COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00488-CR
RICHARD DANIEL GRANDBERRY APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 43RD DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR13-0014
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
Appellant Richard Daniel Grandberry, who pleaded guilty to attempted
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine, 1–4 grams) in
exchange for ten months’ confinement, appeals the denial of his motion to
suppress. We affirm.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Suppression
In two points, Grandberry argues that there was no reasonable suspicion
to stop his vehicle and that his continued detention escalated into an arrest.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on
questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor but reviewing de novo the trial court’s
rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of the witnesses. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State
v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court
makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings and
then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings
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that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly,
204 S.W.3d at 818–19.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
1. On April 29, 2011, a package was addressed to the 24-hour Pilot
Truck Stop at 1201 I-20 West with the name of the recipient being
the defendant, Richard Grandberry. This package was opened by a
representative of the Pilot. Inside the package was a substance
believed to be methamphetamine. This methamphetamine was
retrieved by Officer Johnson of the Weatherford Police Department
and eventually handed to Officer Bravo with the Weatherford/Parker
County Special Crimes Unit who tested the suspected
methamphetamine at the Sheriff’s Office where it was logged into
evidence.
....
3. Later that evening, Officer Bravo was contacted by dispatch and
informed that a representative from the Pilot had advised that a
subject was at the Pilot attempting to pick up the package containing
the methamphetamine. Officer Bravo and Cpl. Ramirez with the
Parker County Sheriff’s Department both traveled to the Pilot[2]
where they were advised by the Pilot manager that the truck
belonging to the person who attempted to pick up the package was
identified as having a brown cab with a white trailer and the numbers
5200 on the side with an Alabama license plate.
4. The description of the vehicle driven by the defendant was a
specific description.
5. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Cpl. Ramirez had
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop on the vehicle
2
Officer Bravo testified that he went to the truck stop and called for another
officer to meet him there because he was in an unmarked vehicle. Corporal
Rameriz responded to his call as the nearest deputy to the truck stop, and Officer
Bravo explained the situation to him, including that it involved a felony narcotics
offense and investigation.
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driven by the defendant and to temporarily detain the defendant
pending further investigation into the methamphetamine offense.
6. Cpl. Ramirez and Officer Bravo both went along Interstate 20
looking for this vehicle.
7. Cpl. Ramirez located the vehicle and after he verified the specific
identifiers of the vehicle (that the vehicle had an Alabama license
plate, was a brown cab and had the numbers 5200 on the side),
activated his emergency lights and initiated a stop on the vehicle.
8. Mr. Grandberry was the driver of the vehicle.
9. While waiting on Officer Bravo to arrive, Cpl. Ramirez advised the
defendant that he was being detained and that an officer was en
route to talk with him.
10. The defendant was not handcuffed and was standing on the
side of the interstate with Cpl. Ramirez and they engaged in chit chat
but did not discuss the reason for the detention.
11. Approximately 5 minutes later Officer Bravo arrived on scene
and told the defendant that he was being detained and that he
wanted to speak with the defendant.
12. The defendant did not indicate that he would not speak with Ofc.
Bravo.
13. Officer Bravo and the defendant got into Bravo’s vehicle there
on the side of the Interstate and they engaged in a recorded
conversation.
14. This non-custodial recorded conversation contained the Article
38.22 warnings. . . .
15. There was no search warrant for the vehicle driven by the
defendant.
16. There was no arrest warrant for the defendant.
17. Ultimately, the defendant admitted that he had a friend in
California mail “a teen” of methamphetamine to the Pilot in
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Weatherford and that he was attempting to pick up the package
containing the methamphetamine.[3]
18. The length of the detention of the defendant was not longer than
was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
19. The defendant was not arrested on April 29th.
20. Cpl. Ramirez is a 21 year law enforcement officer with 10–11
years of narcotics experience at the state, local, and federal level.
21. Officer Bravo is a 7 year law enforcement officer with
approximately 4 years[’] experience with the Special Crimes Unit
which is a mainly narcotics-related unit.
The trial court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, the
officers lawfully stopped Grandberry and properly detained him for further
investigation of a felony narcotics offense and that any statements that
Grandberry made were freely and voluntarily given.
We have reviewed the record, and it supports the trial court’s findings of
fact, which in turn are dispositive of the trial court’s legal ruling. See Kelly, 204
S.W.3d at 818–19.
3
Their recorded conversation lasted around three minutes and 50 seconds.
In the recording, Officer Bravo told Grandberry that he had been stopped
because of the package of methamphetamine that was mailed to Grandberry at
the truck stop; he then gave Grandberry his Miranda warnings. After he gave
Grandberry his Miranda warnings, Officer Bravo told Grandberry that he did not
have to talk to him. Grandberry asked him about going west, and Officer Bravo
told him that that was a likely possibility. Grandberry said that he did not know
how much methamphetamine was in the envelope but that it had been sent to
him because he had asked for it to be sent to him.
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C. Analysis
In his first point, Grandberry argues that Corporal Ramirez lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because at the time his vehicle was
stopped, the truck stop’s manager had not provided a physical description of him
or identified him and had not informed the police that criminal activity had
occurred or was occurring. In his second point, Grandberry argues that once he
was stopped, he was effectively arrested. He also complains that Corporal
Ramirez did not conduct an investigation between the initial stop and Officer
Bravo’s arrival that would lead to probable cause to arrest or reasonable
suspicion for the continued detention.
1. Reasonable Suspicion
An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has
reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Crain v.
State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488,
492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that when
combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably
conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. This is an objective standard that
disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to
whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id.
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This case is similar to others we have addressed that involve vehicle
descriptions by third parties. See Turley v. State, 242 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 342 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). A person who is not connected with the police
or who is not a paid informant is considered inherently trustworthy when he
advises the police that he suspects criminal activity has occurred or is occurring;
when he provides self-identifying information that makes himself accountable for
the intervention, the degree of reliability significantly improves. Taflinger v. State,
414 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (op. on
reh’g). Under Texas law, there is an inverse relationship between an informant’s
reliability and the amount of corroboration needed to justify a stop. Id. at 886.
Corroboration means that the officer confirms enough facts to conclude
reasonably, in light of the circumstances, that the information provided is reliable
and a detention is justified. Turley, 242 S.W.3d at 181.
In Stolte, for example, an officer testified that his dispatcher told him that a
cell phone caller had reported a suspected DWI and had relayed that the suspect
was traveling westbound on Highway 183 and exiting at Bedford Road in a red
and tan Chevrolet pickup with license plate number BV4-358; the cell phone
caller followed the suspect. 991 S.W.2d at 339. When the officer saw the pickup
described by dispatch, he turned on his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren and
stopped the pickup. Id. at 339–40. We concluded that because the caller had
given the license plate number and a specific description of the vehicle and had
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continually updated the dispatcher on the location of the suspect’s vehicle, the
officer had every reason to believe that he was detaining the right person. Id. at
342. Compare Turley, 242 S.W.3d at 181–82 (holding there was reasonable
suspicion to stop appellant when officer knew gas station employee who called
from work to report drunk driver, continued to observe appellant’s vehicle in the
parking lot, and gave the officer the vehicle’s make, model, color, and license
plate number), with Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop appellant
when the police only knew at the time of the stop that an unknown man in a
described vehicle was taking photographs at a public pool, which was not an
unusual, suspicious, or criminal activity), and State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700,
705 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (stating that citizen-informant did not
witness a crime because his information did not allege any criminal activity).
Although Grandberry complains that the truck stop’s manager did not
provide any physical description of him, the manager provided a description of
the vehicle driven by the person who had attempted to pick up the envelope, and
this description was sufficiently specific to identify the vehicle on the interstate at
night. Further, Officer Bravo and Corporal Ramirez were aware at the time of the
stop that a felony—attempted possession of methamphetamine—had already
been committed by the driver of the described vehicle based on previous testing
of the envelope’s contents and the truck stop manager’s having informed them
that the driver of the described vehicle had tried to claim the envelope.
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Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that the initial stop was lawful,
and we overrule Grandberry’s first point.
2. Arrest
We consider the following factors when determining whether a seizure is
an arrest or a detention: the amount of force displayed; the duration of the
detention; the efficiency of the investigative process and whether it is conducted
at the original location or the person is transported elsewhere; the officer’s
expressed intent, i.e., whether he told the detained person that he was under
arrest or was being detained only for a temporary investigation; the nature of the
crime under investigation; the degree of suspicion; the location of the stop; the
time of day; the number of suspects present; the reaction of each suspect; and
whether the officer actually conducts an investigation. State v. Whittington, 401
S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing State v.
Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Grandberry focuses
on the duration of the detention and the efficiency of the investigative process. 4
The reasonableness of the duration of a detention depends on whether the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel any suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
4
There is no indication in the record that any amount of force was
displayed, and although Grandberry had a female passenger in the truck at the
time of the stop, there is no indication that she was considered a suspect or was
otherwise involved. Grandberry was not transported elsewhere, and he was
allowed to depart at the conclusion of his interview with Officer Bravo. The stop
occurred on the side of the interstate around midnight.
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defendant. Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007,
no pet.). A delay in an officer’s required investigation to confirm or dispel his or
her suspicions and a resultant prolonged detention is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the delay furthers legitimate law enforcement
purposes, which may include securing the scene, complying with department
procedure, ensuring officer safety, and bringing in officers with greater expertise
who can complete an investigation more rapidly. Id. at 539–40; see also Bullock
v. State, 426 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)
(stating that ensuring that an adequate number of patrol cars are available to
respond to emergency calls and using a DWI unit that has greater experience in
investigating DWIs and can perform such investigations with greater expediency
is a legitimate law enforcement purpose). Delays of twenty-six minutes or longer
have been found reasonable, depending on the balancing of the public interest
served by the delay against the appellant’s right to be free from arbitrary
detentions and intrusions. Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 542. When assessing
whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop,
if police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, the court should not indulge in
unrealistic second-guessing. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.
Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).
Officer Bravo testified that he had called for another officer to join him at
the truck stop that evening because he was in an unmarked vehicle, and he was
not in a typical police officer’s uniform because of the nature of his work in the
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Special Crimes Unit, which investigates narcotics-related offenses. Corporal
Ramirez, a patrol sergeant whose main responsibility at the time of the stop was
to supervise deputies and respond to “typical law enforcement” calls such as
“domestics, accidents,” and 911 calls,5 was the nearest officer available to
respond. He stopped the truck at Officer Bravo’s direction, and he said that his
responsibility that night at the stop was to back up Officer Bravo. When Corporal
Ramirez stopped Grandberry, he told him that he was being detained and that an
investigator, i.e., Officer Bravo, was en route to talk to him. It took around five
minutes for Officer Bravo to reach them, and Corporal Ramirez stated that when
Officer Bravo arrived, he “basically just ran the show from that point on.”
Grandberry relies on Wolf v. State, which generally stands for the
proposition that unparticularized hunches are insufficient to constitute the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify prolonging a detention. See 137
S.W.3d 797, 800–01, 804–05 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see also
Simpson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
pet. ref’d). But unlike the situation before us, Wolf involved a state trooper who
stopped the appellant and his companion for a defective “tag lamp” and then
5
Corporal Rameriz also had significant past experience in drug
enforcement work. During his twenty-one years of law enforcement work (twenty
of which had been with the Parker County Sheriff’s office), he had spent ten or
eleven years working in narcotics in a state or local capacity and four years with
the Drug Enforcement Task Force in Fort Worth; he was with the Cross Timbers
Narcotics Task Force Unit in the 1990s and with the DEA in the early 2000s.
However, there was no testimony about his recent experience in drug
investigations.
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prolonged the detention for a K-9 unit to arrive—after receiving a clear warrant
report—based merely on the appellant having been overly cooperative and his
companion appearing nervous. 137 S.W.3d at 800–02, 804–05.
In contrast, here, the officers had more than an unparticularized hunch
when they pursued Grandberry’s truck with regard to the driver’s commission of a
drug-related felony, and the brief delay in the investigation occurred because
Corporal Ramirez was waiting for the lead investigator to arrive to conduct the
investigation, a legitimate law enforcement purpose. We cannot conclude, given
the totality of the circumstances, that Grandberry’s brief detention while awaiting
Officer Bravo’s arrival was unreasonable or that it became an arrest at any point:
when Officer Bravo arrived, he conducted a very brief investigation in his vehicle
because of the noise from the interstate, and then he allowed Grandberry to
depart.6 See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 542; cf. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407,
412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that there was no investigative detention
when no one asked any questions prior to or during the search and seizure of
appellant’s person and vehicles); Akins v. State, 202 S.W.3d 879, 886–88 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (reviewing cases in which detention was
unreasonable when no investigation was undertaken). We overrule Grandberry’s
second point.
6
Although Grandberry argues that Officer Bravo told him that he was not
free to leave until the investigation was complete, that is essentially a per se
definition of a temporary detention. See Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 193
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
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III. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Grandberry’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 3, 2014
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