Opinion issued February 10, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00625-CV
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STEVEN MOODY, Appellant
V.
SPRING CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM DEALERSHIP CO.
AND AUTO NATION CORPORATION, Appellees
On Appeal from the 133rd Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2014-26991
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Steven Moody, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at the time of
filing his notice of appeal from the interlocutory orders granting the appellees’
motions for summary judgment, has neither paid the required filing fee nor
established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 20.1;
see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.208, 51.941(a), 101.041(1) (West
2013), § 101.0411 (West Supp. 2014); Order Regarding Fees Charged in the
Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and Before the Judicial
Panel on Multi-District Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 13-9127 (Tex. Aug. 16,
2013). After being notified by the Clerk of this Court on August 14, 2014, that his
appeal was subject to dismissal for failure to pay the fee, appellant filed a motion
for an extension of time to pay the fee on August 28, 2014, claiming that he had
filed an affidavit of indigence in the trial court on July 24, 2014. Although
appellant claimed that he had established his indigence and the trial clerk’s website
indicated that the trial clerk had filed a contest to the affidavit, no order regarding
the contest had been included in the record.
Furthermore, on September 25, 2014, appellees notified the Clerk of this
Court that the trial court had recently signed an order severing the John Doe
defendants that appellant had sued. On October 30, 2014, this Court ordered the
trial clerk to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the orders regarding the
severance motions and the contest to appellant’s affidavit of indigence. On
January 5, 2015, the trial clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record containing the
trial clerk’s contest to the appellant’s affidavit and motion for extension of time for
a hearing on the contest, but no order regarding the contest or motion. The trial
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clerk also filed the trial court’s September 23, 2014 order granting the appellees’
motions for severance, making the interlocutory orders now final and appealable.
However, the Court’s October 30, 2014 Order was returned on November
17, 2014, with the following typed notations, “RETURN TO SENDER,
ATTEMPTED — NOT KNOWN, UNABLE TO FORWARD,” and the following
handwritten notation, “RTS RLSD,” indicating that it was returned to sender
because appellant had been released from prison. On December 30, 2014, the
Clerk of this Court notified appellant, at his last known prison address provided by
him, that this appeal was subject for dismissal for want of prosecution unless he
provided the Clerk his current address within 15 days of the date of that notice. On
January 9, 2015, the Clerk’s notice was returned with the same “RTS RLSD”
notations listed above. Appellant has neither paid the filing fee nor responded to
the Court’s notices with any other address. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5; 42.3(c).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 5, 42.3(b), (c). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.
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