Opinion issued March 3, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00143-CV
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FELICIA NICOLE JONES, Appellant
V.
MACY’S, ERIC LIMBOCKER, CITIBANK, AND HOUSTON FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION, Appellees
On Appeal from the 239th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 74030
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant Felicia Nicole Jones sued Macy’s and a local store
manager, Eric Limbocker, alleging that she was injured during her visit to a
Macy’s shoe department when Limbocker dropped metal shoe racks on the floor. 1
Although not expressly identified as defendants in her petition or in the style of the
case, Jones referenced Citibank, Houston Federal Credit Union (“HFCU”), and
AJF Systems, Inc. in her petition and sent these parties copies of her petition. The
trial court granted HFCU’s special exceptions, HFCU moved to dismiss after Jones
failed to properly amend her pleadings, and the trial court granted the motion. The
remaining parties moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13
because Jones’s claims were groundless and lacked a basis in law and fact, and the
trial court granted the motions. Jones appealed the final judgment. We affirm.
Background
Jones first filed her suit in justice court, alleging that she suffered ankle and
back injuries and requesting “unlimited access to an authorized ID for future
purchases” and $10,000 in damages. The justice court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction because Jones’s request for $10,000 exceeded the justice court’s
jurisdiction.
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Jones filed this lawsuit on September 5, 2013. On May 19, 2014, Jones was
declared a vexatious litigant. See http://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious-
litigants.aspx (listing vexatious litigants subject to pre-filing orders); Douglas v.
Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 878 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.) (taking judicial notice of records of vexatious litigants). As a result, Jones is
prohibited from filing any pro se lawsuit in the State of Texas without permission
of the local administrative judge in the district in which she seeks to file suit. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.102 (West Supp. 2014).
2
Jones then sued Macy’s and Limbocker in district court. She alleged that
while she was in the Macy’s shoe department, Limbocker dropped several metal
shoe racks on the floor, which caused injuries to her heel and back. She sought
$30 million in damages. Jones’s petition failed to expressly state a cause of action,
but a liberal construction of her petition suggests that she attempted to assert
premises liability claims. Regarding Citibank, HFCU, and AJF Systems, Inc.,
Jones alleged the following:
The amount of money from the Citibank in New York owes me $1.3
million dollars that is stated on a legitimate documentation. Because
of the incident in MACY’S I am out of a job with AJF SYSTEM INC.
due to the HFCU taking my check and then charging me for a
legitimate check deposited into my bank. The filing a claim of
exemption of my written bank account was exempt due to me
receiving (SSD), and the bank was supposed to deliver the copy of the
bank statement as well as a copy of the check that was deposited.
HFCU filed an answer and special exceptions, arguing that Jones’s petition
failed to provide HFCU with “fair notice” regarding the causes of action filed
against it. Macy’s and Limbocker also filed an answer in response to Jones’s
petition, as well as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
13 (“Rule 13 motion”). In their Rule 13 motion, Macy’s and Limbocker argued
that Jones failed to allege viable causes of action and sought an “absurd escalation
of damages.” They requested that the trial court dismiss the suit because Jones’s
claims were “groundless and brought in bad faith.”
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The trial court held a hearing on Macy’s and Limbocker’s Rule 13 motion
and HFCU’s special exceptions on October 29, 2013. That same day, the trial
court entered an order stating that Macy’s and Limbocker’s Rule 13 motion
“should in all things be granted.” It ordered that Jones “take nothing in connection
with her lawsuit against Defendants Macy’s and Eric Limbocker and her claims
and causes of action be dismissed with prejudice.”
On the same day, the trial court granted HFCU’s special exceptions and
directed Jones to replead recognized causes of actions against HFCU within 10
days. Jones timely filed additional documents, but HFCU filed a motion to dismiss
because she failed to provide a statement of her claims and the factual basis for
them.
Additionally, Citibank filed a “Motion to Dismiss all Parties (Named or Not
Named) with Prejudice” (“Dismissal Motion”), which incorporated Macy’s and
Limbocker’s Rule 13 motion and moved to dismiss “it and all other defendants
either clearly named or not clearly named.”
The trial court held a hearing on the Dismissal Motion and HFCU’s motion
to dismiss on January 28, 2014. On the same day, the trial court granted HFCU’s
motion to dismiss and entered a “Final Judgment” dismissing Jones’s claims
against all remaining parties.
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Discussion
Litigants appearing on their own behalf must comply with all applicable
laws and rules of procedure, and they are held to the same standards as licensed
attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.
1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1985, no writ). A pro se litigant must properly present her case on appeal,
and we may not make allowances or apply different standards for litigants
appearing without the advice of counsel. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg.
Servicing, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellate briefs to contain clear and
concise arguments with appropriate citations to the record and supporting
authorities. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). As always, however, we construe briefs
liberally; substantial compliance with the rules is sufficient. See TEX. R. APP. P.
38.9.
In Jones’s appellate brief, she reiterates some of the factual allegations
contained in her trial court filings and makes new allegations regarding an alleged
default judgment and settlement offer from Citibank. She does not present any
argument that the case should not have been dismissed or that the special
exceptions should not have been granted. Nor does her brief comport with the
requirements of Rule 38.1, which requires an appellant to state the issues presented
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and make a clear and concise argument for her contentions with appropriate
citations to legal authorities and the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) & (i). The
brief contains no citations to the record or to cases.
With respect to Macy’s, Limbocker, Citibank, and AJF Systems, Jones does
not present any argument that the trial court erred by granting their Rule 13
motions. By failing to raise any issue related to the dismissal of the case against
Macy’s, Limbocker, Citibank, and AJF Systems, Jones has waived any argument
pertaining to this potential issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
With respect to HFCU, Jones does not present any argument challenging the
special exceptions or the trial court’s granting of HFCU’s motion to dismiss
following Jones’s failure to amend her petition to comply with the trial court’s
order granting the special exceptions. A party appealing a dismissal after special
exceptions must challenge the trial court’s ruling sustaining the special exceptions.
See Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied)
(controlling issue in case in which trial court sustains special exceptions and
dismisses cause of action following plaintiff’s failure to amend properly is
propriety of trial court’s ruling sustaining special exceptions). Because Jones did
not challenge the special expectations ruling, we must affirm the trial court’s
judgment in favor of HFCU. See id.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We dismiss all pending motions
as moot.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
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