NUMBER 13-13-00432-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
LOUIS ROGERS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court
of Calhoun County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
By one issue, appellant Louis Rogers appeals a judgment revoking his probation
and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment for delivery of a controlled substance,
a third-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112, 481.134 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Appellant argues the trial court’s decision to revoke his
probation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because his probation officer had no
training in mental health issues or disabilities. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant initially pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance in 2003. See
id. The trial court assessed punishment at seven years in prison, suspended the
sentence, and placed appellant on probation for seven years. Appellant’s probation
would have ended on January 30, 2010, but the court extended the probation three years
after appellant violated the terms of his probation. On January 29, 2013, one day before
the scheduled termination date of appellant’s probation, the State filed a timely motion to
revoke, alleging that appellant again violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
The State alleged that appellant stalked a woman he formerly had a relationship with by
constantly texting and calling her, leading her to believe appellant placed her in danger. 1
At the hearing, appellant pleaded true to every allegation in the State’s motion to revoke
probation.2 The trial court revoked appellant’s probation and sentenced him to six years’
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division along
with court costs. Appellant did not make any objection or file any motion for new trial.
1 The woman appellant allegedly harassed testified, “[h]e would come on the street and stuff and
passby [sic] hollering out, you know, he would just holler out stuff I could kill you; I love you; call me if you
love me—different things like that.” The prosecutor described the situation in his closing statement, “[the
appellant] pled true [to allegations] and he’s not a lovesick teenager. He's 53 years old and I can see that
at his age and his conduct would have certainly been the type which would have threatened and alarmed
this woman and I can understand why she wanted these charges filed and pursued in this case and I'd ask
you to revoke his probation.”
2 The violation report stated that appellant: was arrested for public intoxication and for stalking;
failed to pay monthly probation fees; and failed to reimburse Calhoun County for court-appointed attorney’s
fees.
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II. DISCUSSION
By his one issue, appellant contends that the revocation of his probation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment because his probation officer had no training
in mental health issues or disabilities and therefore did not recognize the need to tell
appellant not to stalk a woman.
“It is axiomatic that errors that are asserted on the part of the trial court must
generally be brought to the trial court's attention.” Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1). Furthermore, in
order to preserve a complaint, the appellant must either make a timely and specific
objection during trial or post-trial motion. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 303–04 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2013, pet. ref’d); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2005, pet. ref’d). This Court has determined in the past that an appellant waives
most constitutional claims, even a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, by failing to
object to it at trial, sentencing, or in a post-trial motion. Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927 (citing
Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
Here, by failing to object to his sentence, we conclude that appellant has waived
this issue for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927; see also
Arevalo v. State, No. 13–13–00485–CR, 2014 WL 223230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Jan. 16, 2014, pet. dism'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex.
R. App. P. 33.1.) (A case involving a similar procedural posture where this Court held that
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appellant waived his claims by not objecting during trial or post-trial). We overrule
appellant’s sole issue.3
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
3rd day of July, 2014.
3 Even if appellant had preserved his objection, we note that he provides no case law specifically
applicable to the facts of this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
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