COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00453-CV
JERRY LOFTIN APPELLANT
V.
DAVID HARVEY, JANET HARVEY, APPELLEES
KENNETH HARVEY, JANICE
SCHATTMAN, AND LYNNE
MILLFORD
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FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 231-336866-02
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Jerry Loftin attempts to appeal from the visiting trial judge’s
judgment denying his requests advanced in his seventh amended petition for
intervention in a family law case (1) that Appellees Janet Harvey, Kenneth
Harvey (the Harveys), and David Harvey (David) pay his attorney’s fees and (2)
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
that they and their counsel or former counsel, Appellees Janice Schattman and
Lynne Millford, pay sanctions. The Harveys and Schattman filed a joint motion to
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, and David filed a similar motion to
dismiss. Both motions contend that the judgment is not final because it does not
dispose of all issues. Specifically, the supplemental petition to terminate David’s
parental relationship with the child at the center of the litigation, filed before the
judgment was signed, remains pending. Neither Loftin nor Millford has filed a
response to the motions to dismiss the appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction of appeals from final judgments and from
interlocutory orders that the legislature has specified are appealable. 2 To be final
and appealable, a judgment must dispose of all parties and all issues. 3 The
judgment here disposed of Loftin’s seventh amended petition in intervention, and
other matters had been resolved earlier in the suit. But the appellate record
reflects that the supplemental petition to terminate David’s parental rights
remains pending in the trial court, and no party or intervenor filed a motion to
sever. 4 Accordingly, the judgment Loftin attempts to appeal is not a final
2
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see, e.g.,
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2014); see also Tex. R.
Civ. P. 301 (“Only one final judgment shall be rendered in any cause except
where it is otherwise specially provided by law.”).
3
Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195.
4
See In re C.H., No. 02-09-00060-CV, 2009 WL 1564936, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 4, 2009, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (holding judgment not final
when issue of termination of father’s parental rights remained pending and
2
judgment. Additionally, orders denying attorney’s fees or sanctions are not
appealable interlocutory orders. 5
Because the judgment on Loftin’s seventh amended petition in intervention
is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we grant the
motions to dismiss, and we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 6
PER CURIAM
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
DELIVERED: August 28, 2014
mother had not sought severance); Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (stating general rule that severance of an
interlocutory judgment into a severed action makes it final if all claims in the
severed action have been resolved).
5
See Allmond v. Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs & Windsor, P.C.,
No. 02-07-00282-CV, 2008 WL 4601910, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 16,
2008, no. pet.) (mem. op.); Byrd v. Byrd, No. 02-07-00404-CV, 2008 WL 204511,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
6
See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
3