Opinion issued April 30, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00606-CR
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WILLIAM DELACRUZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 179th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1370103
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, William Delacruz, was charged by indictment with aggravated
assault.1 Appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty, and assessed
punishment at four years’ confinement. In two issues, Appellant argues the trial
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2014), § 22.02(a)(1)
(Vernon 2011).
court abused its discretion by (1) excluding evidence of prior charges brought
against the complainant and (2) denying his motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
We affirm.
Background
Appellant, R. Tollette, and A. Ortiz were in Appellant’s car on November
25, 2012. Ortiz was in the back seat along with Appellant’s uniform and firearm
for Appellant’s job as a security officer. Ortiz has a mental disability and had
never been exposed to guns before that time. He picked up the gun, removed it
from its holster, and accidentally fired the gun. The bullet went through the front
passenger seat and hit Appellant. Ortiz dropped the weapon and said he was sorry.
Appellant turned around, grabbed the gun, and shot Ortiz. The bullet hitting Ortiz
shattered his vertebrae, permanently paralyzing his legs.
During the trial, Tollette described Ortiz as someone who would never
intentionally harm anyone. During Appellant’s cross-examination of Ortiz’s
mother, Appellant attempted to introduce evidence showing that Ortiz had
previously been charged with various offenses, all but one of which had been
dismissed. The trial court excluded the evidence.
After the trial, Appellant filed a motion for new trial. In it, Appellant’s
counsel alleged that, after trial, he learned for the first time that Appellant had
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psychiatric problems for which Appellant had been hospitalized in 2011. Based on
this and some outbursts by Appellant during the trial, Appellant’s counsel
suggested that Appellant may not have been competent to stand trial. The trial
court denied the motion.
Excluded Evidence
In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of prior charges brought against the complainant.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the
court acted without reference to guiding rules and principles—that is, whether the
court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We must uphold the trial court’s ruling so long as it is
“within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879,
888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Analysis
During his cross-examination of Ortiz’s mother, Appellant sought to
introduce evidence showing that Ortiz had previously been charged with various
offenses. The State objected. Appellant argued that, while the evidence may be
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generally inadmissible, the State opened the door about Ortiz’s character with
Tollette’s testimony describing Ortiz as someone who would never intentionally
harm anyone. The trial court excluded Appellant’s proffered evidence. Appellant
later made an offer of proof of the charges brought against Ortiz.
“Evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may become admissible when a
party opens the door to such evidence.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “A party opens the door by leaving a false impression
with the jury that invites the other side to respond.” Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d
549, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Proof that the opposing party “opened the door”
to such evidence, however, does not establish an absolute right to introduce
contrary evidence. See id. Instead, the trial court “still has the discretion to
exclude the evidence under Rule 403.” Id. Rule 403 provides, “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
TEX. R. EVID. 403.
Even assuming Tollette opened the door to rebuttal evidence by describing
Ortiz as someone who would never intentionally hurt another person, we hold the
trial court still had the discretion to exclude the proffered evidence under Rule 403.
Appellant’s bill of review is a sheet identifying fourteen charges brought against
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Ortiz from 2002 to 2013. All but one of the charges were dismissed. The one
charge that had not been dismissed was for criminal trespass. Of the dismissed
charges, only one included proof of any aggression or violent acts: assault of a
family member, first offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)
(Vernon Supp. 2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (Vernon 2014).
The claim that Appellant was attempting to rebut was that Ortiz would never
intentionally harm someone. This necessarily limits the rebuttal evidence to proof
that Appellant has intentionally harmed or attempted to harm someone. See
Rowshan v. State, 445 S.W.3d 294, 299–300 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013, pet. ref’d) (“A defendant who ‘opens the door’ to otherwise inadmissible
evidence risks having that evidence admitted and used against him, provided the
party offering the evidence does not stray beyond the scope of the invitation.”
(Internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, only one of the charged offenses—the
offense of assault—is potentially relevant to the claim Appellant sought to rebut.
That offense was dismissed, however.
There is no indication in the record that Ortiz’s mother had any specific
knowledge of the events giving rise to Ortiz being charged with assault. We must
conclude, then, that Appellant was relying on the simple fact that Ortiz had been
charged with this offense to rebut Tollette’s testimony. Even assuming this has
some probative value, evidence of prior bad acts can also be prejudicial.
5
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 388–89. Appellant presents no argument for how the
trial court abused its discretion by determining that any probative value of the
dismissed offense was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and we have found
none.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Motion for New Trial
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
concerning his competence to stand trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and uphold the
ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. A trial court abuses
its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable view of
the record could support the trial court’s ruling. Id. We do not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court. Id.
B. Analysis
In a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant
must satisfy the following elements:
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(1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or
obtain the new evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due
diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely
cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new
evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different
result in a new trial.
Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1, 2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Appellant’s new-trial evidence consists of his claims that (1) he exhibited
outbursts at trial, (2) he had been hospitalized in 2011 for psychiatric problems,
and (3) his attorney was not aware of his psychiatric trouble and had no basis to
think his psychiatric history needed investigating. As he concedes, Appellant
worked as a security guard during the intervening years since his psychiatric
hospitalization. Appellant’s evidence, then, only offers some hypothetical link
between the few demonstrated outbursts he exhibited during trial and his prior
psychiatric problems. From this, Appellant asked the trial court to further surmise
that, not only did Appellant’s condition return at the time of trial, but it worsened
to such a degree as to render him incompetent to stand trial. Appellant sought this
ruling despite the fact that, at the time of trial, no one considered his behavior and
interactions with his attorney to indicate incompetence. We hold that this
conjecture is insufficient to establish that it is “probably true” that he was
incompetent to stand trial. See id.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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