2012.
At the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, appellant pleaded “true” to all of
the allegations made by the State. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
adjudicated appellant guilty of the underlying offense—injury to a child—and
sentenced him to three years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant appeals, and we affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d
493 (1967), appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds of
error upon which an appeal can be predicated.1 Counsel’s brief meets the requirements
1 Initially, appellant was represented by Scott Stevens on appeal. On December 31, 2012, Stevens
filed an Anders brief in this matter. However, accompanying Stevens’s Anders brief was a notification that
he could no longer represent Cotton because he had accepted a position with the Coryell County District
Attorney’s Office. In light of this notification, we sent the trial court a letter requesting the removal of
Stevens as counsel and the appointment of new counsel. Nikki Mundkowsky has appeared on
Cotton v. State Page 2
of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance
‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to
the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins
v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v.
State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling
authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has
informed this Court that she has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable
grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to
withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and
to file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813
S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate
period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. See In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.
appellant’s behalf and, on February 20, 2013, filed a motion to adopt Stevens’s previously-filed Anders
brief and a motion to withdraw. We grant counsel’s motion to adopt.
2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “‘the pro se response need not comply with
the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether
the case presents any meritorious issues.’” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
Cotton v. State Page 3
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988). We have reviewed the entire
record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the
nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised
in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of
appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813
S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for
permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at
1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776,
779-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous,
he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation,
the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing
the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion,
counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant
Cotton v. State Page 4
and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP.
P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670,
673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 11, 2013
Do not publish
[CR25]
3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this
case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
discretionary review or must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary
review must be filed within thirty days from the date of this opinion or the last timely motion for
rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P.
68.2. Any petition and all copies of the petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of
the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. at R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply
with the requirements of rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 68.4; see also In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.
Cotton v. State Page 5
Stephen Lee Cotton v. State
Combined Opinion